SIMULATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS VETO INITIATIVE: PROCESS, DOCUMENTS, AND PROSPECTS FOR REFORM

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Policy Paper
May 2024
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Policy Paper #5


Photos: Tori Repp/Fotobuddy, 2023/2024
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In April 2023, a year after its adoption, the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination (LISD) held the first-ever simulation of the United Nations (UN) veto initiative (UNGA RES/76/262). A subsequent simulation took place in March 2024. Passed amid criticism of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) inaction in response to the war in Ukraine, the veto initiative resolution aims to enhance the effectiveness, accountability, and transparency of the UN when it comes to matters of international peace and security. In the simulations, we tested scenarios for the implications of the veto initiative for the relationship between the UNSC and the UN General Assembly (UNGA), and for the legitimacy of the UN as a whole.

The veto initiative resolution requires that the President of the UNGA convene a formal UNGA meeting within 10 working days of a veto by a permanent member of the UNSC. At the UNGA meeting, the veto-wielding state is invited to explain its vote, and the broader UN membership debates the situation as to which the veto was cast. The resolution also invites the UNSC to submit a special report on the use of the veto ahead of the UNGA meeting. The UNGA is free to decide what action to take within its mandate: it could agree to pass a resolution on the issue or request that the UNSC (re-)consider the matter. The 12 veto initiative meetings since the adoption of UNGA Res. 76/262 have featured oral statements by the veto-wielding state(s) and a broad range of member states, but the meetings did not result in the discussion or adoption of a UNGA resolution.

The student-led simulations at LISD were designed to gauge the potential for reform inherent in the veto initiative. Princeton University students debated the security implications of the state of emergency in Myanmar and the impacts of climate change, respectively. The first simulation presumed a veto by China and the Russian Federation on a UNSC resolution pertaining to Myanmar, and the second focused on a climate security resolution that was vetoed by the Russian Federation, with China and India abstaining. During the UNGA debate on Myanmar, three resolutions were put forward, two of which passed. The UNGA debate on climate security saw three resolutions put forward, one of which garnered sufficient support.

The simulations yielded the following insights:

- The veto initiative enhances the representativeness of key processes at the UN. The 15-member UNSC has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, but the UNGA, which grants each UN member state one vote, is more representative of the international community. Prior to the adoption of the veto initiative resolution, a veto in the UNSC on a matter of international peace and security signified the end of the debate on the issue under consideration. As of April 2022, a veto instead results in the issue being brought to the attention of the broader UN membership, including states that are not members of the UNSC, and all states are invited to deliver statements on the issue.
as to which the veto was cast. In the simulations, as in the 12 veto initiative meetings thus far, a large and diverse number of states chose to make their positions on the issue known.

• The veto initiative provides an opportunity for **reason giving**. At the UNGA meeting, the permanent members that blocked passage of the UNSC resolution are given precedence on the list of speakers, and the veto initiative debate thus foregrounds their justification for the veto. Subsequent statements occur in the context of a decision and justification that are on the record, and member states can scrutinize their reasoning and reflect on arguments as well as offer new ones. However, the veto initiative also allows the UNGA to pass a resolution on the issue or to direct the UNSC to consider it anew. The UNGA has not yet done so. In the simulations, much of the debate focused on the texts of proposed UNGA resolutions, and this may have promoted the exchange of reasons about the intricacies of the topic at hand, since participants were motivated to persuade others to modify, reject, or vote for particular resolutions. In spite of the time limit, participants engaged in extensive and focused deliberations on areas of disagreement and compromise. Both simulations were characterized by nuanced arguments and substantive exchanges. It is not clear whether future veto initiative meetings will feature the discussion or adoption of a resolution and whether that process will further encourage reason giving in the UNGA.

• Last, the veto initiative has the potential to enhance the **accountability** of the UNSC to the UNGA. While the UN Charter confers upon the UNSC the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, it does so with the understanding that the UNSC agrees to carry out these duties on the UNGA’s behalf. The veto initiative allows states in the UNGA to register their discontent with the way the UNSC is discharging these duties. In the simulations, as in the UNGA veto initiative meetings, many states used their platform to object to the use of the veto and the way it blocked expedient action related to international peace and security. However, accountability refers not only to the right to judge whether responsibilities have been fulfilled but also to the right to impose sanctions if they have not. The simulations provided an opportunity to examine the reputational costs associated with veto actions, but the results were inconclusive. It is not yet clear whether the veto initiative meetings entail any reputational costs or other forms of sanctions for the veto wielder.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The organizers are grateful to the Permanent Mission of Liechtenstein to the United Nations, and in particular to Myriam Oehri, Deputy Permanent Representative, and Matt Edbrooke, Political Coordinator, who very generously shared their insights both before and during the simulations. They would also like to thank the faculty and experts in attendance: Sabrina Arias, Nadia Crisan, Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Egemen Kolemen, Minh-Thu Pham, Mayank Sarika, and Yelena Yermakova; our cosponsor, Princeton International Relations Council; and the students who participated in the simulations: Derin Arat, David Chau, Finn Doyle, Omar Elhaj, Noah Eshaghpour-Silberman, Lauren Fahlberg, Preston Ferraiuolo, Harrison Fintz, Francesca Formato, Kristy Gonzalez, Sejal Goud, Luis Guaman, Fatima Haider, Thomas Hobbs, Katya Hovnanian-Alexanian, Calvin Hunt, Andrei Iosifescu, Vincent Jiang, Afsana Khan, Natalia Lalin, Nong Li, Abby Lu, Allie Matthias, Nolan Musslewhite, Aybars Önder, Niccolo Platt, Humnah Poonawalla, Sophie Pye, Mia Sampson, Daniel Shaw, Tevin Singei, Ferenc Somogyi, Trew Strong, Leighton Symons, Joshua Wells, Alexandra Wong, Joyce Yang, Laura Zhang, and Grace Zhao.
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BACKGROUND ON THE UN VETO INITIATIVE

“The Council’s lack of unity on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and on Israel’s military operations in Gaza following the horrific terror attacks by Hamas on 7 October, has severely – perhaps fatally – undermined its authority. The Council needs serious reform to its composition and working methods.”
António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, remarks to the Human Rights Council, February 2024

“Liechtenstein was proud to lead the adoption of UN General Assembly resolution 76/262 creating the Veto Initiative, and we believe that it is a milestone not only for the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly in addressing issues of peace and security, but also for increased transparency, accountability, and effectiveness of the UN as a whole.”
Myriam Oehri, Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Liechtenstein to the United Nations, personal communication, May 2023

Within the UN system, the UNSC has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The UNSC is composed of five permanent members (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States) and 10 nonpermanent members. Nonpermanent members must compete for two-year terms. Some countries have been temporary members of the UNSC numerous times; 60 countries, from Afghanistan to Vanuatu, have never had a seat on the UNSC at all. The UN Charter provides for a veto power in Article 27(3), which states that all substantive decisions in the UNSC must be made with the “concurring votes of the permanent members.” Since 1946, 225 UNSC resolutions have been vetoed, with the Russian Federation/USSR and the United States using the veto most prolifically.

UNSC reform has long been the subject of debate among member states, and the veto has been a frequent target. The last major structural reform of the UNSC occurred in 1965, when four additional nonpermanent members were added. But the permanent membership has remained unchanged, as has their veto power. Proposals for structural reform include expanding the number of permanent members (with veto power) to include emerging powers, such as Brazil and India or the former Axis powers Germany and Japan, and adding

nonpermanent seats to ensure equitable regional representation. Furthermore, a new category has been proposed for medium-size states, which would be granted certain privileges, primarily extended time on the UNSC. However, it has proven difficult to achieve consensus on such changes due to conflicting interests among prominent power blocs and concerns over diluting the UNSC’s overall effectiveness.

