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INTRODUCTION

Wolfgang Danspeckgruber

The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University, LISD, has arranged for several Liechtenstein Colloquia, LCM, and initiatives during the 2017 Austrian chairmanship of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This compendium should offer an overview of key findings and important meetings.

Keywords of these LCM were “unconventional and out-of-the-box thinking,” non-polemic, critical, deep substantive, innovative, and realistic in an unruly world. The final LCM prior to the 24th Ministerial Council was called together with the objective to discuss results and initiatives of the Austrian chairmanship and LISD contributions within the emerging framework of a “global actors’ system” (please see the WFD Discussion Background); to critically analyze the situation concerning effective and meaningful international initiatives at the end of 2017, and to search for perceptive and emphatic, while realistic and sustainable ways to stabilize.

This OSCE-LCM Results Compendium is comprised of four segments and an Appendix: i.) Introductory Segment with an overview of the key events; followed by a Chair’s Summary with key findings, a WFD-Discussion Background, the translations of “threat” and “crisis”, and a brief summary of three key LCM “Conceptual Conclusions,” which the Liechtenstein Institute at Princeton University had organized in 2017: on “Rebuilding Trust, Dialogue and interaction” in May, on “Religion, Values and Spirituality” in June in Wien and, following a special colloquium on “China in Europe” a meeting on “Crises cataloging, evaluations and prioritization” in Triesenberg, Liechtenstein, August 2017.

ii.) Segment offers the longer versions of these meeting summaries;
iv.) Segment is reprinting the key LCM and LISD materials on security – August 2016, 2017, and crises cataloging, as well as special charts and explanatory graphs;
v.) Appendix: reprinting the programs of 8 OSCE Chairmanship related LCMs.

For summarizing and compiling as well as for brilliantly organizing this all, I would like to express my gratitude and appreciation to my wonderful LISD team, particularly to Ms. Rana Ibrahim and also the support and interest by the Austrian CiO Leadership, particularly Amb. Christian Strohal. Nevertheless, please address any critique and suggestions to me.

Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Princeton, 12 December 2017

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List of LISD Colloquia and Initiatives
August 2016 to November 2017

Multilateral Responses to Emerging Threats
Stadtpalais Liechtenstein & Hotel Bristol, Vienna, Austria
26, 27 November 2017

Crises Cataloging, Evaluation, and Prioritization
Triesenberg, Principality of Liechtenstein
22-24 August 2017

China in Europe:
Chinese Interests from Lisbon to Vladivostok
Triesenberg, Principality of Liechtenstein
17-20 August 2017

Religion, Values, and Spirituality:
Impact on Diplomacy and Security
Stadtpalais Liechtenstein, Vienna, Austria
5-7 June 2017

Rebuilding Trust
Dialogue – Interaction – Crisis Management
Garden Palais Liechtenstein, Vienna, Austria
11-13 May 2017

The United States Post-Presidential Elections
and her Relations with EU-Ru-Asia
LISD, Bendheim Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey,
10 December 2016
The Project on Generational Perspectives on National and International Security

LISD, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, Saturday, 10 December 2016

Triesenberg, Principality of Liechtenstein
24-27 August 2016

LISD Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University
1-3 March, 2017

European Forum Alpbach, Austria
26-27 August 2017

* * *

Security:
Internal and External – Its Interactions & Perceptions
Triesenberg, Principality of Liechtenstein
24-27 August 2016

* * *

Security:
Internal – External – Interactions – Perceptions
Hall of the States, Washington, D.C., U.S.A.
4 August 2016

* * *

Debriefing - Austrian Chairmanship Team
Stadtpalais Liechtenstein, Vienna, Austria
18 December 2016

* * *

Team Retreat of the Austrian Chairmanship Team
Of the OSCE
Schloss Wilfersdorf, Lower Austria,
August 2016

* * *
Change: cost-benefit calculation / opportunity costs / incentive to cooperate versus enticing to implement change. (‘old rules, no rules, new rules, ‘my’ rules’)

19th Century meets 22nd Century – science & technology, Realpolitik, generational change; The old order gone, new order not yet in, “think the unthinkable”

China: emerging key actor (technologic capability, market, size, geopolitical and strategic interests) in Central Asia, wider Middle East, EU-Europe

Economy & interests / connectivity: globalization; competition between transit- & ‘silk’ roads via Arctic versus Central Asian; high speed rails, cyber, Connectivity (insourcing versus outsourcing).

Key non-state-actors: groups of people, corporations, powerful individual actors, all that plus states included in global actors framework

Democratization of warfare: wider distribution of cheaper weapons and dual use / weaponization of cyber, etc., arms race with hypersonic weapons, etc, favoring new powers and non-state actors – propensity of more and new forms of conflict with covered special forces operation;

Cyber & “robotic doctor / priest”: rapidly emerging world, artificial (super) intelligence, (AsI), robotics; IVth industrial revolution, social media, shapes all, including diplomacy.

Multiple realities
“Perception forms reality” - fight the fake: – spoilers / active deep intervention into societies; immersion

Identity & communal empowerment: Amplification of communal and national identities (counter to globalization), a new generation of leaders, advanced technologic capabilities, brings increased capability for independence, hence appeal of self-determination.

‘Stem the Trend’ and stabilize – less is more: small meaningful successes; specific meetings with powerful influential actors

The Will is key; person-to-person talk and discussion; small meetings; unruly, unusual times demand unusual ways to develop a will to cooperate for peace and stability.

Let us jointly define & avoid what we do not want to happen: going to people, communities, having personal contact, candid open dialogue, respecting, arguing, and listening – this is why an organization like the OSCE is so important today.
Introduction

At the end of 2017, the political security situation in the OSCE region – comprised of 57 states, plus the neighborhood – is confronted by multiple short term and long term challenges which are often met with a perception of uncertainty, mistrust, and fatigue. In our times, the old order seemingly doesn’t work anymore, a new stabilization has not yet emerged, thus everything is possible and one must plan and be ready for the unthinkable.

Today in geopolitics, 19th century meets 22nd (traditional power politics, Vielstaaten Realpolitik in the time of globalization, robotics and A.I., and generational change) - with all this we hence live in unruly times when the ‘new normal’ seemingly comprises the hitherto considered “un-normal”. In the perception of many these times are extraordinary - so we need hitherto unusual or extraordinary methods to stabilize.

In terms of security-relevant developments from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, to the Urals, to Vladivostok, and North East Asia would even suggest that some address this as “the unthinkable”. Concerns range from fundamental changes and rejuvenations in leadership, to concerns about weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, potentially new hot conflict and an intensification of crises in the Middle East, to populism and re-emerging strives for self-determination. All this is combined with serious competition of crises and crisis fatigue, increasing dissatisfaction with the existing order and calls for a new order and appropriate leadership.

What does this mean for the mission and implementation of the world’s largest regional security organization, the OSCE? How can one consider appropriate steps for stabilization and possible anticipatory responses on national, international, and multilateral levels? In times when local issues and threats can escalate into regional and national, even international, concerns nearly instantaneously, when crises encompass such different themes as refugees, migration, cyber security, economic & energy challenges, great power politics, natural disasters, climate change, to name only a few, it is important to have anticipatory and in-crisis response available. Fatigue, mistrust, change of order perception and uncertainty add; hence one must address these concerns as well.

Fundamental conceptual background:

- A system is in balance / develops out of balance in case its members consider the benefits of change higher than the costs incurred = systems change
- The global actors’ system: state & non-state actors & corporations & powerful individual actors
- Any actor has 3+1 considerations (factors Stakes, Costs, Time + perception) & cost-benefit-calculation
- Level of analysis: communal/local - national - continental – global
➢ Multidimensional fatigue: systemic, leadership, crises, even democracy and globalization

➢ Reinvigoration of national and communal identities, and religious fervor.

