Afghanistan After 18 Months
Its Humanitarian, Financial, and Governance Crisis

Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Editor
Cover Photo: A Taliban fighter stands guard as women wait to receive food rations distributed by a humanitarian aid group in Kabul, Afghanistan, Tuesday, May 23, 2023. (AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi, File)
I. Triesenberg Paper

**Afghanistan After 18 Months:**
Its Humanitarian, Financial, and Governance Crisis

**Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Editor**

*with* Karl Eikenberry, Robert Finn, Franz Marty, Joseph Mohr, Karen Gallagher-Teske, Leonie Sajdik

Lauren Schwartz, *Executive Editor*
About the **Triesenberg Paper** Series

The Triesenberg Papers are a new publication series edited by Wolfgang Danspeckgruber and published through the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University (LISD), which emanate from the Liechtenstein Colloquia on European and International Affairs (LCM) as well as other specialized meetings on critical topics in contemporary geopolitics, communal relations, security, technology, society, and cultural-religious issues. The LCM have been active since 1989. The meetings and subsequent papers seek to produce meaningful, non-polemic, analytical and substantial analysis — both applied and conceptual — following the LCM tenets: independent, international, intergenerational, intercultural, innovative, inspirational, global and sustainable.

About the **Afghanistan Reflection Team**

Members of the Afghanistan Reflection Team (ART):


Since Spring 2001, a group of experts on Afghanistan have regularly met on the initiation by Wolfgang Danspeckgruber to conduct analysis and evaluation on Afghanistan and the region at LISD, Princeton University, and globally. That network of experts from and on Afghanistan have also undertaken joint research and publications. This Afghanistan Reflection Team (ART) fosters and coordinates research, evaluation, and policy recommendations on Afghanistan and the region while privileging independent, inter-disciplinary, inter-generational, inter-cultural, and inter-religious respect. ART draws on significant input from Afghans themselves, seeking to help create peace and stability for the individual woman, man, and child in Afghanistan — its motto: “by, for, and with the Afghans and Afghanistan.”
# Table of Contents

Summary Observations 8

Key Points 10

Afghanistan is the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. What is to be done? 12

Afghanistan Central Bank and Finances 14

Finance and Banking Overview 17

Timeline of Withdrawal and Taliban Return to Power, Taliban Decrees on Women 23

Afghanistan: A History of Coups 43
Summary Observations

The Taliban essentially rules Afghanistan from Kandahar by decree and by deliberately conducting a strategy of intimidation, distortion, and promulgation of neo-absolutist rule in its most aggressive form through a political system it describes as implementing Islamic Law (Shari’a). The Taliban is succeeding in co-opting—by forcing, bribing, or tricking—Afghanistan’s elite into collaboration (or at least passive silence), while cunningly exploiting Western readiness for humanitarian assistance, overall Afghanistan fatigue, crisis exasperation, and numbness to suffering.

Taliban strategies to suppress the media are augmented by clever use of Western exhaustion to create fait accompli on the ground; combined with charm, falsification, distortion, and stubborn intransigence this successfully creates alternative realities. The Taliban has ensured that today Afghanistan is the only country in the world with gender apartheid: girls are denied education and women are widely excluded from economic life, even from assisting NGOs, which should provide aid.

Al-Qaida, the Tehrik-i Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and related groups continue to enjoy a safe haven in Afghanistan and have partly embedded in Taliban structures. While in opposition to the Taliban, the regional franchises of the so-called Islamic State—notably its chapters called the “provinces” of Khorasan and Hind—remain active in the country.

The Taliban movement has also begun to assert control in the north and northeast; the climactic conditions there are more severe and drastic; in winter 2022-2023 these conditions exacerbated poverty and issues of food and aid distribution. There seem to be increasingly separate realities north and south of the Herat-Kabul-Jalalabad line: north of the line, numerous groups are looking for so-called liberation from the Taliban and believe that they could overcome it provided these groups find some support. However, south of the line many people in rural areas profess that they saw the Taliban as liberators (caution: think of the Khmer Rouge experiment); across the country, elites refuse to stand up against the Taliban, and more broadly seek so-called accommodation.

Through control of state institutions left over from the Islamic Republic, the Taliban collected close to $2 billion in 2022 through taxation while, partly as a result of its restrictive policies, about half of Afghanistan’s population is in need of humanitarian assistance. The de facto authorities expect the international community (IC) to continue providing this assistance: the Taliban pursues an ongoing charm offensive directed toward internationals and those seeking to “do good” to help and send money. These monetary donations are then taxed to the fullest so the Taliban can calculate and ensure continuing income. It hopes that the IC will ignore Afghanistan and, for the sake of convenience and expedience, end up recognizing the Taliban as rulers while continuing to provide subsidies. The Taliban also benefits from the fact that influential powers in the region do not place a high priority or emphasis on inclusive governance and human rights in Afghanistan compared to the maintenance of stability and their own interests in the country and region.

In our times of multiple crises, the Ukraine War, and intensified great power competition, the Taliban skillfully exploits international crisis exasperation and fatigue, especially Afghanistan fatigue and general numbness to suffering. In view of climactic challenges, particularly last winter (an Afghan proverb: “Winter is the death for the poor.”), the Taliban is trying to accelerate international concessions by exploiting the severity of the season and climate, putting Afghanistan’s impoverished population under even more pressure. The Taliban know how and are able to instrumentalize/weaponize incoming resources and aid against those the aid was to benefit and whom they want to penalize.
The Taliban seem to have seriously infiltrated systems of aid distribution. It also has smart policies and methods to finance and support sympathetic Afghans abroad, through money skimmed from international assistance to buying the allegiance of select Afghans abroad or facilitating payoffs by third parties and luring those living abroad to the Taliban's side, eventually preparing them to return and join the Taliban.

During the poppy harvest in April 2022, Taliban leadership issued an unsigned decree prohibiting narcotics production and deferred implementation to this year's harvest season. By doing so, the price of opium increased at least fourfold in anticipation of lowered production in the 2022–2023 season, but because there is almost no access to wide parts of the Afghan landscape, there is no way to judge how the decree affected production.

The Taliban (notably, the Haqqani Network) maintains shelter for Al-Qaida as shown by the death of Aiman Muhammed Rabi al-Zawahiri in Kabul on 31 July 2022. A plethora of Al-Qaida–aligned terrorist groups have set up shop and threaten to topple the governments in countries neighboring Afghanistan. The most prominent is the TTP, which has been emboldened to attempt to repeat the Afghan Taliban’s success. With access to weapons previously owned by Afghan security institutions, the TTP and others have caused significant casualties in Pakistan. Although the so-called Islamic State is present with franchises, it does not aspire to gain control of territory in Afghanistan in the short term. Its rivalry with the Taliban—carried out through ideological challenges and targeted attacks—will continue to have a destabilizing effect in Afghanistan and the region.

In a race toward ideological supremacy between these competitors, Afghanistan is becoming a laboratory for radicalization and a hornet’s nest for global terrorism.