Unlike structural reform, so-called working-methods reform focuses on improving the efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency of the UNSC through informal means. This can take the form of modifying procedural rules, enhancing the role of the UNGA, or streamlining the bureaucratic processes. Proposals have also addressed the use of the veto within the UNSC. The Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Code of Conduct calls on all members of the UNSC to not vote against any resolutions intended to prevent or halt mass atrocities. France, for its part, has advocated for voluntary restraint in exercising the veto in cases of mass atrocities. Both initiatives aim to prevent gridlock and to facilitate decisive action in humanitarian crises.

On April 26, 2022, the UNGA reformed the working methods of the UNSC by adopting a landmark resolution known as the veto initiative. UNGA resolution 76/262 created a standing mandate for a formal meeting of the General Assembly whenever a veto is cast within the UNSC by one or more of its five permanent members. The aim was to bring greater accountability to Security Council deliberations and promote the General Assembly’s role on peace and security issues.

Complementing the Uniting for Peace resolution, which affirmed that the UNGA may convene an emergency special session if the UNSC fails to exercise its responsibility to maintain international peace and security, the veto initiative resolution centers on the decision to automatically “convene a formal meeting of the General Assembly within 10 working days of the casting of a veto by one or more permanent members of the Security Council, to hold a debate on the situation as to which the veto was cast.” The relevant permanent members are invited to speak on the issue first and the UNSC is invited to provide a special report on the use of the veto at least three days before the UNGA meeting.


7 See footnote 5
The veto initiative resolution was adopted by consensus after 83 member states, including permanent members of the UNSC France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, agreed to cosponsor it. This working-methods reform garnered support in the context of the Russian Federation’s veto of draft resolution S/2022/155, which condemned the declaration of the Russian Federation’s “special military operation” in Ukraine.⁸ Work on the veto initiative resolution began more than two years earlier out of a concern that the frequent use of UNSC vetoes was making it difficult for the UNSC to carry out its work on behalf of the broader state membership.

When introducing the draft resolution, Ambassador Christian Wenaweser of the Permanent Mission of Liechtenstein to the UN noted that “there has never been a stronger need for innovation in order to secure the central role and voice of the United Nations in this respect.”⁹

Although resolution 76/262 was adopted by consensus (i.e., without a vote), it was not uniformly well received. The Philippines and Brazil, for instance, abstained. The automaticity of the veto initiative (and its referral process) was problematic for the former, and the latter charged that the veto initiative had not been properly thought through.¹⁰ India raised a number of concerns, including about the way the veto initiative might entail structural changes in the relationship between the UNGA and UNSC.¹¹ China expressed worries about “procedural confusion and inconsistency”¹² and the Russian Federation decried the veto initiative as an attempt to create an instrument that exerts pressure on the permanent members of the Security Council.”¹³ In contrast, Argentina argued that the UNSC ought to be “more democratic, transparent, efficient, representative and accountable vis-à-vis the international community,”¹⁴ and Ireland, one of the co-sponsors, related that with the veto initiative, “the General Assembly and the wider UN membership have been given a voice when the Security Council is silenced.”¹⁵

The veto initiative has several core aims. It is designed to increase the accountability of the UNSC and its permanent members to the UNGA, allowing for greater public scrutiny through a stronger institutional process. This scrutiny might make it more costly, in reputational and political terms, for a permanent member to cast a veto. The veto initiative is also intended to strengthen the UNGA’s own ability to respond to peace

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¹¹ Idem p.9

¹² Idem p.8

¹³ Idem p.15

¹⁴ Idem p.14

¹⁵ Idem p.29
and security issues. Although the UNGA is the primary deliberative, policymaking, and representative organ of the UN, it is unable to take up peace and security issues that are currently under consideration by the UNSC. The veto initiative provides a mechanism through which the UNGA can quickly take up such issues following the UNSC’s deliberations, provided that a veto was cast.

Thus far, the veto initiative has triggered UNGA meetings on North Korea and nonproliferation, sanctions against Mali, humanitarian aid for Syria, nonproliferation in space, the conflict in Israel/Gaza, and the membership of the observer state of Palestine. These meetings saw member states focus on the use of the veto and the responsibilities of the UNSC, with many calling for the veto-wielding permanent members to reconsider their votes. (The veto initiative would also have triggered UNGA meetings following Russian vetoes of UNSC resolutions on the war in Ukraine, but an emergency special session of the UNGA had already been called.) At the veto initiative meetings, the UNGA could have passed resolutions on the issues in question or directed the UNSC to address them. However, thus far, none of the 12 veto initiative meetings has resulted in the adoption of a resolution.
AIMS AND STRUCTURE OF THE SIMULATION

The simulations were held on April 28, 2023, and March 1, 2024. The aim was to explore the General Assembly’s capacity to respond to the veto and the key areas of tension and alignment among member states on how the UNSC and the UNGA interact. In these simulations, we tested scenarios for the application of the veto initiative and its implications for the possibility of action in the UNGA and the UNSC, as well as the relationship between the two bodies.

Regarding structure, the simulations were heavily inspired by Model UN Rules of Procedure. These provided a basic framework for debate, beginning with a speaker's list—every delegate spoke—followed by moderated caucuses aimed at discussing particular subtopics of the broader topic. Intermittently, the chair of the debate encouraged the participants to enter an unmoderated caucus, allowing them to speak to each other informally and in groups to work on paperwork.

Both in the interest of time and realism, the structure of the simulation was refined from conventional Model UN proceedings in a number of ways. First, rather than having the participants produce resolutions from scratch, each delegate was sent a simulated vetoed resolution to work with. This resolution was modeled closely after an actual vetoed UN resolution, with edits that we believed would be conducive to wider debate in the UNGA following the invocation of the veto initiative. Second, while one member of the organizing committee chaired the committee and steered debate, the other members were available to delegates to ask for stance clarifications intermittently. This allowed participants to focus on engaging with debate, not scramble to research their foreign policy during the session. Last, the debate flow was meant to be specific. Both sessions started with a speech from the permanent member(s) that cast the veto (as envisioned by the veto initiative resolution), and subsequent debate was focused on refining the resolution or potentially forming a new one on the floor, rather than rehashing historical foundations of the topic.

While both simulations followed the same central structure and had the same central aim, the second simulation differed from the first simulation in two distinct ways. First, the duration of the debate was extended from two hours to three and a half hours. The extended time period allowed for a more elaborate amendment period before voting on resolutions. Second, the topic of the first simulation was the Myanmar conflict while the topic for the second simulation was climate security. Whereas debate on armed conflict put some participants in fixed positions due to their state’s stance, the debate on a more emerging issue like climate security allowed for more nuance. It was also more accessible to participants who may not have expertise in foreign policy but had more detailed knowledge of environmental policy.
KEY INSIGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The simulations at LISD were designed to facilitate debate about one or more UNGA resolutions, proposed in response to the veto. In the absence of real-world examples, they provided “a laboratory to game out the possibilities for General Assembly action on live issues that may be subject to a veto in the future.”

The simulations yielded several insights into the potential for reform inherent in the veto initiative.

First, the veto initiative enhances the representativeness of key processes at the UN. Prior to the adoption of UNGA Resolution 76/262, a veto signified the end of debate on the issue under consideration. As of April 2022, a veto instead results in the issue being brought to the attention of the broader UN membership, including states that are not members of the UNSC, and all states are invited to deliver statements on the issue as to which the veto was cast. In the simulations, as in the 12 veto initiative meetings thus far, a large and diverse number of states chose to make their positions known. The simulation in 2023 also saw the adoption of a UNGA resolution that referenced “the importance of the General Assembly as the representative body of the full community of nations.”