Technical development and intrusion:

➢ On the other hand, the ambitions and ideals of the new generation combined with the technological capabilities to do so - from the in real-time interconnected global environment, with the internet, www.2.0, via the hand-held devices, to 3-D printing, domestic alternative energy to artificial intelligence, A.I., machine learning, & sentiment; “in.sourcing” instead of “out.sourcing” and robotics / drones autonomous operations. This all and Uber-ization and the fourth industrial revolution breed critical uncertainty.

➢ Individual empowerment “having everything on one’s fingertips” - plus “immersion” of real-time information with hand-held device.

➢ So it seems the capability of the smallest cell/unit of state has dramatically increased, but state power has also acquired new forms of control and will fight back.

➢ This all can potentially provide for nearly revolutionary tensions between “the have - have-nots” or between those who can participate and benefit versus those who can’t. Also for serious differences in industrial technological development and income distribution with profound economic and financial ramifications.

“war is the father of all and the ruler of all” - Heraklit of Ephesus

➢ In military operations and a potential hot conflict today anything goes - from the basic, traditional war-fighting to (“invisible”) special forces wars - trolls, cyber, robots, A.I., autonomous weapon systems, micro-drones + face recognition, 360-degree warfare: autonomous weapon systems, swarm systems – on the ground, on sea, underwater, air, space, cyber; operating in real time, regional, potentially continental or global.

➢ In today’s world multi-use technology, all dimensions, all sizes, all continents - even simultaneously.

➢ Privatization of warfare / mix between public and private, instrumentalization of private security; official, semi- official, and criminal networks - connecting to cyber ...Thinking the unthinkable.
Key Assumptions

Assumption #1:

The OSCE might be weakened because of the overall strategic reality but it and its original mission of dialogue and direct interaction seems today more important than ever (while not really working as planned). Let us get back to the roots – in our emerging real time interdependent global actor’s system.

The OSCE is necessary for keeping information channels open and for having concrete engagement with situations on the ground and experts on the ground and in the capitals. We now have the global actor’s system (comprising states, powerful individual actors, corporations and non-state actors). Within this system, a rather flexible organization offering regular direct personal contacts between representatives of key actors, and experience and information on the ground, like the OSCE can be much more powerful and effective than ever before. But we need to see this as part of the global actor’s system, to be able to deal with the unconventional actions of leaders.

Assumption #2:

Today, the new leaderships’ ambitions and concerns together with sophisticated technology (see above) interact with classical power politics – 19th century meets 22nd century. There traditional great power politics, multipolarity and non-state actors, classical sovereignty, weapons of mass destruction, leadership (generational) change & crises, and self-determination (individual empowerment), robotics are forming a new normal - but only in some regions, not everywhere - hence huge regional differences. The key for anything is the political WILL.

There seems to exist the capability of the “deep state” to resist too dangerous and unstable politics or strategies, just observe the USA-North Korea relationship 2017. The international system shows resilience and so far, favor for peace. 2017 the OSCE is faced with challenges within and between its great power players. There are various “complex political problem sites;” Ukraine, Caucuses, the Balkans, the Turkish region, even regions in Western Europe; continued crises and war in and around Syria, Lebanon, Libya, tensions concerning Iran, and the Gulf States, etc. In addition, one is witnessing emerging populism and political or democracy fatigue in Poland, Hungary, etc.

History and geography have one thing in common - they happened; Geography remains, is present - but History is of the past / can be reinterpreted and rewritten; if knowledge of history is declining, then the appropriate points of reference are missing, and history can easily repeat itself… (the restraints/experiences of the older generation are passing / … for many (particularly in Europe or in North America) a hot conflict has been far away, the Cold War is of the deep past.)

European security seems to be seeing a re-emerging axis of stability between Berlin and Paris and perhaps a new role of the European Union. How to bring more stable situation to the OSCE region – which ranges also from the Urals to Vladivostok, where perceptions on leadership, power, security, fears and challenges are presumably different than west of the Urals, where other powers exert great influence, where one witnesses pervasive tensions.
The pendulum swings back / after pure and intense globalization, communalism and nationalism appeals again - but the established and deep state is going to resist change as well. The question we now have is what does this all mean for a large regional organization that works on security and cooperation amongst 1.5 billion people? How can one adapt and improve its workings?

**Assumption #3:**

**Unusual times demand unusual actions – in times of mistrust and manipulation, loss of direct personal communication, even personal contacts - there is a need for honest and earnest dialogue and interaction. The more technologization the more direct personal contact is needed.**

In a time when current and new leadership seemingly tests “old rules, or no rules - new rules, or my rules,” one has to (re-) learn how to speak, how to listen, how to empathize and try to comprehend the other; to realize the power of perception and misperception. It is also evident that the current opportunities for change offer continued incentives for some (to redraw borders, etc.) while serious challenges for others. Negotiations should continue, in earnest and with focus and purpose. Small limited areas of successful cooperation and stabilization can go a long way.

In a time of ever increasing (social) media influence and robotization, where traditional politics and strategic interests, leadership, and the role of the community and state strive besides public and private organizations and non-state actors; a time where there is overwhelming information and develop. This all must be confronted by personal direct contact, rebuilding of trust, fighting untruth and misrepresentation with trust; having extensive and validated people to people contact and going into the field and being present and reassuring everyone of a positive and viable and sustainable way forward. Challenges may be fearful and tiresome, but they are energizing and offer opportunities.

**Conclusion:**

The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University, LISD, will be dedicated to the following avenues for cooperation with emerging actors to find better solutions to threats and crises throughout the OSCE area:

- LISD will provide social media distributed education and clarification – to the best of knowledge, crash courses in history regarding crises background and possible development in the wider environment; instruments like the Princeton encyclopedia on self-determination (PESD) and DIRMAIS;
- Offering a voice of reason, reliable information and common sense regarding interpretation of current emerging threats and global crises. Through conceptual models, LISD will identify the specific ways and means to find possible responses;
- Lastly, LISD is committed to the following: “If there is fake news, one is obliged to fight back”. LISD will provide information with indisputable integrity.
- To judge government (and determination of one’s destiny), one can only judge it based on if every man, woman, child and elder is better off. Government is to make people secure and happy gentis felicitas.
In all that, there is hope, nevertheless!

If one can develop small areas of success, dimensions of cooperation, gain trust in some situations; and hence begin to create a counter trend – of trust and cooperation. The old world-order seems not to work effectively any longer, but a new order does not work yet, so nothing seems impossible – and one must prepare for “the unthinkable”. Nevertheless, any actor performs according to a cost- benefit analyses for its objective, engagement (or their dis-engagement) in a collaborative, deliberative processes. If actors see value in cooperation, they will participate. As cyber/robotic challenges and natural/environmental disaster have shown: in view of such overwhelming crises experiences cooperation is opportune, easy and happens. If the costs of cooperation however exceed the costs of abstaining, or even counteracting; if that later even could be advantageous to an actor’s interests, then it might well be tempted to withhold cooperation.

Implicitly or explicitly, new initiatives should seek to highlight benefits and lower costs for participants, leading actors to value (continued) cooperation, to “work with” instead of “against”. There is a relationship that is built on the understanding of previous mistakes and successes, but the future is uncertain and one should try to incentivize parties for participation. To wait for trust to appear to engage is to misunderstand how trust emerges and is sustained. Building trust is a product of hard sustained work, and the will to do so. Trust is built on confidence – but confidence cannot be without truth, nor can trust be. Trust also requires honest and earnest conversation, readiness to listen sincerely and understand, and to speak earnestly and respectfully. Hence, if one realizes that non-truth is told and propagated, one must contradict and set the record straight. Silence equals acquiescence.

This work can be but only a small step contributing to an earnest process re-establishing trust, confidence, dialogue, and hence meaningful cooperation in the OSCE region.

*   *   *   *
DEFINING “THREAT”

**ENGLISH**

*Threat, noun*

1. A statement of an intention to inflict pain, injury, damage, or other hostile action on someone in retribution for something done or not done.