Obligations for concerned members of the international community, IC:

- To find ways to feed the Afghan people appropriately, including the use of part of the money snatched away by the Taliban in 2022.
- To be unified, to act with one voice, and not to fall prey to the Taliban’s tactics to separate and split it into factions. The same must be said for the international Afghan diaspora community—it must act with one voice.
- Not to permit itself to be manipulated by hard core Afghan extremists and ethno-nationalists based abroad, nor Taliban apologists within the IC who have been advocating for the Taliban and promoting Taliban interests while also seeking to benefit from business dealings with the Taliban regime.
- To hold the Taliban accountable for flagrant humanitarian violations, including gender apartheid and rape of girls and boys, suppression of free media, and killing of opposition members and members of former security forces.
- Not to apply a lower humanitarian standard to Afghan women and children than to others in need of serious assistance and support—like refugees from the Ukraine War.
- Not to look away from the Taliban’s deliberate repression of minorities like the Hazara and other ethnic groups who are being punished, raped, executed, or chased out of communities simply because of their ethnicity and/or religion.
- To assist those who struggle for their human rights and fundamental freedoms, especially women and girls. Shelter should be offered to those who are forced to flee.

2 32nd report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted to the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee 25 July 2023 (S/2023/549) (https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/monitoring-team/reports)
Key Points

- The people of Afghanistan have had to suffer a state of war/acute crisis since 1979 (43 years, almost 1.5 generations): the 1978 Communist coup; the 1979 Soviet occupation followed by inner-Afghan Mujahideen war; and the international post-9/11 intervention based on the right to self-defense by the United States backed by UN SC Resolutions and Article V of NATO.

- Afghans and Afghanistan are confronted simultaneously with multiple crises: food, malnutrition, poverty, and collapse of health services; mistreatment of girls and women; Islamic fundamentalism and education; economic, employment, financial, and liquidity crises, as well as environmental crises.

- Fundamental conceptual and moral quandary:
  What comes first: development or moral-ethical principles?
  Or: moral-ethical principles and legal standards/fundamental rights versus the survival of the people and economic development?

- Afghanistan is the only place on Earth where girls and women are denied education, training, and participation in professional life.

- Boys are being subjected to increasingly radicalized curricula in schools. They may become instrumentalized and many are abused; the next generation of Talibs is being created while the world turns its attention elsewhere.

- Dramatically reduced information flow out of Afghanistan:
  Stringent information control and disinformation, self-censorship by media and social media, resulting in little concrete information leaving the country.

- Much more violence: public executions, disappearance of people, incarcerations, and more elimination of personal freedom than the Taliban admits.

- The Taliban is intensely targeting former Afghan National Defense and Security Forces personnel.

- Taliban infighting between Haqqani Network members and other groups. Victory will likely go to the Kandahar-based faction that emphasizes cohesion and adherence to its interpretation of Shari’a.
• The Taliban has NOT changed from the 1990s: it holds to the same fundamentalism and misogynistic principles.

• The Taliban instrumentalizes/weaponizes aid and humanitarian assistance domestically, reduces free movement of international presence, and challenges diplomatic representations in Kabul with the result that certain states withdraw their bilateral missions. Seemingly, that is what the Taliban desires.

• The Taliban expects the IC to continue humanitarian assistance and feeding of more than 28 million Afghans, while apparently enriching itself through taxation (almost $2 billion in 2022) and sales of arms, natural resources, and drugs.

• The Taliban movement has become more public-relations savvy and media aware (knowing what the IC wants to see and hear), while remaining intransigent with its absolute objectives.

• The neo-absolutist system erected by the Taliban: the so-called Islamic Emirate excludes compromise and therefore, accommodation through engagement is likely unattainable.

• The Taliban’s internally pervasive sociocultural warfare against Afghan culture, against other ethnicities, and against women.

• Afghanistan has once again become a pawn in the great power game—Russia, Pakistan, India, China, and others, with tensions between India and China looming large.

• Afghanistan has become a hub for terrorism, a hornet’s nest for terrorists with international connections: Al-Qaida, TTP, Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement/Turkistan Islamic Party, but also the so-called Islamic State (Da’esh).
Afghanistan is the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. What is to be done?

The Taliban, defined by experts as an “apocalyptic death cult,” must not be successful; its potential success could serve as an inspiration and model for other radical Islamists and other radical organizations.

This strategy is particularly relevant for Pakistan, Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, where the Taliban tries to incite others.

- There exist multiple realities and we must acknowledge that we do not know much if anything of the reality in Afghanistan. We do not even know what we do not know.

- Part of the reason for this limited information flow about and within Afghanistan is the stringent and suppressive Taliban control: voluntary self-censorship is done by nearly all in the field to save their own lives.

- Gender apartheid must not pass unpunished. If it succeeds in Afghanistan and if the Taliban can simply exclude women from education, economic life, public life, and humanitarian action, others might find this appealing and copy the policy elsewhere.

- In addition, women and girls are receiving far less to eat, eat last, or are not permitted to eat anything at all.

- The more the disastrous situation in Afghanistan continues and worsens, the more all those who can will try to leave the country.

Important obligations for concerned members of the International Community, IC:

- to find ways to feed the Afghan people appropriately, including the use of part of the money snatched away by the Taliban in 2022.

- to be unified, to act with one voice, and not to fold/fall prey to the Taliban's tactics to separate and split it into factions. The same must be said for the international Afghan diaspora community—it must act with one voice.

- to hold the Taliban accountable for flagrant humanitarian violations, including gender apartheid and rape of girls and boys, suppression of free media, and killing of opposition members and members of former security forces.
• **not to apply different a humanitarian standard** to Afghan women and children than to others in need of serious assistance and support—like refugees from the Ukraine War.

• **not to look away from** the Taliban’s deliberate repression of minorities like the Hazara and other ethnic groups who will be punished, raped, executed, or chased out of communities simply because of their ethnicity and/or religion.

• **to assist those who struggle for their human rights and fundamental freedoms, especially women and girls.** Shelter should be offered to those who are forced to flee.

• **not to permit itself to be manipulated** by hard core Afghan extremists and ethno-nationalists based abroad who have been advocating for the Taliban and promoting Taliban interests while also seeking to benefit from business dealings with the Taliban regime.

---

The **Taliban must not be (economically) successful**, because this could entice and inspire radical Islamic forces elsewhere to follow that model and try to create similar suppressive states. The Taliban will never change its repression.

A **group of wise experts** should be formed that on the one hand are informed and experienced enough to realize and to understand what the Taliban is and wants and on the other hand is able to develop tactics and strategies to mitigate it.

A **Contact Group** of interested and relevant powers and states, including BRICS members, should be active in order to mitigate the situation economically and also deal with ideological and political fallout.

**The Afghans and Afghanistan should not be forgotten nor overlooked:** decades of wars and crises have caused death, suffering, and destruction, have impoverished the Afghans, exposed them to repression and Islamic fundamentalism, and creating a hornets nest for global radicalization. This situation in Afghanistan challenges the neighborhood and beyond, and can easily be further instrumentalized.
Afghanistan Central Bank and Finances

Afghan Central Bank and International Financial Support

The Taliban narrative is, *If we get the foreign reserves, everything will be fine…but we must be in total control.* It is the Taliban’s attitude that is the main problem, not money.