Second, the veto initiative has the potential to enhance the accountability of the UNSC to the UNGA. Accountability “implies that some actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met.” The UN Charter confers upon the UNSC the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the UNSC agrees to carry out these duties on the UNGA’s behalf. The veto initiative allows states in the UNGA to register their discontent with (or judge) the way the UNSC is discharging these duties. In the simulations, as in the UNGA veto initiative meetings, many states used their platform to object to the use of the veto and the way it blocked expedient action related to peace and security.

Third, the veto initiative provides an opportunity for reason giving. At the UNGA meeting, the permanent member that blocked passage of the UNSC resolution is given precedence in the list of speakers, and the veto initiative debate thus foregrounds the

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17 See Appendix V
19 UN Charter, fn. 3
permanent member’s justification for the veto. Its reasoning is then subject to public scrutiny. Subsequent statements occur in the context of a decision and justification that are on the record and member states can reflect on arguments as well as offer new ones.

The simulations arguably allowed for a more robust exchange of reasons than the 12 UNGA meetings that have been held thus far. As explained in the previous section, the simulations, unlike the UNGA meetings, followed modified Model UN Rules of Procedure, which included structured moderated debates on subtopics. These moderated debates lent themselves particularly well to the exchange of reasons among the membership. The simulations included substantively rich debates about human rights, self-determination, and the impacts of colonialism.

In addition, participants in the simulations—unlike in the UNGA—were encouraged to propose resolutions and to work towards their adoption. Having access to detailed texts arguably promoted reason giving about the intricacies of the topic at hand, since participants were motivated to use their persuasive power to convince others to vote for their preferred resolution(s). In the simulation of 2024, the atoll nation of Tuvalu spoke with moral authority about its susceptibility to climate change impacts and was the target of attempts by all coalitions to support their draft resolutions. One of the resolutions that failed called for technology transfer and the creation of a reparations program to the benefit of countries like Tuvalu, among other measures, in recognition of “climate-related security risks.”

A resolution in 2023 also gestured towards the reason-giving potential of the debate by recognizing it as a “democratic” forum.

While the diplomats and experts in attendance indicated that the simulations were illuminating, only two simulated veto initiative meetings have thus far taken place at LISD, and it is possible that subsequent iterations will yield contradictory insights. On the basis of our two simulations, it is also impossible to predict whether the meetings will reach their objectives of enhancing the accountability of the UNSC and encouraging the UNGA to act when the UNSC fails to do so.

Although veto initiative meetings include the entire UN membership and are thus more representative than UNSC meetings, it is not yet clear whether this will result in greater accountability. Recall that accountability refers to the right to judge whether responsibilities have been fulfilled but also to the right “to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities have not been met.” Among the six mechanisms of accountability in Grant and Keohane, the peer and public reputational mechanisms—in which the costs to the power wielder are measured in terms of “effects on network ties and therefore on others’ support” and “diffuse effects on reputation, prestige,

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20 See Appendix XI
21 See Appendix V
22 Grant and Keohane 2005, fn. 18. P.29
self-esteem,” respectively— are most likely to apply here. But as one of the veto-wielding states in the simulation of 2024 noted, they did not experience a reputational cost, and in both simulations, the veto-wielders successfully built or joined a coalition of states in support of their preferred resolution.

It is also not yet clear whether the potential for reason giving will be realized. With a draft resolution to debate, the simulations were arguably more deliberative in nature than the 12 UNGA meetings thus far; participants were focused on communicating—explaining and justifying—their positions to others. The UNGA meetings have thus far not revolved around a potential UNGA text.

The absence of UNGA resolutions gives us pause for a second reason: while the veto initiative provides an opportunity for the broader UN membership to weigh in on issues related to international peace and security, the success of the veto initiative will be measured in part by the ability of the UNGA to act promptly and effectively when the UNSC’s veto blocks such action. Although the UNGA has reacted promptly, convening within 10 working days to debate the issue as to which the veto was cast, it has arguably not yet acted effectively to move the issue forward. One explanation may be that the 10 working days between the casting of the veto and the UNGA meeting do not leave sufficient time for UN member states to work on the adoption of a product. The two simulations that took place on single days in 2023 and 2024 cannot provide guidance here.

In future years, LISD will therefore tailor the simulations to test a wider variety of scenarios. The organizing committee may encourage students to consider a resolution that directs the UNSC to look at the issue (again), potentially working with allies in advance of the UNGA veto initiative meeting, and the interaction between the UNSC and the UNGA may be further modeled by including the UNSC in the simulation. Amid serious challenges to multilateralism and concerns with the accountability and effectiveness of the UN, the veto initiative is a promising working-methods measure for reform, and LISD looks forward to continuing to explore its potential.

23 Grant and Keohane, 2005, fn. 18. P.36
Appendix I — Simulated vetoed UNSC resolution 2023

United Nations Security Council

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution S/2023/XXX

The Security Council,

Expressing deep concern at the ongoing state of emergency imposed by the military in Myanmar on 1 February 2021 and its grave impact on the people of Myanmar,

Recalling its previous resolutions and statements regarding the situation in Myanmar, including its resolution 2669 (2022), which called for concrete and immediate actions to effectively and fully implement ASEAN’s Five Point Consensus agreed on 24 April 2021 by all members of ASEAN,

Expressing further deep concern about all forms of violence across the country, and attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure,

Recalling its Press Statements SC/14986 of 27 July 2022, SC/14785 of 2 February 2022, SC/14430 of 4 February 2022,

Recalling the United Nations General Assembly resolution 75/287, which called for all Member States to prevent the flow of arms into Myanmar,

Recognizing the need for further action by the United Nations Security Council,

Expressing deep concern at the increasingly large numbers of internally displaced persons, and dramatic increase in humanitarian need, particularly among women, children, and persons in vulnerable situations, stressing the need for the protection of minority groups, noting the rise in extreme poverty, and stressing the urgent need to mobilize sufficient resources to meet humanitarian needs in the country,

Expressing further deep concern that recent developments in Myanmar pose particularly serious challenges for the voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees and internally displaced persons, and underlining the risks that the Rohingya situation poses for the wider region,
Further recognizing the reports of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, including report A/HRC/52/66 of 9 March 2023, which outlines the gross human rights violations and brutality enacted by the military against the people of Myanmar,

Reiterating its full support for ASEAN’s central role in facilitating a peaceful solution in the interests of the people of Myanmar and their livelihoods and welcoming the efforts of the Chair of ASEAN and the ASEAN Special Envoy on Myanmar, including efforts to facilitate constructive dialogue among all parties, as well as the provision of humanitarian assistance,

Further reiterating support to the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar for her good offices, and underlining the need for close coordination with the ASEAN Special Envoy, and encouraging them to maintain communication and engage intensively with all parties, and reaffirming the need for them to meet with all concerned parties,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Strongly condemns all attacks by the Myanmar military on civilians and civilian infrastructure, including the recent aerial attack on the village of Pa Zi Gyi as a result of which 168 civilians were killed;

2. Demands an immediate end to all forms of violence throughout the country;

3. Recognizes the seizure of power by the military of Myanmar in February 2021 as an illegal coup d’état;

4. Calls for the military of Myanmar, as well as all members of ASEAN and the international community, to pursue constructive dialogue, reconciliation, and the establishment of democratic institutions and processes in accordance with the will and interests of the people of Myanmar;

5. Reiterates the necessity of full, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access to Myanmar and underlines the need for scaled-up humanitarian assistance to all people in need in Myanmar and to ensure the full protection, safety, and security of humanitarian and medical personnel;

Economic Sanctions

6. Decides that all Member States shall, for an initial period of one year from the date of the adoption of this resolution, freeze without delay all funds, other financial assets, and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the individuals or entities designated by the Committee established
pursuant to paragraph 16 below (herein “the Committee”), or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, and decides further that all Member States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the individuals or entities designated by the Committee;

7. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 6 above do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant Member States:

a) To be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services in accordance with national laws, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant State to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources, and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;

b) To be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee;

c) To be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral judgment, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that judgment provided that the judgment was entered into prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated by the Committee, and has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee;

8. Decides that Member States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 6 above of interests or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;

9. Decides that the measures in paragraph 6 above shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing
of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 6 above, and after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, 10 working days prior to such authorization;

**Arms embargo**

10. *Decides* that all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the individuals and entities designated by the Committee, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related material, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories;

11. * Calls upon* Member States, in particular States neighboring Myanmar, to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all cargo to Myanmar, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply, sale, or transfer of which is prohibited by paragraph 10 of this resolution for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

12. *Decides* to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, upon discovery of items the supply, sale, or transfer of which is prohibited by paragraph 10 of this resolution, seize and dispose (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable, storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination States for disposal) of such items and decides further that all Member States shall cooperate in such efforts;

13. *Requires* any Member State when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 11 of this resolution, to submit promptly an initial written report to the Committee containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspections, the results of such inspections, and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if prohibited items for supply, sale, or transfer are found, further requires such Member States to submit to the Committee within 30 days a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure, and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a
description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;

**Designation Criteria**

14. *Decides* that the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 10 shall apply to individuals or entities designated by the Committee as engaging in or providing support for acts by the military of Myanmar;

15. *Underscores* that such acts as described in paragraph 14 above may include, but are not limited to:

a) Obstructing or undermining the successful completion of the ASEAN-led mechanism and process towards a peaceful solution to the crisis in Myanmar in the interests of the people of Myanmar, including through the implementation of the Five Point Consensus;

b) Impeding a peaceful transition to democracy through violence, or attacks on civilians or civilian infrastructure; or

c) Planning, directing, or committing acts that violate applicable international human rights law or international humanitarian law, or acts that constitute human rights abuses, in Myanmar;

**Sanctions Committee**

16. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council (herein “the Committee”), to undertake the following tasks:

a) To monitor implementation of the measures imposed in paragraphs 6 and 10 above with a view to strengthening, facilitating, and improving implementation of these measures by Member States;

b) To seek and review information regarding those individuals and entities who may be engaging in the acts described in paragraphs 14 and 15 above;

c) To designate individuals and entities to be subject to the measures imposed in paragraphs 6 and 10 above;
d) To establish such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed above;

e) To report within 60 days to the Security Council on its work and thereafter to report as deemed necessary by the Committee;

f) To encourage a dialogue between the Committee and interested Member States, in particular those in the region, including by inviting representatives of such States to meet with the Committee to discuss implementation of the measures;

g) To seek from all States whatever information it may consider useful regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed;

h) To examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations or non-compliance with the measures contained in paragraphs 6 and 10;

17. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.
Appendix II — Simulated Special Report 2023

United Nations General Assembly

Seventy-seventh session

Strengthening the United Nations system

Letter dated 24 April 2023 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the President of the General Assembly

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 76/262, I hereby submit a special report on the use of the veto at the XXXth meeting of the Security Council, held on 18 April 2023 in connection with the item entitled “The situation in Myanmar” (see annex).

(Signed) Vassily Nebenzia
President of the Security Council

Annex

Special report of the Security Council

The present special report of the Security Council is submitted in response to the invitation made by the General Assembly in paragraph 3 of its resolution 76/262 and in accordance with Article 24 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations.

On 18 April 2023, the Security Council held its XXXth meeting, at which it took action on the draft resolution contained in document S/2023/XXX, which had been submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in connection with the item entitled “The situation in Myanmar.”

The result of the voting was as follows:

In favor:
Albania, Ecuador, France, Gabon, Ghana, Japan, Malta, Mozambique, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.
Against:
China, Russian Federation.

Abstaining:
Brazil.

The draft resolution contained in document XXX was rejected because two permanent members of the Security Council voted against its adoption.
Appendix III — Participants 2023

Bangladesh
Belarus
Cambodia
Canada
China
Costa Rica
European Union
France
The Gambia
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Liechtenstein
Malaysia
Myanmar
Norway
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Thailand
Turkey
Ukraine
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America
Vietnam
Appendix IV — Proposed UNGA Resolution 2023: ASEAN Way on ASEAN Issues — Failed

United Nations General Assembly

13 March 2023

Draft Resolution on Myanmar:

ASEAN Way on ASEAN Issues
Sponsors: China, Russian Federation, Belarus
Signatories: Vietnam, Cambodia, Singapore, Thailand

Expressing concern about the ongoing violence and civil war in Myanmar, especially regarding the possibility of spillover into neighboring regions,

Registering the apprehension of the international community with respect to the domestic crisis in Naypyidaw on 1 February 2021,

Condemning attempts by foreign great powers to prop up illegitimate regimes that damage the international standing and perception of the United Nations,

Recalling the situation of 1949, when the People's Republic of China was denied representation in the General Assembly and Security Council, despite being the legitimate representative of the Chinese people,

Expressing hope that it will take shorter than 22 years for the General Assembly to come to its senses on the issue of Myanmar moving forward,

Reaffirming the United Nations' commitment to upholding the sovereignty of each of its members,

Reiterating the need for bilateral cooperation on the issue for a lasting peace, as opposed to an internationally imposed agreement,

Acknowledging the role that the veto power of the United Nations Security Council Permanent Members have played in promoting peace,

Resolved,
1. **Reaffirms** the proper role of the Permanent Members in safeguarding international security through the exercise of the veto power,

   a) **Conceding** that debate in the General Assembly on the exercise of the veto is conducive to transparency and accountability,

   b) **Registering** concern, however, that erosion of the powers in the United Nations Charter given to the Permanent Members could be destabilizing,

   c) **Reserving** the constitutional separation of powers between the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly,

2. **Refers** the issue of the diplomatic credentials of the current claimant to the government of Myanmar to the United Nations General Assembly for further debate, and:

   a) **Recommends** the immediate seating of a new ambassador who legitimately represents the government of Myanmar,

   b) **Condemns** the so-called ‘democratic government’ currently seated in the Assembly for sustained and severe human rights violations, including ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya people in Rakhine state,

3. **Calls for** all sides of the ongoing conflict to take part in peace negotiations,

   a) **Recognizing** the unique stake that regional partners of Myanmar have in the conflict because of the potential of spillover,

   b) **Encourages** the nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to take a leading role in the arbitration,

   c) **Emphasizes** the importance of the ASEAN way of consensus-based, peaceful ways of addressing problems with respect for the internal sovereignty of Member States,

4. **Approves** the formation of a United Nations Security Council subcommittee to explore the possibility of dispatching UN Peacekeepers to refugee camps in surrounding nations, affirming the sole responsibility of the Security Council to authorize the deployment of peacekeepers,

5. **Refers** this issue to the recommendation of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,

6. **Affirms** the right of all Member Nations to conduct free trade with the legitimate current government of Myanmar.
Appendix V — Proposed UNGA Resolution 2023: Achieving Just and Sustainable Peace through a Fairer UN — Adopted

Draft Resolution on Myanmar: Achieving Just and Sustainable Peace through a Fairer UN

SPONSORS: Costa Rica, Ireland, Canada, Liechtenstein
SIGNATORIES: European Union, United States of America, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ukraine, Norway

The General Assembly,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Recalling its relevant resolutions on Myanmar, including its resolution 75/287 of 18 June 2021, and the resolutions of the Human Rights Council, including the most recent, resolution 46/21 of 24 March 2021, adopted by consensus,

Recalling also Security Council resolution 2669 (2022) of 21 December 2022, as well as the Security Council statement on the situation in Myanmar of 4 February 2021, the statement by the President of the Security Council on the situation in Myanmar of 10 March 2021, and the press elements of the Security Council on the situation in Myanmar of 1 and 30 April 2021,