2. A person or thing likely to cause damage or danger

3. The possibility of trouble, danger, or ruin.

(Middle English thret coercion, Middle High German drôz annoyance, Latin trudere to push, thrust;)

**GERMAN**

*die Bedrohung, Substantiv (fem.)*

1. Jmdn. drohen, ihm Gewalt anzutun
   
   To threaten someone to hurt them

2. Eine Gefahr für jmdn., etw. bilden, jmdn., etw. Gefährden
   
   A danger for someone, to put someone in danger

**SPANISH**

*La Amenaza, sustantivo (fem.)*

1. Delito consistente en intimidar a alguien con el anuncio de la provocación de un mal grave para él o su familia.

   A crime consisting of the intimidation of a person with the announcement of a provocation of grave harm for him or his family.

**FRENCH**

*Menace, nom (f.)*

1. Action de menacer; parole, comportement par lesquels on indique à quelqu'un qu'on a l'intention de lui nuire, de lui faire du mal, de le contraindre à agir contre son gré.

   Act of threatening; word or behaviour through which one demonstrates one's intention to hurt someone or force them to act against their will.

2. Signe, indice qui laisse prévoir quelque chose de dangereux, de nuisible.

   Sign, indication showing that something bad might occur.

**ITALIAN**

*La Minaccia, sostantivo (fem.)*

1. Parola o atto finalizzati a spaventare, con la prospettiva di un danno, un male, un castigo ecc., e quindi a dissuadere o a costringere a fare qualcosa

   A word or act undertaken to scare, with the prospective of damage, hurt, punishment etc., and therefore intended] to dissuade or constringe [a person] to do something

2. Reato commesso da chi provoca in altri il timore di un danno ingiusto

   A crime committed by whomever provokes terror of unjust damage or harm in others

**CHINESE**

威胁，verb

威逼胁迫。用威力使人服从。

To coerce through intimidation. Use formidable power to make people cooperate.

**RUSSIAN**

*Угроза (ooh-GROZ-ah)*

1. обещание причинить зло - a promise to inflict evil

2. возможная опасность - a potential danger

**ARABIC**

خَطْر [kāṭar], noun

1. (exposed to a possibility of suffering harm or injury)

2. (a menacing intent to inflict harm)

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A crisis represents a real or perceived challenge to the sustainability of the status quo, which demands, or is perceived to demand, an urgent decision. Over time, threats and challenges can develop into negative trends that, if not addressed, can erupt into crises. The prevention of, or solution to a crisis requires the instinct, will, and capacity to do so. (LCM Triesenberg Aug ‘17)

**ENGLISH**

*Crisis, noun*
1. A time of intense difficulty or danger
2. The turning point of a disease when an important changes take place, indicating either recover or death.

(etymology: from Greek: krisis, meaning decision, or krenin, meaning decide)

**GERMAN**

*die Krise, substantiv (fem.)*
1. eine schwierige Lage, Situation, oder Zeit die den Höhe und Wendepunkt einer gefährlichen Entwicklung darstellt
2. ein kritischer Wendepunkt bei einem Krankheitsverlauf

(1. a difficult place, situation or time in which the intensity and turning point of a dangerous situation presents itself 2. a critical turning point in the course of an illness)

**ITALIAN**

*Crisi, sostantivo (fem.)*
1. stato transitorio di particolare difficoltà o di turbamento nella vita di un uomo o di una società

(1. a transitory state of particular difficulty or turbulence in the life of a person or a society)

**CHINESE**

*危机 (noun)*
1. 潜藏的危险，祸害。
2. 生死成败的紧要关头。

(1. A hidden danger or catastrophe 2. A critical juncture that determines life or death, success or failure)

**RUSSIAN**

*кризис (noun)*
имя существительное мужской род
1. резкое изменение, перелом кризис среднего возраста
2. экономика расстройство экономической жизненно-финансовый кризис
3. нехватка чегол. водянной кризис
4. пренебрежительно затруднительное положение у него кризис с деньгами.

(1. A sudden change, a break 2. economic upset 3. insufficiency of something 4. increasing deterioration/complication of a situation)

**ARABIC**

*أزمة, أزمة (noun)*
1. وضع مهين يزداد سوءه بانتظام.
2. التأỏi أو الهجوم مثل الاستياء وللوضع المفاجأة والمفاجأة.
3. Any bad situation that gets worse regularly
4. emergency or attack, such as a seizure (medical in nature); 3. critically developed and aggravated situation
Trust is a psychological disposition that enables both parties in an ongoing relationship to trust that the other will give some consideration to one’s interests. It relies on tribalism characterized by shared values. Trust of this kind is necessary to solve problems of cooperation, but it is difficult to establish and maintain in a pluralistic setting. It is highly vulnerable to defection.

There exists an international system; but in our times exists a global actors system – comprising state, non-state actors, corporations, powerful individual actors; a supranational entity, and also international organizations.

A key result is the importance to affect and influence positively the political will. Any actor makes it’s decisions in view of a cost-benefit-calculation. The more this can be influenced in a certain way, the higher the chance that also the political will can be influenced accordingly. In other words – the objective for a successful and peaceful negotiation and mediation is to help shape the political will by convincing or cajoling a given actor that the other options would be to the detriment of it’s cost-benefit calculations. The more this is brought about convincingly, the higher the chance that the actor will search for a peaceful solution. Also, such successful instances can help to create certain areas or “islands of cooperation and consensus”, which then eventually extend out and influence – positively – other areas.

History and Geography are both there, are past – however, historic events can be re-interpreted and history lends itself to being re-written. The more the actors, the generations have changed and passed; The less the people know about or are aware of history, the easier it can be re-interpreted. Perception forms reality. The conflict in Ukraine has laid bare some of these issues and the divisions and perceived asymmetries of the post-Cold War order. (a) The European institutional configuration developed over time after the Cold War. As a result, political challenges are often addressed consecutively and ad hoc, rather than in a more purposeful strategic manner. (b) In addition, the end of the Cold War saw the West portrayed as the ‘winner’ in a conflict about ideology. This had the unfortunate consequence of relegating the former Soviet Union to the status of ‘loser’ – or at least creating the impression among elites in the former East Bloc that this is how the West regarded them. Participants noted this as an obstacle to restoring trust and dialogue among the OSCE membership.

To find a way forward in the OSCE, it is also important to study best practices elsewhere. Corporations and civil society have made significant progress in experimenting with a novel basis for trust. Instead of relying on tribal loyalty (with liberal nationalism representing the last iteration of that view) corporations have established a purpose-focused understanding of trust. Individuals connect based on their shared purpose – a
work task, for instance – or a shared understanding – such as the common mission of a civil society organization.

- The role of social media ought to receive more attention. Social media may complicate the building of trust or facilitate it; they may help solidify ‘modern tribes’ or complicate that task. Either way, they must be included in the analysis. On the one hand, social media are the great equalizer – between men and women, old and young, poor and rich. Immersion derived from working with hand-held devices, guarantees the effects on psychology and intellect of information, news, etc. But social media have also been used to disseminate manipulated or so-called ‘fake news.’ (Social media networks are now trying to bolster trust by, among others, filtering news and assessing the reputational basis of news.). In case there is a discrepancy between what is said and reported, and what was real, one is obliged to correct by documenting the facts, one is obliged to resist and correct such manipulated news. Silence equals Acquiescence; equals acceptance.

- When it comes to concrete political challenges, there is a need for more accurate information, since this may in turn lead to broader agreement among states on the nature and features of the key problems. Major crises that affect the entire region may enhance mutual understanding and move us towards cooperation. However, more agreement is not always necessary or important. Key terms, for instance, are often left undefined for good reason. And while it is often assumed that complex political challenges must require multilateral solutions, many of the suggested solutions take place within a domestic setting. For instance, in cyber security, the initial response should be to shore up operational security on the inside.

**Religion, Values, and Spirituality: The Impact on Diplomacy and Security**

Stadt Palais Liechtenstein, Wien, 4-6 June 2017

- Religiosity can manifest itself in varying degrees of influence. Meaning, religion can impact conversations on regional, international, national, local, familial, personal or individual levels. While an individual may have an internationally focused outlook on religion, this perception can vary dramatically in one-on-one interactions, or within their individual spiritual journey.