Between 1 December 2021 and January 2023, the IC shipped in about 1.75 billion USD in hard cash. Although it can be argued that the dollar shipments did not go directly to the Taliban, the delivery of approximately 112 million USD worth of Afghan banknotes between October 2022 and February 2023 went to the Taliban controlling the Afghan Central Bank. The printing of these banknotes had been paid for by the Republic and those supporting it, and now was a net transfer to the Taliban.

In December 2022 there was still limited Afghan economic activity. Since 15 August 2021, the Afghan economy has faced a series of transformations:

- *a fiscal transformation* as there had been a considerable decline in investment, humanitarian, and direct economic aid, which in the case of humanitarian aid has resumed at much higher rates than prior to the takeover. Overall, the state’s budget has significantly shrunk, from the 3.5 billion USD for expenditures and 2 billion USD for development projects under the Republic to roughly 2 billion USD overall;

- *transformation in tax revenue* less trade (due to less investment) was balanced out as increased and more efficient taxation of trade, which now could flow unimpeded by the conflict and a boom in royalties and export duties from extraction and export (e.g., coal to Pakistan) brought in roughly 2 billion USD in revenue;

- *a transformation of the monetary policy framework* with the foreign exchange reserves of the Afghan Central Bank (now controlled by the Taliban) no longer accessible, which has caused liquidity issues; and

- *a massive de-risking by corresponding banks and increasing scrutiny on transfers* applied for business with the remaining banks, because the government was taken over by a combination of narcotics traffickers and terrorists who are now supposed to combat money laundering and terrorism financing.

The failure of the Taliban to appropriately maintain a banking system, monetary policy, trade, and aid flows has been overlooked by many outside observers and supporters of Afghanistan.

Originally, analysts anticipated a devaluation of the Afghani in 2018 when President Donald Trump announced withdrawal; the long-term 70 : 1 Afghani/USD exchange rate moved to 80 : 1 upon the announcement, at which it remained until July 2021. It then rose to ~109–113 Afghani : 1 USD in December 2021. One major reason for this devaluation was the sudden loss of liquidity when the US and others froze Afghan Central Bank assets and the IMF halted the delivery of Afghanistan's SDR reserves. Because of the lack of reserves, limits on withdrawals were quickly set as many feared a bank run.

A large number of workers went without paychecks because essentially, teachers’ and public sector employees’ salaries were paid by the US government. Firms couldn’t access capital to keep their businesses running due to lack of funds. Physical cash in circulation was decreasing, and the Afghan Central Bank is not able to print its own money, further contributing to the liquidity crisis.
In spring 2023, the exchange rate was about 88 AFN : 1 USD, so it can be said that there has been a devaluation since mid-2018 of about 30 percent. Now, the AFN is stabilized due to the frozen assets still backing it, and the short-term loss is about 12 percent—but if the backing falls away, we easily may see a return to the spike price as the new normal. So, a loss of about 30 percent (as we saw in December 2021 prior to the massive influx of cash dollars that started in December but mostly from January onwards).\(^1\) By September 2022, the United Nations transferred 1.03 billion USD in cash into the country.\(^2\) This amount grew by mid-2023 to a total of 2.59 billion USD, with inflationary tendencies subsiding and the AFN even appreciating against the dollar by 5 percent in March-April 2023.\(^3\)

---

1 Some mention the massive cash injections by the UN as one of the (if not the) main reasons for the stabilization of the Afghani because the devaluation was also caused by people panicking. They were reassured when it was publicized every week that the UN ships millions in cash to Afghanistan.


**Afghan Afghani**

![Afghan Afghani per US Dollar](https://www.dollarfx.org/Afghan-Afghani)

**Fig. 1: Afghan Afghani per US Dollar, January 2018 – mid-July 2022**

*Source:* https://www.dollarfx.org/Afghan-Afghani

**Claims of fiscal prosperity and lack of transparency on spending**

The Taliban claims repeatedly that it managed to increase revenue collection compared to the previous period of the Islamic Republic, and announced a 2022–2023 budget of 2.6 billion USD to be financed by revenues of 2.1 billion USD. The Taliban was successful in having collected at least 1.5 billion USD of customs revenues.

It appears that most of the revenue is used for military and other security-related elements of the administration or to construct religious buildings or paramilitary forces. Civil salaries have been slashed by a factor of 10.
Cash Transfers to Afghanistan

**Fig. 2: Cash Transfers to Afghanistan**

Source: Twitter channel announcements of cash shipments via UNAMA to AIB and Afghan Central Bank (DAB) dollar auctions published by Taliban-run DAB, compiled by Joseph Mohr.

**Fig. 3: Afghanistan, Government Revenue, 2020 and 2022**

Source: The Economist Print Edition, June 11th 2022
Finance and Banking Overview

2022 Afghanistan Aid Summary:

- Total Incoming Funding: US $3,358,283,796
- Total requirements: $4,442,200,000
- Coverage: 75.6%

Source for 2022 data and graphs, unless otherwise specified: https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/1100/summary

Largest Sources of Afghanistan Humanitarian Response Plan 2022 Funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Governments / Institutions</th>
<th>Funding in US$ (Millions)</th>
<th>As a share of overall funding to the response plan/appeal (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1,141.4</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>453.7</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>449.0</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
<td>296.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>214.2</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>123.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>106.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disasters Emergency Committee (UK)</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Emergency Response Fund</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private (individuals and organizations)</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Governments / Institutions</td>
<td>Funding in US$ (Millions)</td>
<td>As a share of overall funding to the response plan/appeal (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multidonor flexible humanitarian contribution (UNICEF Global Humanitarian Thematic)</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission Directorate-General for International Partnerships (formerly EuropeAid DEVCO)</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF National Committee/Germany</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Fund for UNICEF</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF National Committee/United Kingdom</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF National Committee / Switzerland</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Governments / Institutions</th>
<th>Funding in US$ (Thousands)</th>
<th>As a share of overall funding to the response plan/appeal (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>937,195</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>624,889</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF National Committee/Italy</td>
<td>568,968</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF National Committee/Denmark</td>
<td>553,503</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF National Committee/Finland</td>
<td>549,338</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss Solidarity</td>
<td>537,057</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Governments / Institutions</td>
<td>Funding in US$ (Thousands)</td>
<td>As a share of overall funding to the response plan/appeal (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>464,094</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF National Committee/Luxembourg</td>
<td>414,214</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF National Committee/Sweden</td>
<td>395,858</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF National Committee/Canada</td>
<td>376,620</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Fund for UNICEF</td>
<td>294,000</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>252,336</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF National Committee/Canada</td>
<td>218,189</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Foundation</td>
<td>174,366</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF National Committee/New Zealand</td>
<td>170,015</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jersey Overseas Aid</td>
<td>159,574</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF National Committee/Japan</td>
<td>120,303</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>113,507</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF National Committee/Australia</td>
<td>106,157</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liechtenstein</td>
<td>101,937</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF National Committee/Austria</td>
<td>92,438</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF National Committee/Poland</td>
<td>80,798</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unitaid</td>
<td>57,780</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>54,348</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam</td>
<td>53,687</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF National Committee/Belgium</td>
<td>46,249</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF National Committee/Czech Republic</td>
<td>45,555</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>30,762</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF National Committee/Portugal</td>
<td>29,318</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>26,652</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF National Committees</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF National Committee/Iceland</td>
<td>4,930</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF National Committee/Norway</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 2022, how much of the funding requirements for Afghanistan were met? How much of the funding requirements were unmet?