Expressing grave concern about the declaration of the state of emergency by the Myanmar armed forces on 1 February 2021 and subsequent actions taken against the elected civilian Government, which also impact regional stability, and stressing its continued call upon Myanmar to act in accordance with the principle of adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional government, respect for fundamental freedoms, and the promotion and protection of human rights, as also provided for in the Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,

Expressing further deep concern that recent developments in Myanmar pose particularly serious challenges for the voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable return of Rohingya refugees, as well as to the rights of women and children, and underlining the risks that the Rohingya genocide
poses for the wider region,

*Recalling also* its resolution 76/262 of 26 April 2022,

*Recognizing* the General Assembly’s competence on questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, as observed by the International Court of Justice,

*Having examined* the special report from the President of the Security Council to the President of the General Assembly contained in document A/77/XXX,

*Welcoming* the opportunity to consider the deeply concerning situation in Myanmar,

1. *Calls upon* the Myanmar armed forces to stop persecution of demonstrators and end restrictions on civil society, media, and labor unions;

2. *Reminds* the Myanmar armed forces of the importance of re-instituting the authority of the civilian government elected by the people and the need to halt all forms of interference in the politics of the country;

3. *Recognizes* the seizure of power by the military of Myanmar in February 2021 as an illegal coup d’état;

4. *Reaffirms* its commitment to disarmament and a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Myanmar and in that regard calls for all parties to engage in constructive dialogue and reconciliation to end human rights abuses within Myanmar;

5. *Calls upon* the Myanmar armed forces to immediately and fully halt all violations of human rights and ensure the protection of all rights, including the rights of women and children, and the promotion of gender equality;

6. *Underlines* the imperative of ensuring accountability for all human rights violations in Myanmar,

7. *Calls for* unobstructed humanitarian aid to the civilian population from the United Nations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management, and other relevant organizations;

**Affirming the Veto Initiative**

8. *Regrets* the casting of a veto by two Permanent Members of the Security Council at its meeting held on 18 April 2023;
9. **Leverages** the importance of the General Assembly as the representative body of the full community of nations and **recognizes** the democratic discourse provided to the General Assembly in the first instance of the utilization of the Veto Initiative, and in support of urgent assistance in times of humanitarian crises, henceforth **recommends** a reinforced Veto Initiative with the following reforms:

a) In the case of the use of a veto in the UN Security Council, the topic that was vetoed will immediately go to the General Assembly for a vote. The vote will define whether the topic that was vetoed constitutes a humanitarian crisis or important international emergency that should immediately be addressed by the UN General Assembly;

b) A simple majority in favor of defining the vetoed topic as a crisis or emergency by the UN General Assembly would enact an immediate meeting of the UN General Assembly to further discuss the topic;

c) The current requirement of the Veto Initiative for Permanent Members who cast the veto to explain their reasons for the veto would continue to stand;

d) The goal of this clause is to lend democratic credibility to the Veto Initiative and enable immediate debate on the vetoed issue at hand in the UN General Assembly in times of crisis, as defined by the vote of the UN General Assembly;

**Recommending the Arms Embargo**

10. **Accordingly requests** the members of the Security Council to immediately reconsider the situation in Myanmar, with a view to adopting a product containing an appropriate collective response by the international community in order to protect the people of Myanmar and facilitate constructive dialogue, reconciliation, and the establishment of democratic institutions and processes in accordance with the will and interests of the people of Myanmar;

11. **Recommends** that all Member States take necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of arms and related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related material, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories, to the individuals described in paragraph 13 below;

12. **Encourages** Member States, in particular those States neighboring Myanmar, to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation and consistent with international
law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, all
cargo to Myanmar in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the State concerned
has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the
supply, sale, or transfer of which is prohibited by paragraph 1 of this resolution for the
purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;

13. **Decides** that recommended embargoes shall apply to individuals designated as participating
in the following acts:

a) Obstructing or undermining the successful implementation of the ASEAN-led Five
Point Consensus plan, as determined by the General Assembly’s Disarmament and
International Security Committee;

b) Planning, directing, or committing acts that violate applicable international human rights
law or international humanitarian law, or acts that constitute human rights abuses, in
Myanmar, as determined by the General Assembly’s Social, Humanitarian and Cultural
Committee;

14. **Decides also** to remain seized of the matter.
Appendix VI — Proposed UNGA resolution 2023: IBM: Islamic Block for Myanmar — Failed

Seventy-seventh session
Strengthening the United Nations system

SPONSORS: Republic of The Gambia, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, People’s Republic of Bangladesh
SIGNATORIES: People’s Republic of China

IBM - Islamic Block for Myanmar

The General Assembly,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Recalling its relevant resolutions on Myanmar, including its resolution 75/287 of 18 June 2021, and the resolutions of the Human Rights Council, including the most recent, resolution 46/21 of 24 March 2021, adopted by consensus,

Recalling also Security Council resolution 2669 (2022) of 21 December 2022, as well as the Security Council statement on the situation in Myanmar of 4 February 2021, the statement by the President of the Security Council on the situation in Myanmar of 10 March 2021, and the press elements of the Security Council on the situation in Myanmar of 1 and 30 April 2021,

Expressing grave concern about the declaration of the state of emergency by the Myanmar armed forces on 1 February 2021 and subsequent actions taken against the elected civilian Government, which also impact regional stability, and stressing its continued call upon Myanmar to act in accordance with the principle of adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional government, respect for fundamental freedoms, and the promotion and protection of human rights, as also provided for in the Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,

Recalling also its resolution 76/262 of 26 April 2022,
Recognizing the current litigation in the International Court of Justice, *The Gambia v. Myanmar*, pertaining to the ongoing violation of human rights against the Rohingya people in Myanmar,

*Acknowledges* that many Member States have investigated and already considered the violence against the Rohingya people as a genocide,

*Recognizing* the General Assembly's competence on questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, as observed by the International Court of Justice,

*Having examined* the special report from the President of the Security Council to the President of the General Assembly contained in document A/77/XXX,

*Welcoming* the opportunity to consider the deeply concerning situation in Myanmar,

1. *Calls upon* the Myanmar armed forces to stop persecution of demonstrators and end restrictions on civil society, media, and labor unions;

2. *Reminds* the Myanmar armed forces of the importance of re-instituting the authority of the civilian government elected by the people and the need to halt all forms of interference in the politics of the country;

3. *Reaffirms* its commitment to disarmament and a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Myanmar and in that regard *calls for* all parties to engage in constructive dialogue and reconciliation, excepting those parties currently involved in litigation for violations of the Genocide Convention;

4. *Calls upon* the Myanmar armed forces to immediately and fully halt all violations of human rights and ensure the protection of all rights, including the rights of women and children, and the promotion of gender equality;

5. *Underlines* the imperative of ensuring accountability for all human rights violations in Myanmar;

6. *Calls upon* Member States and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to continue financial assistance for regional and ASEAN states, including but not limited to India, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, that have been taking in refugees on account of the protracted ethnic persecution within the borders of Myanmar;

7. *Calls on* the legitimate government of Myanmar to recognize its role in the mass ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya Muslim minorities;
8. *Calls for* unobstructed humanitarian aid to the civilian population from the United Nations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management, and other relevant organizations;

9. *Regrets* the casting of a veto by two Permanent Members of the Security Council at its meeting held on 18 April 2023;

10. *Accordingly requests* the members of the Security Council to reconsider immediately the situation in Myanmar, with a view to adopting a product containing an appropriate collective response by the international community in order to protect the people of Myanmar and facilitate constructive dialogue, reconciliation, and the establishment of democratic institutions and processes in accordance with the will and interests of the people of Myanmar;

11. *Recommends* that all Member States shall immediately take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the individuals and entities designated by the Committee, from or through their territories or by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related material of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance, related to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any arms and related material, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel whether or not originating in their territories;

12. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.
Appendix VII — Simulated vetoed UNSC resolution 2024

UNSC resolution on climate and security
S/2021/990

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Canada, Chad, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Montenegro, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, and Vanuatu:

draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reiterating the United Nations’ primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and the importance of a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding and sustaining peace,

Emphasizing the adverse impacts of climate change, including sea-level rise, which could have possible security implications,

Recalling that the Security Council has repeatedly stressed the need for the United Nations, regional organizations, and Member States to consider the security implications of the adverse effects of climate change,

Recalling the Sustaining Peace resolutions, and emphasizing the need for a comprehensive approach to address climate change, and recognizing the responsibility for sustainable development issues conferred upon the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, including the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and acknowledging that the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement adopted under the Convention are the primary forums for negotiating the global response to climate change,

Noting that an increasing number of Member States are recognizing the adverse effects of climate change on their security, and stressing the primary responsibility of States to develop and implement measures to manage and address climate-related security risks,

Recalling the obligations of all parties to armed conflict to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law,

Recognizing that there is a strong nexus between peace and security, humanitarian assistance, and sustainable development, and that the adverse effects of climate change could impede or reverse the peacebuilding and development gains of the countries most affected by climate change,

Acknowledging that the adverse effects of climate change, including, inter alia, erratic precipitation, increasingly frequent and extreme weather phenomena, desertification, land degradation and sea-level rise can lead to water scarcity, food insecurity, and large-scale displacement, particularly affecting women, children, ethnic minorities, and other vulnerable communities,

Calling attention to the importance of conflict prevention and emphasizing that the United Nations, including the Security Council, should heed early warning indications of potential conflict and ensure prompt and effective action to prevent, contain or end conflicts, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Emphasizing that Small Island Developing States are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and expressing deep concern that the impacts, especially the loss of territory caused by the rise of sea levels, may have implications for international peace and security, in addition to humanitarian, economic, social, cultural, and ecological consequences,

Welcoming the efforts by regional organizations including the African Union, the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Pacific Islands Forum to develop regional responses to climate-related security threats, and recognizing the need for the United Nations to cooperate with regional and sub-regional organizations,

Recalling that the Security Council has emphasized the importance of taking into account the environmental impacts of peacekeeping operations and thus recalling the need for United Nations peacebuilding efforts to have adequate, predictable, and sustained financing,

Recognizing the need to also involve different stakeholders, including civil society and human rights defenders, and stressing especially the important role of women as part of the decision-
making processes and their full, equal, and meaningful participation and leadership in the design and implementation of programs related to climate and security,

Recognizing the potential benefits of scientifically sound and evidence-based assessments of the interaction between climate change and factors impacting security, and inviting all relevant actors to work towards accessible and interoperable international data in this endeavor,

1. Expresses its intention to take into consideration comprehensive conflict analysis and management strategies incorporating information on the security implications of climate change to enable the Council to recognize root causes of conflict or risk multipliers that may impede the implementation of Council mandates;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to integrate climate-related security risk as a central component into comprehensive conflict-prevention strategies of the United Nations to contribute to the reduction of the risk of conflict relapse due to adverse effects of climate change;

3. Further requests the Secretary-General to submit a report on the security implications for relevant country- or region-specific contexts on the Council’s agenda of the adverse effects of climate change within twenty-four months of the date of this resolution;

4. Also invites the Secretary-General to integrate the security implications of the effects of climate change into its entire purview; requests the reporting to the Security Council of gender- and age-sensitive information relating to the security implications of climate change and recommendations to address them; requests further that the Secretary-General take steps to improve the data collection, monitoring, and analysis of the effects of climate change in the context of armed conflict and humanitarian emergencies;

5. Encourages collaboration between Member States and the scientific community, and the development of online platforms for supporting real-time access to climate-related data and information products to support comprehensive risk analyses;

6. Calls for the creation of a reparations program under the jurisdiction of the United Nations and World Bank for small island states which are at the risk of immense flooding and infrastructure damage due to rising sea levels;

7. Encourages relevant special political missions, peacekeeping operations, and United Nations country teams to incorporate, within their existing mandates, the security implications of climate change in their assessment, analyses, and activities to prevent relapse into conflict;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to verify that relevant personnel involved in United Nations peacekeeping activities have appropriate training within existing resources on climate-related
security risks, and \textit{urges} States and international and regional organizations to ensure that appropriate training is provided in their programs for personnel involved in relevant activities;

9. \textit{Recognizes} the importance for international scientific research and data institutions to take into account local expertise in their field work, products, and outcomes in contributing to the identification of solutions for country- or region-specific climate-related security risks;

10. \textit{Recognizes} the importance of coordinating with host countries to ensure that risk assessments and risk management strategies being proposed are collaborative and respond to their needs;

11. \textit{Welcomes} the deployment of dedicated capacity on climate security in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and \textit{encourages} the deployment of similar capacity, as appropriate, in relevant UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions;

12. \textit{Recognizes} the value of civil society and the private sector in peacebuilding efforts and sustaining peace in increasing awareness about climate-related security impacts and how to address them;

13. \textit{Requests} relevant special political missions, peacekeeping operations, and United Nations country teams to consider the environmental impacts of its operations conducting mission management mindful of the Secretary-General’s United Nations Secretariat Climate Action Plan goals;

14. \textit{Recognizes} the need to address challenges linked to the provision of information and recommendations on climate-change-induced security risks, therefore \textit{welcomes} the convening of the Informal Expert Group of members of the Security Council on Climate and Security to facilitate more systematic and comprehensive approaches to Climate, Peace, and Security;

15. \textit{Encourages} Member States, regional organizations, and the United Nations to take into consideration the security implications of the adverse effects of climate change alongside peacebuilding and sustaining peace in their efforts to address climate change, sustainable development, and peacebuilding and sustaining peace;

16. \textit{Expresses its hope} for the further bolstering of support behind geoengineering programs to combat global warming and encourages Member States to consider a universal regulatory framework for geoengineering that is equally applicable to all Member States;

17. \textit{Decides} to remain actively seized of this matter.
Appendix VIII — Simulated special report 2024

United Nations General Assembly

Seventy-eighth session
Strengthening the United Nations system

Letter dated 24 April 2023 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the President of the General Assembly

Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 76/262, I hereby submit a special report on the use of the veto at the 9549th meeting of the Security Council, held on 15 February 2024 in connection with the item entitled “Climate and Security” (see annex).

(Signed) Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett
President of the Security Council

Annex
Special report of the Security Council

The present special report of the Security Council is submitted in response to the invitation made by the General Assembly in paragraph 3 of its resolution 76/262 and in accordance with Article 24 (3) of the Charter of the United Nations.

On 15 February 2024, the Security Council held its 9524th meeting, at which it took action on the draft resolution contained in document S/2024/990, which had been submitted by Niger and Ireland in connection with the item entitled “Climate and Security.”