- For those actors of influence, religion - and its various mechanisms for impact - can be utilized for intentions of peace or war. Those with and those without power can find strength in religion by instrumentalizing religion to assist or foster the success or decline of certain challenges. For example, religion and culture can be instrumentalized by certain actors to achieve domestic and foreign policy goals that might otherwise lack the support or traction they need to succeed.

- Many societies are currently witnessing and struggling with a modern re-orientation towards radicalization and even extremism in various aspects of political and social life. This radicalization has manifested differently according to geographical and geopolitical boundaries. For example, within the United States, a general desire for intensity of belief has catapulted the country into arguably its most politically divisive era to date. Religion and spirituality has a critical role to play in the outcome of this manipulation. As history
has taught us, religion can foster human engagement and better the lives of many. However, when implemented with the intent of manipulation and instrumentalization, religious belief can also take on the form of an ideologically driven extremism.

- Globalization has widened disparities between those who have access to information - via stable web connections - and those who do not. While mobile devices have the potential to assuage geographic isolation, and provide outlets for marginalized voices to be heard, the infrastructure necessary to access the internet is far from universally available. The disparity between regions that have greater access to technology and those that have lesser access will likely only grow as the IT field develops marketable robotics, R, and artificial intelligence, AI, and machine learning, ML.

- The “Robotic Priest” might become an issue in some technologically very advanced societies. Selective access to stable internet connections already hampers certain segments of the global society from fully participating in online forums, discussions, communities, etc. Simultaneously, individuals and societies who opt out of the information stream provided by mass media are left out of contemporary debates, albeit by choice. Leadership will Essential. Education is critical. It is impossible to stop the advance of scientific-technological progress. The role of religion and values will however not be reduced.

- Neurology and psychology is exploring the effects of ‘immersion’ – the impact of receiving information and interacting via hand-held mobile devices. The use of a mobile device to consume news or social media feeds can personalize an experience (held, as it is, in the palm of your hand), producing emotional reactions that would otherwise be mitigated if the same information were consumed through other platforms. This constant flood of information challenges our capacity to process information and reflect upon it before reacting.

- Participants discussed the notion of the online sphere as a quasi-spiritual space; online, people can reinvent themselves, and live a life entirely apart from their daily existence. The internet has affected human interaction, identity, authority, and conversation, thereby influencing the central question of what it means to be human today. Furthermore, as traditional religious institutions and conventions are often excluded from conversations regarding the growth of technology and the internet, there is no real role afforded to religion within the larger debate.

- The plurality of identities within each human can oftentimes produce discomfort when we are faced with persons who violate our conceptions of traditional identity structures. However, as religion evolves - with new mechanisms facilitating its evolution and spread - so too do religious identities. Borders no longer appear relevant to analyzing religious influence, or identity writ large. The advent of social media and online communities has amply demonstrated this phenomenon. Thus, we must consider both the challenges and advantages that may be presented in a world where traditional communities are disrupted by new facets of identity-forging within religions.

- The attribution of faith and beliefs will be central to understanding the motivations of demographics, societies and polities. The question of the physicality of religion and faith
is influenced by the pervasive role of the internet and our cyber-existence. In our understanding of humanity and the role of religion in the contemplation of that human experience, social media have begun transforming our conception of community.

Crisis Evaluation:

Crisis challenges can develop into negative trends that, if not addressed, can erupt into crises. The prevention of, or solution to, a crisis requires the instinct, will, and capacity to do so.

Crisis Definition:

A crisis represents a real or perceived event challenging the sustainability of the status quo, which demands, or is perceived to demand, an urgent decision. Over time, threats and challenges can develop into negative trends that, if not addressed, can erupt into crises. The prevention of, or solution to, a crisis requires the instinct, will, and capacity to do so.

Crisis Evaluation:

- Different thresholds are surpassed before a situation reaches crisis level. A conflict exists when interests are asymmetrical and non-aligned. As the costs of a conflict rise - objectively or subjectively - the issue can become a problem, and further develop into a crisis. At the same time, some developments qualify as trends rather than crises, either because of the timeline of the conflict, or because the costs are not high enough to qualify the situation as a crisis. Thresholds are perhaps mutable and debatable, but multiple layers exist.

- Globalization means that while crises, such as epidemics, were once confined geographically, they are now not limited in scope. The world is so interconnected now that originally regional crises have the potential to disrupt the global order -- a local crisis can due to internet global interconnectedness become a regional and global crisis in a very short time - while a limited crisis far away can suddenly affect another region. Historically, humans have always been relatively connected--as inter regional trade and the transmission of the Black Plague across the ancient silk road shows. It is important to consider whether our current fears of newly intensified globalization are founded considering that humans have handled these kinds of crises before.

- Crises can be broken down into quantifiable and qualitative dimensions. These dimensions can include the perceived amount of refugees, the fluctuation of the economy, and military movements among many other factors. In addition, non-state actors empowered through technology and global communications, specific regional definitions, the balance between stakes and costs, and the dissatisfaction bordering on distrust between the population and their leadership are instrumental in the contributions of various dimensions.

- On the interdependence between existing systems. Globalization undisputedly benefits the whole world, but also creates great interdependencies between countries. Connecting the world and countries working together because of necessity may strengthen rela-
tions but also creates tensions if one country levitates its power on others. These interdependencies can be very dangerous as they are created individually and no one knows to what extent they will contribute to the acceleration of a potential crises.

Crisis Prioritization:

- Crises can be prioritized by a sense of urgency vs. a sense of importance. It is the policy decision makers or global leaders that determine the sense of urgency of a crisis, how quickly the crisis will be dealt with, and what type of mechanisms will be implemented. One suggestion to ensure more efficient solutions to crises is to provide a conceptual grid to empower leaders to make decisions.

- Based on a vote, participants chose the top 3 most critical crises facing the OSCE area over the next 12 months: violent extremism; migration; and a dialogue between the United States, Russia and Europe. Using the same methods, participants voted to choose the top 3 most critical crises facing the OSCE area over the next 3 years and found the following to be the most critical: climate change; digitalization, automation and unemployment; and migration.
Project Overview

In 2016, the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University (LISD) founded its Generational Perspectives on National and International Security Project to address and mitigate a deeply embedded challenge in the political and policy-making sphere: the lack of interfacing between current decision makers and young voices.

Project events aim to bring together young adults – independent of gender, race, belief, socio-economic and other backgrounds – throughout OSCE territories, to highlight security trends that may not be apparent to the elites that predominate throughout these contexts. Concerted attention is placed on structuring a non-hierarchical, open, dialogue to allow those voices often muffled to be heard, particularly those of young people. Our primary goal is not only to commence an ongoing dialogue on the issues that separate younger and older generations in life and politics, but to help bridge those gaps. Fundamentally, the Generational Perspectives Project is a response to today’s polarization of basic communication and aims to empower a new cohort of young people to better reach out to their peers and overcome security vacuums in their own communities.

LISD has thus far hosted four international events as part of the Generational Perspectives Project. At a meeting reevaluating the modern definition of ‘security’ in Triesenberg, August 2016, LISD Student Associates had the opportunity to deliver presentations on specific security issues of interest to them to assembled participants, including ambassadors and policymakers, field questions and receive feedback. Summaries compiled by each student presenter can be found below. Another highlight was a discussion held in Princeton, March 2017, when assembled students exchanged ideas about modern international security challenges as well as risks in their communities with students from the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna via e-communication platforms in front of senior international representatives.

At the European Forum Alpbach, in August of 2017, LISD presented its work on the project to an audience of students and forum participants. The project highlighted its intent to bring together young adults – independent of gender, race, belief, socio-economic and other backgrounds – throughout OSCE territories to address security trends that may not be apparent to the elites that predominate throughout these contexts. LISD associates and students, Claire Ashmead, Rebecca Keener and Rana Ibrahem, presented their understandings of the gaps in perceptions within Middle America, the Southern States of America and the racial divides throughout the United States. The conversation addressed the ways and means of involving local government, and the specific approach to security taken by young people in general and with regards to their digital security.