**US$4.44bn total requirements of plan**

- Amount funded: $3.36bn (75.6%)
- Amount unmet: $1.08bn (24.4%)

**US$3.73bn total funding to Afghanistan (2022)**

- Amount funded: $3.36bn (89.9%)
- Amount outside plan: $376m (10.1%)

*Response Plan / Appeal Snapshot for 2022*

Over time, how much of the funding requirements for Afghanistan were met? How much of the funding requirements were unmet?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Response Plan Funding (US$M)</th>
<th>Unmet Requirements (US$M)</th>
<th>Total Requirements (US$M)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>295,256</td>
<td>43,576</td>
<td>338,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>331,375</td>
<td>78,038</td>
<td>409,413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>465,432</td>
<td>133,491</td>
<td>598,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>456,122</td>
<td>155,637</td>
<td>611,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>598,889</td>
<td>532,161</td>
<td>1,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>850,129</td>
<td>18,537</td>
<td>868,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>3,358</td>
<td>1,084</td>
<td>4,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023</td>
<td>344,215</td>
<td>4,283</td>
<td>4,627</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Trends in Reported Funding for Afghanistan*

*Source: based on data visualized at https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/1100/summary*
Not specified: US$285,002,270
Multiple clusters/sectors (shared): US$283,304,609

Funding Progress by Cluster

Not specified: US$27,413,287
Multiple clusters/sectors (shared): US$55,849,950

Funding Progress by Sector
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster/Sector</th>
<th>Required (US$M)</th>
<th>Funded (US$M)</th>
<th>Coverage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aviation</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination and Common Services</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>183.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>162.1</td>
<td>217.6</td>
<td>134.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Shelter and NFI (Non-Food Items)</td>
<td>374.0</td>
<td>104.8</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Security and Agriculture</td>
<td>2,660.0</td>
<td>1,508.5</td>
<td>56.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>387.0</td>
<td>242.5</td>
<td>64.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>287.4</td>
<td>371.4</td>
<td>129.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>137.3</td>
<td>164.0</td>
<td>119.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene</td>
<td>332.8</td>
<td>101.9</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Specified</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>285.0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Clusters/Sectors (Shared)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>283.3</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_Funding Progress by Cluster / Sector_
Timeline of Withdrawal and Taliban Return to Power, Taliban Decrees on Women

The following timelines illustrate not only how the humanitarian, financial, and governance crises developed and are interrelated, but also track the continuous and flagrant degradation of the human rights of girls and women in Afghanistan - its increasing gender apartheid - and the escalating religious radicalization of education and society.
Afghanistan: From the February 2020 Doha Agreement
Killings of Human Rights Defenders
Attempts at Diplomacy and Killing of Afghan Journalists and Media Workers

Feb. 29
Doha Agreement

At least 350 pro-government forces and 66 civilians are killed in Afghanistan in Apr. 2020

Mar. 1–2
President Ashraf Ghani rejects the terms of a prisoner exchange envisioned by the Doha Agreement. The Taliban announces violence will resume shortly thereafter.

Mar. 10
The scheduled deadline for negotiations on the prisoner exchange of March 10 is dismissed.

May 24
Taliban announces three-day Eid al-Fitr ceasefire

May 24–July 31
Prisoner exchange progresses slowly, delaying intra-Afghan talks.

July 28
Taliban announces three-day Eid al-Adha ceasefire from July 31 - Aug. 2

Aug. 7–9
Ghani declares his lack of authority for the release of 400 Taliban prisoners, calling on the traditional national assembly (the Loya Jirga) to decide on the matter. The assembly approves the releases, making way for talks.

Sep. 12
The intra-Afghan negotiations commence in Doha

2020
Number of civilians killed: 3,035
Number of civilians wounded: 5,786

Author: Leonie Sajdik

Not for publication, reproduction, or distribution without express permission.
A mutual agreement is reached on the rules and procedures of the talks after three months via negotiations between US representatives and the Taliban. A three-week break is announced shortly thereafter.

At least 256 pro-government forces and 66 civilians are killed, many by the Taliban.

President Joe Biden announces the full withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan beginning before May 1 and concluding by Sep. 11.

The 2020 Afghanistan Conference, cohosted by the governments of Afghanistan and Finland (with the United Nations) takes place.

At least $3.3 million USD pledged for the first year of the 2020-2024 period. Annual commitments expected to stay on the same level year-on-year.

Participants: representatives of the US, Russia, China, Pakistan, the Afghan government and the Taliban

Only one female participant on the Afghan side: Habiba Sarabi, former governor of Bamyan Province

Number of civilians killed in Q1: 573
Number of civilians wounded in Q1: 1,210
Afghanistan: From May to August

Taliban Advances and Activities

Attempts at Diplomacy

Internal Afghan political developments and conditions on the ground

US activities

May 1

Original US troop withdrawal deadline set by Trump Administration and envisioned in the Doha Agreement.

May 11

Taliban capture Nergh district just outside Kabul.

Jun. 11

Taliban gains control of Imam Sahib district in Kunduz Province and encircles the provincial capital.

Jun. 22

Biden announces relocation of Afghans who worked with US forces to locations outside of Afghanistan while they apply for US visas.

Jun. 25

Ghani and High Council for National Reconciliation Chair Abdullah Abdullah meet with Biden in the White House.

May

Apr. 24–May 4

A 10-day peace summit for Afghanistan is scheduled to take place between the Afghan government and the Taliban in the host country Turkey.

The UN and Qatar would also be in attendance, as part of a US-backed push to advance the peace talks ahead of the May 1 troop withdrawal deadline.

The talks are delayed due to non-participation of the Taliban. The Taliban had previously announced it would not participate in any conferences until all foreign forces completely withdraw from Afghanistan.

A resumption is scheduled after the end of Ramadan in mid-May.

Author: Leonie Sajdik

Not for publication, reproduction, or redistribution.
August 2021 – the Taliban Takeover
Advances and Political Developments
on the Ground

May 1 - Aug. 5, 2021
Total civilians killed: 715
Total pro-government fighters killed: 1,559

Aug. 2–9
US leaves Bagram, largest US airbase in
Afghanistan. Central Command: troop
drawal deadline extended from Aug. 31 to
Aug. 31.

Aug. 6–12
The Taliban seize 10 provincial capitals
within a week.

Aug. 15
Collapse of Afghan
government.
Taliban takeover. Ghani flees the
country.

Aug. 19
Kabul and Jalalabad fall to the Taliban.

Aug. 24–26
CIA director William Burns meets with Taliban
First Deputy PM Abdul Ghani Baradar ahead of
G7 meeting.

Aug. 30
World Bank suspends aid
to Afghanistan.

Aug. 30
The US military withdraws a final contingent from
Afghanistan, ending its presence in Afghanistan.

