On February 12, 2024, the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination hosted a conversation on the feasibility, legality, and future of prosecuting war crimes in the Russo-Ukrainian War with legal experts from Europe and the United States. The panel, moderated by Director of the Princeton Program in Law and Public Policy Deborah Pearlstein, comprised Christian Wenaweser, Permanent Representative of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the UN; James Gow, Professor of International Peace and Security and Co-Director of the War Crimes Research Group, King’s College London; Olena Lennon, Adjunct Professor, National Security Department, Henry C. Lee College of Criminal Justice and Forensic Sciences, University of New Haven; and Iva Vukušić, Assistant Professor in International History at Utrecht University, Visiting Research Fellow at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London.

The panelists first established and defined key terms that are essential to understanding a discourse surrounding the prosecution of war crimes, including crimes against humanity, crimes of aggression, genocide, and war crimes. They also set out some of the different ways that prosecutions may be approached and the potential problems and possibilities. This clarification provided the audience with a conceptual framework for understanding the topic.

Dr. Lennon’s contextualization of the ongoing domestic efforts in Ukraine, particularly the work carried out by the office of the prosecutor general of Ukraine, shed light on the practical dimensions of prosecuting war crimes within the country. The panel further reflected on domestic criminal justice work, and emphasized the imperative of coordinated efforts among Ukrainian authorities, international and domestic NGOs, and other stakeholders to streamline investigative processes, prevent duplication of efforts, and minimize the potential retraumatization of survivors. Dr. Vukušić questioned what the reported figure of over 100,000 war crime cases identified in Ukraine actually meant, and suggested that the War Crimes Chamber in the Court of Bosnia and Hercegovina, where she had worked, had identified 10,000 cases, but that fewer than 500 had been investigated and come to court. She noted the importance of the hybrid nature of the court with significant international support, something that Kyiv would also desire, but that the experience of Bosnia and Hercegovina indicated that expectations would need to be moderate.

Throughout the discussion, the panelists underscored the intricate nature of pursuing justice for war crimes, emphasizing that the pursuit of justice cannot occur in isolation from political realities— recognizing the considerable influence of political dynamics on the prosecution process. Professor Gow set out how changing politics in Russia would be vital to any prospect of senior figures ever being prosecuted. He reported how most observers in other situations had said that leaders like Charles Taylor at the Sierra Leone Court or Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić, and Ratko Mladić,at the Yugoslavia Tribunal, would never appear in court. Yet once political change had occurred, each of those individuals and others was eventually put on trial. Gow argued that political change in Russia will come at some point and even if it is not radical and liberal democratic, those coming to power may find it useful to engage with war crimes prosecutions. Prosecution could occur—perhaps in Russia itself—where aggression is a crime in the criminal code. Or perhaps trials could happen at the International Criminal Court (ICC), following a UN Security Council referral with indictees, even including President Vladimir Putin, transferred to The Hague. The indictment of Putin and his Commissioner for Children’s Affairs, Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, for the forcible transfer of children from Ukraine was a vital step, making an immediate trial possible, should they come into custody. Although the chance of events leading to a prosecution was there, there was no chance that it would happen soon and clearly no certainty that it would happen at all.

Amb. Wenaweser, who had led the Liechtenstein process on defining the crime of aggression for the ICC statute (in cooperation with LISD), argued strongly that Putin’s aggression in Ukraine was such a brazen and complete flouting of a most basic rule of international law that an exceptional international response to tackle the crime was needed. He had supported the creation of a Special Tribunal for Aggression, but acknowledged that myriad political and legal complexities had reduced the prospects that such a body would emerge. He still judged it to be a vital step while the ICC had jurisdiction. Dr. Vukišić noted, from her perspective in The Hague, that the steam had gone out of this initiative, but that it remained on the agenda. Professor Gow suggested that a Special Tribunal would be problematic, especially if pushed by the EU and the US, appearing as a form of “victor’s justice” (albeit not by victors as such). This would complicate diplomacy with Russia. However, all agreed with Amb. Wenaweser that Moscow’s aggression was so egregious that extraordinary measures in criminal justice were needed.

In this respect, the panelists emphasized that whatever form and approach is taken to holding Russia accountable in international criminal law and whatever the problems associated with it, international unity will be indispensable. They highlighted the importance of collective action and solidarity among nations in confronting the challenges posed by war crimes, and of upholding the principles of accountability and justice on a global scale.

With contributions from International Policy Associates Luke Carroll '26 and Zhenia Khalabadzhakh '26.

Click here to watch the event recording (YouTube).