Looking forward, the LISD Team hopes to conduct a US based meeting contemplating partisan fissures in American society, and their impact on prioritizing, and responding to, foreign security dilemmas. The specific aim will be to bring students and young academics, service people, politicians, community organizers and political commentators from both liberal and conservative domains together to discuss traditionally divisive issues. Given that ideological loyalties have increasingly fostered interpersonal resentment amongst Americans, this discussion is a prescient one. We also hope

1 Project Leaders: Jacqueline Gufford ’17 and Rana Ibrahem ’15.
to specifically address cyber issues as the program advances, including questioning how digitalization and artificial intelligence may affect future economies, and social media’s effects on democracy and international relations.

Discussion Themes

Generational Views on Existential Threats
The Western millennial generation has matured during an age without war in the immediate consciousness. The Russian annexation of Crimea began to re-introduce geopolitical imagination and realism into the millennial generation’s worldview. At the same time, the rising “millennial” generation has been spared the experience of total war (WWII) and as a result has experienced a world lacking geopolitical imagination.

Virtual Reality v. Tangible Threats
Life in the Information Age – after the “Digital Revolution” – is characterized by unsurpassed interconnectivity, an overload of information, and the unprecedented intervention of technology in daily life. Difficulty regulating the internet has encouraged the proliferation of information warfare (IW) (i.e Anonymous, hacking etc.) and entailing cyber-attacks, which feature kinetic as well as profound psycho-social effects. Leadership has also begun developing within cyber-communities.

Terror and “Lone Wolf Attacks” Attacks
Though “existential threat” remains a theoretical concept for most millennials, the terror attacks of recent years are changing that reality. Coordinated attacks by groups like ISIL, as well as the lone-wolf attacks perpetrated by actors outside of terrorist networks, are dragging millennial perceptions into a world of pervasive anxiety.

Perception and Identity
The pervasive fear of terror in contemporary Western society also contributes to an “us versus them” mentality, amplifying issues of identity security. Securitization of Muslims and other minorities in Europe and the United States undermines not only the safety of targeted groups, but of all actors involved. Those relegated to the “out group” are disenfranchised and become more vulnerable to manipulation by external actors – including terrorist groups as well as adversarial states.

Climate Change
There will be no future of security challenges in a world that does not sufficiently address this global issue. Its impacts - such as rising sea-levels, heatwaves, droughts, and changes in precipitation patterns - are likely to induce large-scale intra- and international migrations, as well as competition for increasingly scarce resources, especially water and food.

Of course, generational perspectives vary regionally. This paper attempts to present an overview of Western youths perspectives on security. The ideas presented here were generated by a group of American and European Princeton University graduate and undergraduate students. The project aims to expand on the above themes. Additional topics for discussion include: globalization; trade and development; industry 4.0; social media; cyber; discourse and language; traditional media; “the west”; inter-generational relations; leadership; culture and religion; existing international institutions; and conflict and war, to name a few.
A New World Order
The current moment clearly marks a historic shift in the global balance of power; speculations regarding the rise of multi-polar world order are ongoing. However, we also notice significant shifts in perceptions and definitions of national identity, perhaps redefining the nation-state system. As global corporations and tech companies accrue greater power and influence on world affairs, we wonder whether a future world order might hinge upon private interests and networks. What happens when private actors have capabilities that extend beyond those of the state?

Presentations at Liechtenstein Colloquia 2016-17

Jacqueline Gufford, Princeton University
For me, the generational perspectives project is important because it presents an opportunity for young people to shed the personas we often project in professional settings, to meet in an open discussion, without hierarchy, that is genuinely informed by our personal backgrounds and experiences. People of all generations are susceptible to molding themselves to fit a specific character in institutional settings. Groupthink is a phenomenon that results precisely from this sort of tendency; individuals in a gathering are so keen to conform to an implicit standard of behavior and thought that no productive ideas are generated, and sometimes even poor decisions are made. In my experience, the pressure to conform to an institutional character among ambitious millennials in professional settings can be extreme. We want to be taken seriously by our senior colleagues despite our young age. But, as a result, we may filter our opinions to a detrimental degree to project the image of professionalism we believe is expected of us.

The younger generation does have much to contribute to debates on security in the modern era; we understand all too well that communities are no longer primarily defined by geographic proximity, that the concept of news is malleable and often viral, that people are all too connected digitally, and yet can feel misunderstood and lonely. We live these experiences on a daily basis, and are therefore perhaps best poised to address the security challenges that arise in such an environment.

Justinas Mickus, Princeton University
The generational perspectives project is important because the young generations are most adept at the tools that shape the emerging understanding of international relations, where state and place are becoming less important than privacy, connectivity, and credible information. It is of extreme importance to be able to integrate active young people into high-quality discussions on security and international affairs because young people are better ambassadors to other young people than old people; in other words, by doing this project, we can empower a new cohort of driven people to better reach out to their peers.

Young people, even if sometimes naively and idealistically, are generally more sensitive to the question of corruption in government and the public sector more broadly. Corruption is a significant factor in understanding modern security issues. First, it directly contributes to various illegal activities, some posing a direct threat to world populations and some acting more indirectly (arms smuggling representing the former, ivory trading, the latter trend). Second, it is extremely damaging to the image of the political establishment and political institutions in the modern West, contributing to the rising appeal of radical and populist movements.
Michelle Nedashkovskaya, Princeton University

Some of the gravest contemporary threats to national and international security, particularly in the West, stem from a government lag. Often, it seems, governments and policy leaders on the world stage seem out of touch with on the ground realities in their home countries and beyond. While class, race, and gender have often been highlighted as major elements in this dissonance, it appears that generational differences correlate very strongly with all of these factors. However, age and generational identity also add a new dimension to our understanding of politics, policy, and issues of security. One of the greatest contributions of the project is the opportunity to seriously brainstorm about innovative ways to bridge the gap between government and people by accelerating political responsiveness to generational change. There are clear channels through which young individuals already participate in government and decision-making – (internships and fellowships primarily). How can we bring decision-makers to engage with younger generations more often? How might we persuade society to entrust younger individuals to higher positions of responsibility? For example, perhaps the generations that have grown up internalizing cyberspace will stand a chance at effectively regulating it.

Jessica S. Sarriot, Princeton University

This project will mostly be important if it is successful in impacting the attitudes and policies of the current generation of policy-makers or (ideally and) if it helps us create bridges between young participants from across a broad spectrum of socio-economic, national and experiential backgrounds. I have grown up living between five different countries, I speak three languages and I am fully incapable of caring about US or European security apart from Syrian, Palestinian or Colombian security, i.e. international security writ large. More young people have cross-border allegiances and sensitivities today than any other time and so while nation-states will inevitably prioritize the security of their own citizens, I believe my generations’ contribution to questions of security must be a wider and longer-term perspective on the conditions and scope of international security. Bringing youth from nations currently in conflict (be it physically or ideologically) with each other into dialogue with each other and formulating in writing some key issues for short term security and necessary conditions for long-term international security which could influence policy-makers is a deliverable this project could illicit.

Frederick Vincent, Diplomatic Academy Vienna

Europe has witnessed a vast increase in digitalization and growth in the technology sectors in recent years. Alongside these new opportunities however, there are also new dangers and risks, not least in regards to cybersecurity. Nowhere is this more evident than in the United Kingdom, where a new National Cyber Security Strategy is currently being launched. At the heart of this initiative is a push to incorporate younger people, and take on board the differing generational outlooks.

Lena Pieber, Diplomatic Academy Vienna

A major issue facing our society is the ability of the state to monitor its people, even if no clear threat is visible. The implementation of the new State Protection Law in 2016 in Austria unleashed a huge debate on the state’s legitimacy to expand its surveillance competence. Does an increase of surveillance improve security or does the extended collection of data cause new threats?
**Lucas Ortner, Diplomatic Academy Vienna**

Uncertainty and perceived insecurity are part of modern ignorance, in times of digitalization. Ignorance can be caused by lacks of education and competence management, due to rigid education systems and non-maintenance of knowledge transfers, which are not able to react on 21th challenges or to give answers on security questions. Nevertheless, the number of people in the comfort zone of ignorance is constantly growing. Who is in charge for providing information about security matters, is it a demand by the society or a duty of the state?