Aug. 13–14
Taliban captures Herat and Kandahar

Aug. 14
Taliban captures Mazar-i-Sharif, last major northern city.
Only Kabul and Jalalabad remain under Afghan
government rule.

Aug. 18
WPF warns that 14 mil.
Afghans currently suffer from severe hunger.
$200m in food aid would be required before the
winter.
IMF halts over $370m in
resources that were set to arrive in late
August
US freezes $7bn in assets belonging to the
Afghan central bank and stops shipments of
cash to the country.

Aug. 26–29
2 suicide bombings
outside Kabul airport;
thousands of Afghans try
to flee the country
(169 Afghans killed, 13 US
troops killed). ISIS-K claims
responsibility.

US initiates a drone
strike against an
alleged ISIS-K member
in the aftermath of the
bombings. Ten
innocent civilians are
mistakenly killed,
including 7 children.
Afghanistan: From A
Taliban Activities, Attempts at Diplomacy
Conditions on the ground

- Attempts at diplomacy
- Conditions impacting civilians on the ground
- Number of civilians experiencing high acute food insecurity
- Taliban advances and activities

Sep. 4
Taliban announces victory over Panjshir Valley, claiming full control of Afghanistan.

Sep. 7
Taliban announces a list of cabinet members for the new caretaker government of Afghanistan. Mullah Mohammad Hasan Akhound is appointed prime minister.

Sep. 9
Taliban reopen Kabul Airport, allowing foreigners and Afghans with dual citizenship to leave Afghanistan.

Sep. 12
Taliban announces gender segregation at universities and Islamic dress code. Women’s education “is to resume” under these new conditions.

Sep. 21
Taliban add ethnic minorities but no women to their interim cabinet. New deputy ministers from ethnic minorities are named, including Hazaras.

Sep. 28
BBC reports that Afghanistan’s banking system is on the verge of collapse according to the chief executive of the Islamic Bank of Afghanistan.

The economy continues to suffer huge withdrawals, soaring inflation, and a plummeting Afghani currency. Most banks are not functioning or providing full services.

Oct. 12
EU announces it will pledge $1.15B in aid to Afghanistan and neighboring countries that have received Afghan refugees.

- From September to October, nearly 19 million Afghans experience high acute food insecurity due to drought, conflict, and economic crisis.
- 6.8 million Afghans experience emergency levels of acute food insecurity. Most of the critically impacted live in Northern Afghanistan.

---

Author: Leonie Saidik

Not for publication, reproduction, or redistribution.
**Aug. – Nov. 2021**

**Vacancy and Political Developments, draft under the Ground**

**Oct. 20–22**
- Russia hosts meeting with Taliban, China, India, Iran, and Pakistan in Moscow. Objective: discuss terrorism and aid to Afghanistan.
- Pakistan announces $28M in humanitarian aid to Afghanistan and eases travel restrictions.

**Nov. 2**
- Kabul Military Hospital, the largest in the country, hit by deadly blasts and gunfire. ISIS-K claims responsibility.
- Taliban bans the use of foreign currency.

**Nov. 10**
- India hosts regional meeting on Afghanistan with leaders from Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Russia, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

**Taking Note:** November so far
- 618,612 internally displaced persons
- 28,014 affected by natural disasters

**Oct. 26**
- Chinese and Taliban Representatives meet in Doha
- Chinese Foreign Minister Wang meets with Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to discuss Afghanistan’s situation and bilateral relations.

**Nov. 8**
- Taliban announces a nationwide polio vaccination campaign. The estimated target population is Afghanistan’s 10 million children under 5 years of age.

**Nov. 2021–Mar. 2022**

- Projected number of Afghans suffering from high food insecurity: **22.8 million**

Further deterioration in food security expected.
- **22.8 million**: projected number of people experiencing high acute food insecurity
- **13 million**: out of 22.8 million will experience critical acute food security
- **8.7 million**: out of 22.8 million will experience emergency acute food security

*Distribution without express permission*
Afghanistan: From De Facto Taliban Regime to Humanitarian Crisis
Attempts at Diplomacy and Conditions on the Ground: Humanitarian Needs

Dec. 2
“Taliban government” reduces civil servant salaries, including the prime minister, head of intelligence department, and other “government” officials.

Dec. 13
The Afghani loses almost 12% of its value against the dollar in a matter of hours, a sign of the deepening economic crisis and soaring inflation.

Dec. 16
“Taliban supreme court” appoints 69 new judges to 33 provinces. Judges are Shari’a law experts, but have no jurisprudential training.

Dec. 25-26
Taliban dissolves Afghan Election Commission, Ministries of Peace, and Parliamentary Affairs.

Jan. 7
Taliban Religious Police and Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (former Ministry of Women’s Affairs) put up posters of burqas around Kabul, ordering women to cover up.

Jan. 15
Taliban announces that all Afghan girls will be back in school by March 21, the Afghan New Year.

Dec. 10
US Treasury formalizes guidance allowing personal remittances to Afghanistan, providing protection to senders and financial institutions from sanctions on the Taliban.

Dec. 17
Two deadly blasts in Kabul’s largely Shia-populated “Dasht-e-Barchi” district. ISIS-K claims responsibility.

Dec. 30
Taliban issues decree asking barbershops to refrain from shaving and beard-trimming according to Shari’a law.

Dec. Recap
In December, 98% of Afghans experienced insufficient food consumption:
- 9/10 are consuming less expensive food;
- 8/10 are limiting portion sizes; and
- 7/10 are borrowing food.

Before Aug. 15, the average household consumed animal protein/dairy less than once a week, now rarely even once a month. The number of families experiencing difficulty accessing health services has doubled since pre-Aug. 15.

Jan. 10–11
- Iran hosts crucial meeting between senior Taliban officials and self-exiled Afghan opposition leaders to end regional conflict.
- UN launches $5 billion funding appeal for Afghanistan—the largest single country appeal.
- The White House announces $300 million humanitarian assistance from USAID to help humanitarian organizations in Afghanistan and COVID-19 vaccine through COVAX.

Author: Leonie Sajdik

Not for publication, reproduction, or distribution.

Political Developments

Projected number of Afghans impoverished by mid-2022: 38.64 million (97% of population)

Jan. Recap
In January, 95% of Afghans experienced insufficient food consumption. Large-headed households are struggling the most, with nearly 100% facing insufficient food consumption. 50% of households do not have access to health services.
- 88% due to lack of money
- 11% due to long distances to hospitals
People are turning to drastic measures:
- 77% are limiting portion sizes
- 76% are borrowing food

Feb. 15-16
Taliban announces plans to build 110,000 strong army after 6 months in power.
EU and US diplomats meet with Taliban delegation in Doha. EU announces €500 million in aid to Afghanistan through the UN and NGO’s

Feb. 2
Public universities open to female and male students for the first time since Taliban takeover.
Universities enforced gender segregation and gender-separate classes in line with Taliban directives.

Feb. 11
Biden signs an executive order allowing approximately half of the $7 billion in frozen assets from Afghanistan’s central bank to be reserved for 9/11 victims. The remaining $3.5 billion will be set aside in a humanitarian assistance trust fund in Afghanistan.