The result of the voting was as follows:

In favor: 12

Against: 1 (Russian Federation)

Abstaining: 2

The draft resolution contained in document S/2024/990 was rejected because one Permanent Member of the Security Council voted against its adoption.
Appendix IX — Participants 2024

Algeria
Australia
Brazil
China
Ecuador
France
India
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Liechtenstein
Pakistan
Philippines
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
Switzerland
Tuvalu
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America
Appendix X — Proposed UNGA resolution 2024: Climate and Security — Passed

UNGA resolution on climate and security

Sponsors: Ireland, Australia, Italy, United States of America, France, Ecuador, Japan, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Tuvalu, Liechtenstein, United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

The General Assembly,

Reiterating the United Nations’ primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and the importance of a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding and sustaining peace,

Emphasizing the adverse impacts of climate change, including sea-level rise, which could have possible security implications,

Recognizing the importance of Member States’ sovereignty and of global economic and climate disparities due to a history of wars and colonization,

Recognizing rising sea levels, climate migration, and food insecurity crises as among the major climate security concerns,

Recalling that the Security Council has repeatedly stressed the need for the UN, regional organizations, and Member States to consider the security implications of the adverse effects of climate change,

Recalling the Sustaining Peace resolutions, and emphasizing the need for a comprehensive approach to address climate change, and recognizing the responsibility for sustainable development issues conferred upon the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, including the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and acknowledging that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement adopted under the Convention are the primary forums for negotiating the global response to climate change,

Noting that an increasing number of Member States are recognizing the adverse effects of climate change on their security, and stressing the primary responsibility of States to develop and implement
measures to manage and address climate-related security risks,

_Recalling_ the obligations of all parties to armed conflict to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law,

_Recognizing_ that there is a strong nexus between peace and security, humanitarian assistance, and sustainable development, and that the adverse effects of climate change could impede or reverse the peacebuilding and development gains of the countries most affected by climate change,

_Acknowledging_ that the adverse effects of climate change including, _inter alia_, erratic precipitation, increasingly frequent and extreme weather phenomena, desertification, land degradation, and sea-level rise can lead to water scarcity, food insecurity, and large-scale displacement, particularly affecting women, children, ethnic minorities, and other vulnerable communities,

_Calling_ attention to the importance of conflict prevention, and emphasizing that the United Nations, including the Security Council, should heed early warning indications of potential conflict and ensure prompt and effective action to prevent, contain or end conflicts, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

_Emphasizing_ that Small Island Developing States are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and _expressing_ deep concern that the impacts, especially the loss of territory caused by the rise of sea levels, may have implications for international peace and security, in addition to humanitarian, economic, social, cultural, and ecological consequences,

_Welcoming_ the efforts by regional organizations including the African Union, the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and the Pacific Islands Forum to develop regional responses to climate-related security threats, and _recognizing_ the need for the United Nations to cooperate with regional and sub-regional organizations,

_Recalling_ that the Security Council has emphasized the importance of taking into account the environmental impacts of peacekeeping operations and thus _recalling_ the need for United Nations peacebuilding efforts to have adequate, predictable, and sustained financing,

_Recognizing_ the need to also involve different stakeholders, including civil society and human rights defenders, and stressing especially the important role of women as part of the decision-making processes and their full, equal, and meaningful participation and leadership in the design and implementation of programs related to climate and security,

_Recognizing_ the potential benefits of scientifically sound and evidence-based assessments of the interaction between climate change and factors impacting security, and inviting all relevant actors to work towards accessible and interoperable international data in this endeavor,
1. *Expresses its intention* to take into consideration climate concerns in peacekeeping missions and in the United Nations Secretariat Climate Action Plan to prevent further exacerbation of conflicts and incorporate comprehensive conflict analysis and data-informed strategies for diplomatic, open, and voluntary sharing of information on the security implications of climate change to enable the Council to recognize root causes of conflict or risk multipliers that may impede the implementation of Council mandates;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to integrate climate-related security risk as a central component into comprehensive conflict-prevention strategies of the United Nations to contribute to the reduction of the risk of conflict relapse due to the adverse effects of climate change;

3. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report on the security implications for relevant Member States or region-specific contexts on the Council’s agenda of the adverse effects of climate change within twenty-four months of the date of this resolution;
   
   a) Calls upon the collaboration across UN bodies to investigate and report to the General Assembly and the Security Council on climate security matters, including but not limited to UNEP, UNDP, and OHCHR;
   
   b) The Commission shall not take more than 6 months to investigate and report to the United Nations;
   
   c) This report shall be added immediately to the agenda of the closest General Assembly meeting;

4. *Also invites* the Secretary-General to integrate the security implications of the effects of climate change into its entire purview; *requests* the reporting to the Security Council of gender- and age-sensitive information related to the security implications of climate change and recommendations to address it; *requests further* that the Secretary-General take steps to improve the data collection, monitoring, and analysis of the effects of climate change in the context of armed conflict and humanitarian emergencies;

5. *Establishes* climate change fellowships for developing countries such as the Pacific island nations to foster research opportunities at institutions in the United States of America, Australia, the European Union, and the Middle East;

6. *Encourages* collaboration between Member States and the scientific community, and the development of online platforms for supporting real-time access to climate-related data and information products to support comprehensive risk analyses, building upon pre-existing real-time data-sharing agreements under the WMO while recognizing Member States’ sovereignty over data collected within their territory;
7. **Calls for** the creation of investment and aid programs under the jurisdiction of the United Nations and Member States for small island states and developing countries who are at the risk of immense flooding and infrastructure damage due to rising sea levels, with funds being aimed at the transition to green and renewable energy within the Member States’ economy; to that end, **calls upon** ethical and comprehensive investments in national, regional, and local initiatives, for example through ASEAN to Southeast Asian nations, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) to Pacific island nations, and ECOWAS to African nations, the Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean (CAF) to Latin American and Caribbean nations, and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to petroleum exporters, cognizant of national sovereignty and the transnational nature of the climate crisis;

   a) **Calls upon** investment from developed nations such as the United States, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and other UN Member States to create a climate change fund

8. **Expresses** the willingness to cooperate with consenting developing nations to devise a set of ethical, transparent, non-imperialistic, and local-centric guidelines to facilitate the inflow of foreign direct investments into those developing nations who wish for support on climate issues;

9. **Calls upon** the Security Council to systematically consider the security implications of climate change in relevant special political missions, peacekeeping operations, and United Nations country teams within their existing mandates to prevent relapse into conflict without broadening the scope of the duties of the peacekeeping operations;

10. **Requests** the Secretary-General to verify that relevant personnel involved in United Nations peacekeeping activities have appropriate training within existing resources on climate-related security risks, and **urges** States and international and regional organizations to ensure that appropriate training is provided in their programs for personnel involved in relevant activities;

11. **Recognizes** the importance for international scientific research and data institutions to take into account local expertise in their field work, products, and outcomes in contributing to the identification of solutions for country- or region-specific climate-related security risks;

12. **Recognizes** the importance of coordinating with recipient countries to ensure that risk assessments and risk management strategies being proposed are developed in collaboration with the local governments and respond to their needs;

13. **Recognizes** the importance of hydrocarbons for development now and in the future;

14. **Welcomes** the deployment of dedicated capacity on climate security in the United Nations
Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and encourages the deployment of similar capacity, as appropriate, in relevant UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions;

15. Calls upon the establishment of a coastal envoy to investigate rising sea levels and the preservation of coastal arena, which shall be carried out by UNEP;

16. Recognizes the value of civil society and the private sector in peacebuilding efforts and sustaining peace, by increasing awareness about climate-related security impacts and how to address them;

   a) Recognizes the importance of local capacity building within various sectors of civil society to ensure the longevity of any incoming grants or investments related to climate amendments in developing nations;

   b) Recognizes the importance to establish guardrails and regular review mechanisms to track the progress of these capacity-building efforts;

17. Recognizes the need to address challenges linked to the provision of information and recommendations on climate-change-induced security risks, therefore welcomes the convening of the Informal Expert Group of members of the Security Council on Climate and Security to facilitate more systematic and comprehensive approaches to Climate, Peace, and Security;

18. Encourages Member States, regional organizations, and the United Nations to take into consideration the security implications of the adverse effects of climate change alongside peacebuilding and sustaining peace in their efforts to address climate change, sustainable development, and peacebuilding and sustaining peace;

19. Expresses its hope for the further bolstering of support behind geoengineering programs to combat global warming and encourages states to consider a universal regulatory framework for geoengineering that is equally applicable to all Member States;

20. Decides to remain actively seized of this matter.
Appendix XI — Proposed UNGA resolution 2024: Developing Countries Resolution — Failed