**Iris Karabaczek, Diplomatic Academy Vienna**

Disinformation – the spreading of false or misleading information in order to deceive an audience – is a phenomenon which has expanded phenomenally in the past few years, especially through the use of the internet and modern communication channels. It became particularly apparent in Europe in the wake of the Paris attacks in November 2015 or after the US presidential elections in 2016. Yet, because of the wide range of possibilities in spreading disinformation – even unknowingly – and its fast pace, it is incredibly difficult to counter it. What is more, once false information has been spread and accepted, it is close to impossible to rectify it. But then, what has been done in Europe to counter disinformation?

**Kristina Amerhauser, Diplomatic Academy Vienna**

Securitization in Germany: during the last 2 years, over 1,5 million migrants have reached Europe in search for a safer and economically more prosperous future. While in the beginning, Germany has welcomed them overwhelmingly, supporting their arrival and integration with all available resources, soon doubts arose on how to manage the situation. Angela Merkel's "we will manage" turned into a "will we manage" and stands today at "we might not manage". This change in discourse is also represented in the public's understanding of the migrant crisis, where especially refugees are met with increasing mistrust, anger and are even perceived as a threat to security. What seems simple is called securitization, i.e. the fact that a political issue is regarded as a threat to the German society and sovereignty of the German state. What emergency measures can Germany provide in order to calm the situation? Are the public's security concerns justified? How will Germany be able to de-securitize the situation again in order to be able to integrate refugees successfully into the Germany society?

**Student Research Interests**

Understanding the Impact of ICTs on Refugee Flight: Potential Solutions to Security Threats Posed by the Refugee Crisis

**Vira Tarnavska**

**Executive Summary**

Today’s refugee crisis poses a serious new challenge for governments and international organizations: refugees with access to information communications technology, or ICTs. Smartphones and various forms of social media have created an open platform for various stakeholders – such as refugees, host countries, smugglers, and NGOs – to communicate with refugees and disseminate information, with both positive and negative consequences for European governments and refugees themselves. The task for OSCE states and European governments is to understand how they can increase security by using technology for the integration of incoming refugees,

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3 Circa Liechtenstein Colloquium on “Security” in Triesenberg, Principality of Liechtenstein, August 2016
their proper tracking and monitoring, providing access to legitimate information, and achieving other objectives.

Counter-terrorism in an Encrypted World: Intersections of Security and Privacy Concerns
Jacqueline Gufford

Executive Summary
Successful counter-terrorism efforts often hinge on timely access to reputable intelligence. As fear of terrorist strikes within the European Union (EU) increases, Member States and the EU itself are increasingly pressured to mount a strong response. This reaction has often manifested itself in the form of EU directives, and national legislation, authorizing widespread data collection and retention. Such mass data collection efforts – and associated calls for inserting ‘back-door’ hatches into encryption code – are red-herrings that divert valuable time, energy and resources from counter-terrorism intelligence efforts without necessarily producing corresponding benefits. They also typically significantly compromise privacy rights.

When Corruption is the System: Implications for Security
Justinas Mickus

Executive Summary
Corruption is deservedly identified as one of the underlying causes for terrorism, transnational criminal networks, political revolutions, and other threats to global security. However, it is often misidentified as a problem of weak and failing states, rather than an international phenomenon with an active character. The presentation examines how systematic corruption is permitted to exist in the present security architecture and what challenges that poses.

Security in the Mind and the First Casualty of War
Michelle Nedashkovskaya

Executive Summary
Security may be understood in terms of a very wide variety of factors. In the international system, security may also be understood as a state of mind exempt from fear or anxiety. People feel secure when they are relieved from insecurities regarding threats to their future well-being. Threat-perception, however, is psychological; it is based on information made available to the individual(s) in question. Such an understanding of security underscores the significance of contemporary information warfare as a major threat to security on the national and subnational levels.

Conditions of Instructive European Integration Measures
Rana Ibrahem

Executive Summary
A visible cultural struggle between non-Muslim majorities and European Muslims on issues of minarets, headscarves, and cartoons has brought to light the need for a conversation regarding the role of religion and values in the European public sphere. The scope of these issues transcends identity politics and instead affects geo-politics, collective defense measures and future integration strategies throughout Europe. Current integrative strategies performed within EU countries and around Europe should consider the following conditions affecting social cohesion: (1) Islam will continue to exist within Europe as a demographic reality (2) inhibiting religious expression exacerbates the discontent which extremists prey upon (4) if Islam is understood as a security concern rather than as a cultural system, measures taken by governments and civil societies will remain reactive rather than instructive.
**Objective**

Until 2014, citizens across the OSCE area had become accustomed to peace⁴ – more so than in any previous period in history. The onset of the conflict in Ukraine ended the longest uninter-
ruptured stretch of time during which Europe was ever spared external conflict. Meanwhile,
when the United States conducts wars abroad, it does so with an all-volunteer force, discon-
nected from the public. The publics of OSCE states have arguably forgotten what war means.

In recent years, however, the OSCE area has faced significant challenges. Chief among them is a
disturbing lack of trust between people and their governments, within societies, between states,
and at a regional level. Bringing together leading scholars and analysts on security and coopera-
tion in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security space, the colloquium focused on the role of
think tanks in rebuilding trust and reestablishing dialogue with the aim of identifying possible
areas of convergent interests. The meeting also provided an opportunity for think tanks to gen-
erate ideas that could stimulate the inter-governmental process of Structured Dialogue.

The LISD state model that forms the context for the meeting envisions states that promote peace
both internally and between states; focus on the entire population; provide a maximal level of
democracy, participation, and the rule of law; support positive competition in an age of globali-
zation and the integration of technology and science; pay attention to the uneven distribution of
income and wealth within states, regions and macro regions; respect religions and opinions
while maintaining the separation of church and state; and finally, permit citizens to decide the
future of their own state.

**Keynotes and Plenary Session: Context and Agenda Setting**

The keynote addresses by Ambassador Zannier and Professor Appiah raised several crucial
questions about trust – what it means and why trust matters, the ways in which the lack of trust
manifests itself in the current political and institutional configuration, and the consequences for
the global order. Amb. Zannier and Prof. Appiah also set the stage for the discussion about
what is needed to restore trust; how institutions and think tanks can engender and strengthen
trusting relationships.

Analyzing the current political reality and institutional context, Amb. Zannier highlighted polit-
ical division among OSCE members regarding the conflict in Ukraine, and a breakdown of rule
following and lax (or no) adherence to principles. This is a serious challenge to the current or-
der, since a rule-based order cannot function without commitment and mutual respect.

The conflict in Ukraine has laid bare the divisions and asymmetries of the post-Cold War order. The European institutional configuration emerged haphazardly after the Cold War, rather than

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⁴ Peace here is understood as peace (within the region) from external conflict. The conflict in Yugoslavia is best un-
derstood as an internal conflict.
as a result of a deliberate process. Political challenges are addressed consecutively and ad hoc, rather than in a more purposeful manner. The OSCE, as an organization, is in addition hampered by not being accorded much space for independent governance and initiative. The OSCE currently faces several political challenges and it has approximately 1,000 staff in Ukraine as part of its Special Monitoring Mission, and yet it is kept ‘on a short leash’ by OSCE member states.

In addition to institutional challenges, there are political challenges. The formal equality of states – in the state system and in treaties – notwithstanding, the actual political context is best characterized as one of multiple asymmetries (among states, sub regions, etc.). The contentious debate about NATO expansion must be viewed in this context. Russia sought assurances that NATO would not deploy troops when they expanded their institutions. This balance now is broken. In the OSCE, Russia accuses other states of transgressing rules and norms, and is accused in return. As multiple participants in subsequent sessions pointed out, the end of the Cold War saw the West portrayed as the ‘winner’ in a war about ideology. This had the unfortunate consequence of relegating the former Soviet Union to the status of ‘loser’ – or at least creating the impression among elites in the former East Bloc that this is how the West regarded them. Participants noted this as an obstacle to restoring trust and dialogue among the OSCE membership.