Feb. 2022
Food security situation remains alarming
Spillover effects of the War in Ukraine worsening the Afghan crisis. In Feb., prices for key commodities in Afghanistan were already 40% higher than in June 2021.

95% of people face insufficient food consumption.
82% are limiting portion sizes
80% are borrowing food

Coping strategies employed at least once a week in average households

Jan. 17
5.3 magnitude earthquake hits Afghanistan’s northwestern provinces of Badghis, Ghor, and Herat, destroying hundreds of homes and causing large-scale casualties.

Jan. 24
Senior Taliban officials, including “Foreign Minister” Murtaza, hold talks with US and European officials in Oslo.
Main outcome: promises of increased humanitarian aid contingent on human rights demands.
Some experts deemed the meeting a “de facto” recognition of the “Taliban government.”

Taking Note:
February so far
- 24.4 million people in need of humanitarian assistance
- 13.1 million children in need of humanitarian assistance
- 1.1 million acutely malnourished children under the age of 5

Meeting Sindian-led key leaders.
- 6 million in need of assistance and 200,000,000 million in need of assistance
- Largest ever humanitarian aid organization

Independent organizations: 1 million doses
Afghanistan: From May Taliban Regulation
Attempts at Diplomacy and
Conditions on the Ground: Humanitarian N

Mar. 14
US State Department announces shutdown of Afghan missions in Washington, New York, and Los Angeles. State Department’s Office of Foreign Missions will assume authority over the missions.

Mar. 17
Taliban raids a private TV station to stop the broadcasting of foreign TV dramas “hurting society’s religious sentiments and threatening national security.”

Mar. 21
“International Humanitarian Trust Fund” launched by Organization of Islamic Cooperation and Islamic Development Bank in Saudi Arabia.

Mar. 23
Taliban bans Afghan girls from attending secondary school (beyond 6th grade) on the day of the Afghan New Year.

Mar. 24
China’s Foreign Minister Wang meets with Taliban’s “Foreign Minister” Mulla Ali in Kabul for talks.

Mar. 27
Taliban directs airlines at Kabul International Airport to prevent women from boarding flights without a male chaperone. Dozens of women, including dual nationals, are blocked from boarding domestic and overseas flights.

Mar. Recap
In March, 93% of Afghans experienced insufficient food consumption. Pre Aug. 15, this was at 81%. Only 7% of people have enough to eat. 63% of people are adopting crisis coping strategies.

Apr. 16
Pakistan’s Army carries air strikes in Khost Province following months of tensions with Afghanistan. Pakistan claims these as a tactic against the Taliban, who it alleges have been instigating attacks inside Pakistan from Afghan territory.

Apr. 3 - 6
Taliban bans opium production, use, and cultivation. The Taliban is now, once again, the world’s largest producer of opium, with the global opium market’s global production at $1.4 billion in 2021.

China agrees to accept 1,000 diplomats of the Taliban government to the People’s Republic of China.

Russian Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov holds diplomatic talks with the Taliban in Moscow, proposing the resumption of full diplomatic relations.

Author: Leonie Sajdik

Not for publication, reproduction, or redistribution.
Apr. Recap
In April, 92% of Afghans experienced insufficient food consumption.
- 83% of households are struggling the most, with nearly 98% facing insufficient food consumption, turning to more drastic measures to cope than 59% of households.
- 59% of households are adopting crisis-coping strategies.

May 7
Taliban orders Afghan women to wear head-to-toe burqa with only their eyes visible in public. Male relatives face imprisonment or layoffs in case of the woman’s noncompliance. Women are ordered to leave their homes “only when necessary.”

May 16 & 19
Taliban announces dissolution of five entities established by former Afghan government, including the Afghanistan Human Rights Commission and the Independent Oversight Commission for the Implementation of the Afghan Constitution.
Taliban’s Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice orders female Afghan TV presenters to cover their faces on air.

May 21
US special envoy on Afghanistan Thomas West meets with Taliban’s “foreign minister” in Doha, raising the improvement of women’s education, freedom of movement and work as a condition for progress to normalized relations.

Apr. 26
Iran confirms Taliban diplomats at Afghan Embassy in Tehran.

May 14
Taliban announces a $501 million budget deficit for the 2022 financial year in its first annual national budget announcement. Spending is foreseen at $2.6 billion, and domestic revenue at $2.1 billion. This follows a 34% decline in per capita income between the end of 2020 and beginning of 2021 (via World Bank).

May Recap
92% of Afghans face insufficient food consumption.
57% of Afghans are adopting crisis-coping strategies.
99% of female-headed households face insufficient food consumption.
50% of households’ incomes deteriorated, 9% increase since April.
+4% increase in price of wheat flour
+8% increase in price of cooking oil

Jan. - June 2022
Projected number of Afghans impoverished by mid-2022: 38.64 million
(97% of population)
Afghanistan: From June
Taliban Regulation
Attempts at Diplomacy and
Conditions on the Ground: Humanitarian

Jun. 4
Afghanistan's exports to
Pakistan lead to a bilateral
trade balance in
Afghanistan's favor for the
first time, Pakistan
confirms.

Jun. 18
ISIS-K claims responsibility
for attack on Sikh Temple in
Kabul

Jun. 1
Pakistani government
sends delegation to Kabul
to negotiate ceasefire
with Pakistani Taliban.

Jun. 2
Indian officials meet with
Taliban for the first time
since Aug. 15 takeover and
closure of Indian embassy
in Kabul to discuss
diplomatic relations, trade,
and humanitarian aid.

Jun. 13
World Bank announces
$195 million package
for Afghanistan, of
which $150 million is
set aside as a lifeline
for rural families.

Jun. 22
5.9 magnitude
earthquake strikes
Southeastern
Afghanistan, leaving
1,000+ estimated
casualties and 1,500-
plus injured. Over 80%
of homes left damaged in
Khost and Pakhtika
provinces. Taliban
subsequently urges US to
unfreeze Afghan reserves
and lift sanctions.

Taking Note:
Mid-Year Check-In
Economic Factors
Millions of dollars in lost income.
In June, 60% of households
experienced income deterioration.
Price Spikes for Key Commodities.
Spillover effect of Ukraine War

War in Ukraine and
Narcotics Trade
The UNODC reports that
control in Ukraine given
state of the conflict open
door for increased drug
The conflict is likely to make
Afghanistan's humanitarian
crisis more vulnerable to
drug. In Afghanistan, incentive for illegal opium
cultivation is high, due to
taliban's ban on product.

Economic Factors continued
Collapse of Afghanistan's banking
sector
US's freezing of Afghan Central
Bank assets has cut Afghanistan off
from the international banking
system, prompting a liquidity crisis
and nationwide shortage of USD
and Afghani banknotes.

Private Afghan banks are unable to
cover withdrawals by depositors,
including aid organizations, due to
lack of cash.

Suspension of additional budgetary
assistance
from the IMF, USAID, and the
Asian Development Bank

Lack of agreement between US and
Taliban

Pre-Aug. 15, India was the
region's largest development aid
provider to Afghanistan since
2003. India's negotiations reflect
its strategic interests in regaining
its previous soft-power presence
in Afghanistan.