Algeria, Brazil, China, India, Philippines, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia

UNGA resolution on climate and security

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Canada, Chad, China, Comoros, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Montenegro, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, and Vanuatu: draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Reiterating the United Nations’ primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and the importance of a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding and sustaining peace,

Emphasizing the adverse impacts of climate change, including sea level rise, which could have possible security implications,

Recalling that the Security Council has repeatedly stressed the need for the United Nations, regional organizations, and Member States to consider the security implications of the adverse effects of climate change but acknowledging the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and General Assembly as the proper forums for the discussion of these matters,

Recalling the Sustaining Peace resolutions, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive approach to
address climate change, recognizing the responsibility for sustainable development issues conferred upon the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, including the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and acknowledging that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement adopted under the Convention are the primary forums for negotiating the global response to climate change,

Noting that an increasing number of Member States are recognizing the adverse effects of climate change on their security and stressing the primary responsibility of developed States to develop and implement measures to manage and address climate-related security risks,

Recognizing that there is a strong nexus between peace and security, humanitarian assistance, and sustainable development, and that the adverse effects of climate change could impede or reverse the peacebuilding and development gains of the countries most affected by climate change,

Acknowledging that the adverse effects of climate change including, inter alia, erratic precipitation, increasingly frequent and extreme weather phenomena, desertification, land degradation, and sea-level rise can lead to water scarcity, food insecurity, and large-scale displacement, particularly affecting women, children, ethnic minorities, and other vulnerable communities,

Calling attention to the importance of conflict prevention and emphasizing that the United Nations, including the Security Council, should heed early warning indications of potential conflict and ensure prompt and effective action to prevent, contain or end conflicts, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Emphasizing that Small Island Developing States are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and expressing deep concern that the impacts, especially the loss of territory caused by the rise of sea levels, may have implications for international peace and security, in addition to humanitarian, economic, social, cultural, and ecological consequences,

Welcoming the efforts by regional and multilateral organizations including the African Union, the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Pacific Islands Forum, the Arab League, OPEC+, ECOWAS, and the Eurasian Economic Union to develop regional responses to climate-related security threats, and recognizing the need for the United Nations to cooperate with regional and sub-regional organizations,

Acknowledging the outsized role that developed nations have played in causing the current climate crisis and stressing the obligation that they have in supporting the mitigation efforts of developing nations,

Recognizing the potential benefits of scientifically sound and evidence-based assessments of the interaction between climate change and factors impacting security, and inviting all relevant actors
to work towards accessible and interoperable international data in this endeavor,

1. Expresses its intention to take into consideration comprehensive conflict analysis and management strategies incorporating information on the security implications of climate change to enable the Council to recognize root causes of conflict or risk multipliers that may impede the implementation of Council mandates;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to acknowledge climate-related security risk as a component into comprehensive conflict-prevention strategies of the United Nations;

3. Requests further that the Secretary-General take steps to improve the data collection, monitoring, and analysis of the effects of climate change in the context of armed conflict and humanitarian emergencies;

4. Encourages collaboration between Member States and the scientific community, and the development of online platforms for supporting real-time access to climate-related data and information products to support comprehensive risk analyses;

5. Calls for the creation of a reparations program to be funded by states whose carbon emissions accounted for a greater per capita share than their population upon ratification of the UNFCCC for small island states and other developing nations who are at the risk of immense flooding and infrastructure damage due to rising sea levels;

6. Further calls upon creating a program funded by developed nations aimed at issuing zero-interest loans to developing nations in the process of expanding their sustainable energy infrastructure while recognizing the importance of energy and hydrocarbons for development, now and in the future;

7. Creating a technology exchange program between all countries in which they can exchange knowledge, resources, and capital on green technology innovation;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to verify that relevant personnel involved in United Nations peacekeeping activities have appropriate training determined by the UN Security Council within existing resources on climate related security risks, and urges States and international and regional organizations to ensure that appropriate training is provided in their programs for personnel involved in relevant activities;

9. Recognizes the importance for scientific research and data institutions to take into account local expertise in their field work, products, and outcomes in contributing to the identification of solutions for country- or region-specific climate-related security risks;
10. **Recognizes** the importance of coordinating with host countries to ensure that risk assessments and risk management strategies being proposed are collaborative and respond to their needs;

11. **Recognizes** the value of civil society and the private sector in peacebuilding efforts and sustaining peace, by increasing awareness about climate-related security impacts and how to address them;

12. **Recognizes** the need to address challenges linked to the provision of information and recommendations on climate-change-induced security risks, therefore **welcomes** the convening of the Informal Expert Group of members of the Security Council on Climate and Security to facilitate more systematic and comprehensive approaches to Climate, Peace, and Security;

13. **Encourages** Member States, regional organizations, and the United Nations to take into consideration the security implications of the adverse effects of climate change alongside peacebuilding, sustainable development, and sustaining peace;

14. **Expresses its hope** for the further bolstering of support behind geoengineering programs to combat global warming and encourages states to consider a universal regulatory framework for geoengineering that is equally applicable to all Member States, with countries historically causing emissions being primarily responsible for the financing of such geoengineering programs;

15. **Decides** to remain actively seized on this matter by referring this resolution to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and viewing it as an important United Nations body for addressing matters of climate change.
Appendix XII — Proposed UNGA resolution 2024: Climate Remediation — Failed

UNGA resolution on climate remediation for developing countries

Draft resolution
Sponsored: Russian Federation, Brazil
Signatories: Algeria, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia

The Security Council,

Recognizing the special danger that climate change poses to small developing countries in the Global South,

Noting the outsized influence of developed countries in climate emissions,

Emphasizing the need of developing countries to exploit existing natural resources, including fossil fuels, to remain competitive within the global market,

Affirming that national sovereignty is of the utmost importance for all nations;

Calling for a resolution that places the needs of the Global South at the forefront on the issue of combating climate change;

1. Encourages the creation of a special committee in the United Nations for the review of climate change concerns in specific countries (especially small, island, and developing nations) that is staffed by representatives from the countries most influenced by climate change;

2. Calls for a general fund financed by developed countries (including every member of the Permanent Five countries of the United Nations Security Council) that distributes aid in the form of grants on a need basis to countries suffering from climate change problems;

3. Emphasizes the right of developing countries around the world to use their natural resources, including fossil fuels, natural gas, and oil, to develop their economic potential;

4. Recognizes the peacemaking role that the economic trade of natural resources offers for countries around the world;

5. Creates a pilot program for climate change remediation in the island nations of Tuvalu and the
Philippines consisting of

a) Targeted remediation on a pre-approved timetable addressing:
   i) Sea-level rise in urbanized centers
   ii) Housing crises
   iii) The effect of climate change on traditional livelihoods
   iv) The detrimental effect that climate change regulations can pose on economic development
   v) Assistance in resettlement programs (based on the right of free movement) for sinking regions, including opportunities for jobs in cooperation with the Russian Federation, the Eurasian Economic Union, and other countries and regional organizations willing to contribute;

b) This pilot program will be financed by multiple countries in the United Nations consisting of
   i) Russian Federation (funding earmarked for both Tuvalu and the Philippines, with 60% of such funding going to the Philippines)
   ii) People’s Republic of China
   iii) Brazil
   iv) Saudi Arabia
   v) United Arab Emirates (with funds earmarked only for Tuvalu)
   vi) Any other nation willing to contribute;

c) Funds from the pilot program will be distributed in tranches to avoid misappropriation of funds and tranches will be released every 3 months after review by a panel of climate experts chosen by each country in the pilot program;

d) The funders will maintain an oversight role for the funding operation that is purely non-binding for the countries in the pilot program aimed at maintaining stable economic growth, including allowing Tuvalu and the Philippines to make use of natural resources.
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