According to Ambassador Zannier, the way forward lies in creating a common space for dialogue and reflection. We should explore the concept of asymmetric stability. “Structured dialogue,” collaboration with universities (such as this one), and an open approach to communication, including brainstorming, are particularly useful in this regard. How can we engender trust in relationships and prevent the violation of principles? Can we create a common, shared understanding of the current realities, such that all the parties to ideological or territorial conflicts in the OSCE area can embrace a unified narrative?

Ambassador Raunig elaborated on the current, bad mood in the OSCE, with its lengthy back-and-forth accusations among member states, all against the background of an unpredictable security environment. The OSCE was established to help manage conflict, and yet now conflict seems to paralyze the OSCE. Broken deals and threat perceptions have reduced trust. Increasing dialogue and “structured dialogue” can reverse that trend. What is needed is a capability to listen and to trust, and empathy and generosity.

Professor Appiah contrasted trust as an act with trust as an attitude. Whereas the former pertains to the act of entrusting something to another person, the latter is a psychological disposition that enables both parties in an ongoing relationship to trust that the other will give some consideration to one’s interests. Trust of this kind is necessary to solve problems of cooperation, and it is this kind of trust that so-called ‘fake news’ targets.

In a democracy, we rely on vertical trust, whereby we do not need to trust a person but instead establish institutions that ensure that the interests of citizens will be represented. Thomas Jefferson refused to rely on interpersonal trust, instead insisting that institutions be designed for individuals who did not trust one another.

Trust within society relies on dialogue between citizens and their representatives. Citizens should expect to be told the truth by their representatives, even when this is uncomfortable or
complex. Citizens may not be able to offer solutions, but they can often be trusted (no pun intended) to accurately identify the problem.

Horizontal trust is important among international political society, including global network of diplomats, civil servants, and military who talk to their counterparts abroad. However, evidence of horizontal trust among elites also generates skepticism among the citizenry about vertical trust.

Professor Heckscher concurred that the current political order is characterized by a lack of trust and continued the conversation by focusing on solutions. Trust in one sense can signify deal-making among diverse groups with mutual self-interest. Trust in another sense is more demanding; it relies on tribalism characterized by shared values. This form of trust is highly vulnerable to defection, and diversity has the potential to weaken the ties that hold societies together. Prof. Heckscher explained that corporations and civil society have made significant progress in experimenting with a novel basis for trust. Instead of relying on tribal loyalty – with liberal nationalism representing the last iteration of that view – corporations have established a purpose-focused understanding of trust. Individuals connect based on their shared purpose – a work task, for instance – or a shared understanding – such as the common mission of a civil society organization. The project to build trust in a chaotic, diverse work requires social invention, but it is a promising way forward. Dialogue must greatly expand, beyond elites to corporations and civil society. We must establish new mechanisms of trust around the complex relationships that characterize the modern political order.

Professor Moravcsik disagreed with the assessment of the other speakers, both in relation to the diagnosis of the problem and the importance of trust. Prof. Moravcsik argued that transnational organizations – especially his primary example, the EU – are more effective and robust than is commonly thought to be the case, and that institutions cooperate to build trust, so that trust need not come first. This is both a more optimistic view, since organizations such as the OSCE function better than we might assume at first glance, and more cynical, since little is expected from the relationships among OSCE member states, and between member states and the OSCE. Trust in the more demanding sense laid out by Professors Appiah and Heckscher is not required at all. Trust may – but need not – follow later, after interstate or state-OSCE cooperation is established.

The discussion brought up several important points about trust and the OSCE.

- First, a few additional distinctions were made to make sense of the concept of trust. Trust can be contrasted with fear, and in addition to vertical and horizontal trust, there is also the matter of inner trust in one’s abilities. European institutions, in particular, may have lost trust in their own ability to act in accordance with their values. The role of religion in inner trust was also brought up.
- Second, in many OSCE states, citizens do not trust the state or one another. This makes it more challenging to create the conditions for trust in the OSCE.
- Third, the OSCE is an especially diverse organization, with several powerful spheres of influence, and it is therefore more vulnerable than, say, the EU, to a decrease in trust and defection from cooperation.
- Fourth, the OSCE does not function in a global governance vacuum. Participants pondered its relationship to the EU and asked how invested the EU should be in the OSCE. One the one hand, it was suggested that the EU might be able to serve as a motor for
the OSCE’s multilateral process, going from the biggest payer to the biggest player. On the other hand, participants noted the differences between the EU and the OSCE – diversity, as highlighted above, but also remit and membership size.

- Fifth, it may be unrealistic to expect OSCE member states to provide their diplomats with more room for independent initiative. Citizens often mistrust elites, and any policy that gives elites more power may be met with suspicion. More generally, domestic considerations will impact the role of the OSCE.

- Sixth, more attention should be paid to the role of non-state actors. They may complicate the building of trust or facilitate it; they may help solidify ‘modern tribes’ or complicate that task. Either way, they must be included in the analysis. On the one hand, social media are the great equalizer. On the other, social media have been used to disseminate so-called ‘fake news.’ (Social media networks are now trying to bolster trust by, among others, filtering news and assessing the reputational basis of news.)

- Seventh, continuity and consistency are important for trust. However, it is difficult to ensure continuity and to build trust based on values and principles in a changing environment. (On the one hand, the chairmanship of the OSCE changes every year. On the other hand, efforts are made to ensure continuity of themes across chairmanships. Trust was an important theme in the German chairmanship as well.)

- Eighth, we must turn to history for lessons on how to rebuild trust and re-establish dialogue in a changing world. One era that might teach us valuable lessons is the end of the Cold War.

While speakers and participants expressed a general concern about the current state of affairs, there was also room for optimism.

- First, the entire OSCE membership shares a few areas of common interest, and those issue areas are especially fertile ground for building coalitions. The primary example is terrorism. Once established, these coalitions may in turn serve as models for trust building more generally. The OSCE can be as strong an organization as its member states want it to be. If there are sufficient areas of common interest, member states may appreciate the role of a more powerful OSCE.

- Second, the OSCE has room for experimentation. For instance, it can explore the role of both Structured Dialogue and more open, free-floating dialogue to see which is more constructive under which circumstances.

- Third, although the tribalism of the nation-state may be diminishing in importance, we are now arguably members of many tribes – even cosmopolitanism could be conceived of as a tribe. Social media has heightened and accelerated this process. This has potentially positive consequences for trust building and establishing dialogue, since tribes are important sources of solidarity and trust.

- Fourth, while the OSCE and other organizations like it are insufficiently inclusive of youth and women, there is strong interest among those constituencies in becoming involved, and their enthusiasm can be harnessed. Similarly, the civil society sector has certain strengths – such as unified narrative building – that can be useful.

**Working Session I: European Security Order Under Stress**

In Working Session I, “European Security Order Under Stress,” participants revived and discussed the vision of a Europe whole and free, without dividing lines, and based on common principles, as well as the current crisis of confidence in the EU and its institutions, and ways to
focus attention to rule of law, education, integration, and other aspects of human security.

The conflict in Ukraine conditions responses and expectations in the OSCE area and is crucial for understanding the current crisis of trust. Ambassador Martin Sajdik relayed the latest developments in Ukraine, beginning with Ukrainian army troop movements in early 2017 to the death in on April 23 of an American OSCE observer, the first death in the history of the organization. There has been extensive damage to civilian infrastructure that is key to both sides and the security situation is worsening.

We have different structures to address the conflict. First, there is the special representative for the Minsk agreements, which were negotiated 2 years ago. There is the ceasefire from 15 February on – it was violated right after it was adopted. There is a true lack of political will to enact these agreements. There is a need to implement on banking. A prisoner exchange is also being negotiated. There are some small positive developments here. Problems with water and electricity are yet to be addressed.