Author: Leonie Sajdik
**July 2022 – Jul. 2022**

**Policies and Strategies**

**Political Developments**

- **Women’s Rights, Economic Issues**

---

**Jul. Recap**

- **89%** of Afghans face insufficient food consumption.
- **48%** of Afghans are adopting crisis-cooperating strategies.
- **96%** of households face insufficient food consumption.
- **50%** of Afghans turn to drastic measures to put food on the table.

---

**Jul. 7**

India reopens its Kabul embassy with small diplomatic presence. The Indian Foreign Ministry asserts the reopening will facilitate better coordination of humanitarian assistance deliveries. Experts also cite security assurances that Afghan territory not be used by Pakistan against India—particularly the Kashmir insurgency movement— as a factor.

---

**Jul. 16**

De facto Taliban government triples coal prices to raise revenue from its mining sector. Rising global coal prices due to the Ukraine War prompted Pakistan to increase coal imports from Afghanistan as an alternative, cheaper coal source. Customs duties from coal exports to Pakistan are a key revenue source for the Taliban. In recent months, Pakistan eased the visa regime for Afghans and removed duties on all Afghan imports to ease bilateral trade.

---

**Jul. 22**

Black Sea Grain Initiative signed in Istanbul for an initial period of 120 days until Nov. 2022. The UN-brokered deal seeks to mitigate grain and fertilizer export blockades imposed on Ukraine by Russia on the territory of the Black Sea. Countries embroiled in humanitarian crises such as Afghanistan are especially affected by the ongoing world food crisis.

---

**Jul. 26**

Tashkent International Conference on Afghanistan sees more than 30 countries attend and engage with de facto Taliban government.

**Main takeaways:**

- Taliban “Foreign Minister” Muttaki adamant on foreign investment and normalization of relations with the US.
- Russia’s representative blames American and Western support of the previous “corrupt” Afghan “puppet governments” for current humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, implying hypocrisy in current punitive policies.
- China’s Foreign Minister Wang announces China will not charge tariffs on 98% of Afghan import foods and is willing to import more specialty products from Afghanistan.
- US and Taliban exchange proposals for release of US-held Afghan Central Bank reserves into a trust fund.

---

Redistribution without express permission
August: Economic Situation

Since end-June 2022, the Afghani depreciated against major currencies. Aug. 11, 2022 status: Afghani trading close to 89.91 per ISO, 4.2% below its pre-Aug. 15, 2021 value. Revenue collection slightly higher than last year:
As of Aug. 16, 2022, revenue collection reached AFN 100 billion since Dec. 22, 2021, higher than AFN 98.8 billion last year.

Aug. Recap—One Year On

89% of Afghans face insufficient food consumption. This is the highest in the world.
92% of household income is spent on food, leaving little left.

Food prices in Aug. 2022 vs. Aug. 2021 increased drastically:
+40% price of wheat
+30% price of high quality rice
+31% price of sugar

In 2020, a laborer would have been able to purchase 3.3 kg of wheat against the daily wage. In 2021, this was 2.3 kg. In Aug. 2022, this dropped to 1.3 kg.
Aug. 2022 – Oct. 2022
Taliban and Policies

Political Developments
Crisis, Women's Rights, Economic Issues

Sep. 19–21
US frees last American
prisoner swap for
Taliban drug lord.

Sep. 30
ISIS-K suicide bombing in Kabul
private tutoring center kills
scores of students, boys, but
mainly Hazara girls.
Girls believed to have been main
targets, as bomb was detonated
in the girls’ section of the gender-
segregated classroom.

Oct. 10
Taliban bans foreign journalists,
accusing them of misreporting.
Numerous recent accounts
from foreign journalists allege
detention, interrogation, abuse,
and intimidation at the
hands of the Taliban for what
militants deem as “overly”
biased and critical reporting
of its governance.

October
Russian Wagner Group
reportedly recruiting former
US-trained Afghan
commandos exiled in Iran
into a “special foreign legion”
for War in Ukraine.

Sep. 27–29
Russia approves provisional deal
with Taliban for oil, gas, and
grain exports to Afghanistan.
-1 million metric tons of
gasoline,
-1 million tons of diesel,
-500,000 tons of liquefied
petroleum gas,
-2 million tons of wheat.

Ukrainian wheat exports make
their way to Afghanistan
thanks to Black Sea Grain Deal.
-30,000 tons of wheat destined for
Afghanistan,
-UN-chartered humanitarian
vessels depart Odessa port for
Turkey, awaiting further shipment
toward countries in need.

Sep. 27
Afghanistan fails election bid for
UN Human Rights Council in
General Assembly vote.

US reveals further sanctions on
Taliban over treatment of
women: visa restrictions for
current/former Taliban members
and other parties involved in
the repression of women.

Oct. 17
Taliban bans women from
pursuing certain university
subjects. Affected subjects:
civil engineering, journalism,
vetinary, agriculture, and
geology.

Sep–Oct. Recap
90% of Afghans face insufficient
food consumption.
90% of household income is
spent on food
84% of households are using
crisis-coping strategies.
50% of Afghans turning to
coping strategies to put
food on the table.
89% buying less expensive/
preferred food
73% borrowing to buy food

Aug. 2021 vs. Aug. 2022
Since the Taliban takeover in Aug. 2021, 89%
(ca. 9/10) of Afghans face insufficient food
consumption. (8% + increase over one year)
Afghanistan: From November
Taliban Regulation
Attempts at Diplomacy and
Conditions on the Ground: Humanitarian N

Nov. 10
Taliban bans women from visiting Kabul parks.
Previously women were only allowed to visit parks three days a week (men four) in line with Taliban’s gender-segregation policy.

Nov. 14
Taliban Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada orders full implementation of Sharia law in Afghanistan. This includes public executions, stonings, floggings for adulterers, and limb amputations for thieves.

Nov. 23
Taliban carries out public flogging in front of thousands of onlookers at a football stadium in Logar region. 3 women among those flogged, in the second flogging of the month.

Nov. 30
Bombing of religious school (Madrasa) in Samangan Province kills 15 students and wounds dozens more. ISIS-K suspected to be responsible.

Dec. 1–2
1. Taliban bans VOA, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty broadcasts, which were carried out in Pashto and Dari.
2. Pakistan’s top diplomat in Afghanistan survives an assassination attempt by ISIS-K.

Dec. 7–13
7. Taliban carries out first public execution since retaking power.
   - Man accused of murder sentenced to death by shooting by the Taliban
   - Taliban appoints murder victim’s father as executioner.

11. Border clashes between Afghanistan and Pakistan cause civilian casualties on both sides.

13. ISIS-K targets Chinese nationals and Taliban members in attempted shooting at Kabul hotel.
   - Several Chinese nationals injured
   - Several Taliban casualties

Nov. Recap
- 89% of Afghans face insufficient food consumption.
  - For five months in a row, >9/10 households are not consuming enough food.

- 62% of households experienced income decreases in November.

- 88% of household income is spent on food.

- 53% of Afghans implementing crisis-coping strategies to put food on the table.
  Most households are borrowing food or reducing adult meal portions so that others can eat.

Author: Leonie Sajdik

Not for publication, reproduction, or distribution without permission.
Nov. 2022 – Mar. 2023
- 20 million Afghans projected to be acutely food insecure. 6 million of these will experience malnourishment at emergency levels.

Dec. 14–20
- Taliban publicly flog 27, including two women, for theft, adultery, and other crimes.
- Taliban indefinitely bans Afghan women from university education.

Dec. 24
- Taliban bans women from working for local and foreign NGOs.
  - Female NGO employees told to stop working until further notice.
  - Move prompted amid reports that some women were allegedly not abiding by Taliban’s rules for Islamic dress code.
  - At least 7 international NGOs to suspend their operations in Afghanistan, affirming they cannot operate without female staff.
  - UN subsequently halts some of its programs in Afghanistan.

Jan. 17
- Several NGOs, including the International Rescue Committee, Save the Children, and CARE, resume operations with female staff after assurances from Taliban that women could work in health sector.

Jan. 28
- Taliban indefinitely bans girls from private university entrance exams. Taliban sends a letter to private universities, directing them not to enroll female students for the upcoming spring semester.

Dec. Recap
- 92% of Afghans face insufficient food consumption.
- +50% of Afghans implementing crisis-coping strategies to survive.
- 88% of household income is being spent on food.
- 8% of households received no income at all.

Jan. 15
- Gunmen assassinate former female parliamentarian and lawmaker Mursal Nabizada in her Kabul home, marking the first assassination of a politician of the former government since Aug. 15, 2021.

Jan. 18
- Subfreezing (-33C/-27F) temperatures kill at least 70 people and 70,000 cattle. Deadly cold wave sweeps across Afghanistan in what meteorologists describe as the coldest winter in years.

2023 1st Quarter Projections
- 20 million Afghans are projected to be acutely food-insecure between Nov. 2022 – Mar. 2023.
- +6 million Afghans’ malnourishment is at an emergency level.
- 3rd consecutive year of drought; 30/34 provinces report extremely low water quality.
Taliban Decrees on Women 2020-2023

with Contextual Information

2022

2023
Afghanistan: A History of Coups

It is essential to understand Afghanistan's tumultuous recent history in order to project its future. Afghanistan’s humanitarian and financial crises flow directly from its ongoing crisis of governance, which is worsening by the day.
Jul. 1973
July 17, 1973: General and Prince Mohammed Daoud Khan overthrows King Mohammed Zahir Shah, ending two centuries of Afghan monarchy and establishing the Republic of Afghanistan under a one-party system with Khan as president.

Apr. 1978
April 27, 1978: the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) assassinates President Khan and overthrows his government in a pro-communist coup. Nur Mohammed Taraki becomes president and prime minister. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is established. Taraki transfers his post of prime minister to Hazifullah Amin in March ’79, retaining his position as president. Taraki proclaims a “socialist revolution,” and signs a 20-year “friendship treaty” with the Soviet Union.

Sep. 1979
September 14, 1979: Amin overthrows Taraki, declaring himself president. Amin pursues nationalist policies. His era of rule is marked by rapprochement with the US and Pakistan, fueling distrust from the USSR.

Dec. 1979
Dec 27, 1979: Growing discontent over Amin’s communist dictatorship, land and social reform, and violation of the Afghan constitution creates an unstable political situation in Afghanistan. The Samsung versus Parcham rift in the PDPA grows deep. In December, the USSR forms an alliance with Babrak Karmal, leader of the Parcham faction. On Dec 24, the Soviet Union invades Afghanistan. Three months later, Amin is assassinated and Karmal installed as successor.

Mar. 1990
Mar. 6, 1990: General Shah Nawaz T. attempts to overthrow President Mohammed Najibullah. Tajik and Uzbek forces, supported by the Hezb-e-Islam faction of the Mujahideen, successfully repel the invasion, the CIA and Pakistan’s ISI worked closely to recruit Muslims to fight the Soviet Union. The ISI acted as the go-to organization for the CIA in the Afghan war, favoring the Mujahideen.

Author: Leonie Sajdik

Not for publication, reproduction or re-use.
Apr. 1992
Apr. 15, 1992: After the withdrawal of Soviet forces and collapse of the USSR, Najibullah, Karmal’s successor, is forced from office by Mujahideen rebels. Equipped with US weapons, the Mujahideen engage in a bloody civil war between rival factions from 1992 to 1996.

Sep. 1996
Sep. 27, 1996: Conflict between warring Mujahideen forces gives rise to the Taliban. Religious clerics with Salafist and Pashtunwali ideology, the Taliban grows increasingly stronger, taking over Kandahar in 1994 and capturing Kabul in 1996. Najibullah is executed, the Taliban declares the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan ruling under strict Sharia law, committing scores of human rights abuses and cracking down on women’s freedoms. A brutal civil war between the Northern Alliance and Taliban ensues from 1996 to 2001.

Jan. 1994
Jan. 1, 1994: Helmatyar (prime minister since 1992 and still backed by the Pakistani ISI) unsuccessfully attempts to overthrow then President Burhanuddin Rabbani. The ISI sets its sights on a new Afghan ruling power favorable to Pakistan: the Taliban. The ISI significantly boosts Mullah Muhammad Omar’s then small-scale movement through financial, intelligence, military and direct combat support, leading to the Taliban’s capture of Kandahar City in Nov. 1994 and its further expansions.

Oct. 2001-Aug. 2021
Oct. 7, 2001: The US and allies invade Afghanistan, toppling the Taliban regime it had accused of harboring Al-Qaeda terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks. This marks the start of the US’s 20-year war in Afghanistan. The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is established in 2004. After the withdrawal of American troops, the Taliban retakes Kabul on August 15, 2021. President Ashraf Ghani flees and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is redeclared.

distribution without express permission
Terms of Use

In downloading or otherwise employing this information, users indicate that:

They understand that the materials downloaded from the website are protected under United States Copyright Law (Title 17, United States Code). This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.

They will use the material only for educational, scholarly, and other noncommercial purposes without written permission.

They will not sell, transfer, assign, license, lease, or otherwise convey any portion of this information to any third party. Republication or display on a third party's website requires the express written permission of the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University or the Princeton University Library.

They understand that any quotations from interviewees or authors reflect their personal points of view. Although all efforts have been made to ensure the accuracy of the information collected, Princeton University does not warrant the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, or other characteristics of any material available online.

They acknowledge that the content and/or format of the archive and the site may be revised, updated or otherwise modified from time to time.

They accept that access to and use of the archive are at their own risk. They shall not hold Princeton University liable for any loss or damages resulting from the use of information in the archive. Princeton University assumes no liability for any errors or omissions with respect to the functioning of the archive.

In all publications, presentations or other communications that incorporate or otherwise rely on information from this archive, they will acknowledge that such information was obtained through the Liechtenstein Institute of Self-Determination at Princeton University website. Our status (and that of any identified contributors) as the authors of material must always be acknowledged and a full credit given containing the following information:

Author(s) or Editor(s) if listed, Full title, Year of publication, “Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University”, Number of Paper.

© 2023, Trustees of Princeton University