The other track is the Normandy format. France, Germany, Ukraine, and Russia are to negotiate the more overtly political parts – for example, local elections. President Macron will certainly continue to be active in this format. Germany is also determined to continue. Another track is the Nuland track, which helped to implement the Minsk agreements. We do not have this track now.

Ambassador Valentin Inzko gave an update on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH). The constitution of BH stopped the war and established a decentralized state, but is an odd construction. Trust was not rebuilt and more attention should be paid to reconciliation and education. The international community neglected the rule of law. Nevertheless, twenty-two years later, the neighborhood of BH is more favorable than it has been in years. BH may become a problem, but only if the international community stops paying attention. Sovereignty notwithstanding, foreign presence has been beneficial. The role of Germany as a humanitarian superpower was highlighted.

Ambassador Inzko suggested that we pay attention to human security, rather than primarily military security. Trust can be rebuilt with intentional initiatives and effort. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, a process was developed and implemented, and more must still be done to move towards integration. The international community is strongest when we are united and weakest when we are divided. In BH, there was a common vision and a united intervention. The question remains what can be done if a partner rejects efforts for trust.

Dr. Magdalena Grono highlighted a lack of trust in the ability of the diplomatic process to deliver progress in the Caucasus. The context, according to Dr. Grono, is a crisis of confidence of trust in the EU and its institutions. There is a substantial gap between the institutions and the populations, and the crisis in the security situation cannot be understood without also looking at the crisis of the international actors – the sense of crisis in the global order.

In Georgia post 2008, conflict resolution cannot move forward without involvement of all three levels; the local level, the relationship between Georgia and Russia, and the geostrategic level of the US and Russia. Presently, it is unclear among participants who is still at the table. Conflict resolution is threatened by a lack of trust. This is dangerous, since a lack of faith in the diplomatic process opens the way to alternative pathways for achieving geopolitical goals. Parties
Currently work outside the systems of conflict resolution, and there has been only partial progress on humanitarian issues.

Over time, as generations grow up isolated from one another, there may be an increasing threat of departing from pluralistic discourses. Electronic media helps only partially to counteract this physical separation. Crisis can be an opportunity to deepen dialogue. Citizens in the OSCE area who are living in conflict regions are keen to be involved in the conversation.

Christopher Nixon Cox surveyed the current political context in the United States. While he perceives real interest on the part of the Trump Administration to strengthen the transatlantic relationship, the Trump Administration is likely to proceed in ways that are different from the approaches of past administrations. First, the administration operates on personal relationships and trust. Second, the administration does not have a well-developed set of foreign policy principles and priorities. The few constants are a determination to destroy ISIS and to fight terrorism. The EU has advantages here as a transnational organization that can collect intelligence and exchange information, and the US has much to offer here as well, in terms of technology, training border security, etc. There should be space for cooperation. Migration is another policy area where the EU and the Trump Administration might find common cause. Finally, the EU should reach out to Congress, which has expertise in these matters.

Working Session II: Transnational Threats, Multilateral Solutions

Working Session II, “Transnational Threats, Multilateral Solutions,” focused on the factors contributing to the emergence of transnational threats and challenges, and the ways in which they can result in threats to security and stability across various political, military, and economic dimensions. The session also highlighted how a government or corporation may be prone to cyber-attack given a group’s lack of operational or organizational security rather than the integrity of its digital firewall.

The session surveyed threats of a transnational nature and looked at some potential solutions. In the program, it states that ‘transnational threats require multilateral solutions since they transcend borders,’ but the panel gave us a more nuanced perspective, since many of the solutions can (indeed should) take place within a domestic setting.

The panel first considered what is transnational about transnational threats. Transnational as opposed to inter-national indicates cross-border reach into states, where at least one non-state actor is involved. In 2003, the OSCE Maastricht Ministerial Council Meeting adopted the “OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century.” The document acknowledged that the OSCE states are exposed to threats that are transnational in character and that affect security of all states. The prime example is terrorism.

A very wide range of threats was identified. Substantively, the panel focused on terrorism, organized crime, migration and cyber security. Less attention was paid on this panel to threats such as climate change and nationalisms. Distinctions were made between military threats and non-military threats. The Maastricht document distinguishes between threats and challenges, where terrorism is a threat and economic matters are referred to as challenges. Finally, from a law and order perspective, there is only threat and crime, and the question is then how we should view terrorism. (Is it a crime?)
The panelists emphasized that analytical categories matter because they point to different solutions. The sources of threats are also varied. State action, or the unintended consequences of unsuccessful state action, can give way to transnational threats. In addition to domestic sources, there are of course also transnational sources, both actors and networks. Transnational threats are sometimes perceived as given, and described as natural phenomena. This is a problem for two reasons. First, we must be able to allocate responsibility for conflict. Second, transnational threats are used to legitimize authoritarian rule, and it is therefore important to know where the threat comes from.

Transnational threats have very diverse impacts, transnationally and domestically. The panel also highlighted the existence of profound disagreements about what constitutes a threat. For instance, Turkey now describes the Gulen movement as purely terrorist in character, as its new name makes clear (i.e., Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü or Fethullah Terrorist Organization). Germany and the United States probably have a different perspective.

Knut Hammarskjold and Georg Gassauer presented two case studies, of cyber security and the nexus between the refugee crisis and organized crime/terrorism, respectively. It goes without saying that cyber security is a significant transnational threat. On the first day of the colloquium, a major cybersecurity ‘ransomware’ attack was underway, with 99 countries affected and 45,000 attacks. However, the source is usually not a cyber security problem on the outside but instead a lack of operational security on the inside. Cleaning staff are often involved, possibly using false identities. Entire cleaning companies are bought to gain access. A transnational threat may thus have a local source and potentially a local solution.

The refugee influx into Europe in the past five years presents another threat. Individuals are migrating without authorization or under false identity. One problem is the gap between those who design policy and those who implement it on the ground. Accurate information is scarce or, when it is available, it is not being transmitted. There is, for instance, a dearth of accurate data on number of refugees in major receiving countries such as Turkey, and a lack of understanding of the domestic legal norms and framework for processing arrivals, such as the attempt to implement an unrealistic 21-day fast-track process in Greece. An additional problem is that solutions designed to be temporary become long term.

Solutions were also offered. First, there is generally a need for more accurate information, with the potential for broader agreement among states on what the problems are, and what their key features are. (A caveat was offered that more agreement is not always necessary or important. Key terms are frequently left undefined for good reason. It is more a rule than an exception to not have a definition.)

Second, cooperation has already proved useful, even if perhaps not decisively so. In cyber security, for instance, there is voluntary exchange of information. More generally, the panel proffered that OSCE can help mitigate transnational threats. The consensus, in the session but also internationally, is that cooperation is valuable. However, agreement does not mean achievement. There are different perspectives on what form that cooperation should take. Cultural and religious differences play a role. Even within societies, there may be disagreement on the relative importance of enforcement, on the one hand, versus intelligence and prevention, on the other.
In addition, there is disagreement about the urgency of the threat or the acknowledgement of responsibility for the emergence of the threat. On the first, we may need to await a major crisis before we gain international understanding and move towards cooperation. On the second, Europeans tend to view terrorism as international problem, when a closer look will reveal the European origin of, for instance, the radicalization of European-born/raised youth who go to fight in Syria and then return. In addition, behind a non-state actor there is often a state actor. Cyber-attacks or the drug trade from Afghanistan cannot take place without the security services of neighboring countries. It is a complex international environment.

It was suggested that we review the Maastricht document, in part because it pays insufficient attention to benign transnational processes and actors.

Third, cultural differences are to be expected and should be respected. That is not a problem, since multilateral solutions are not always needed. Corporations/the private sector and states can also take the lead. For instance, the initial response to cyber security should be to shore up operational security on the inside. It is important to look to best practices in the transnational realm. Corporations such as Google and Facebook have established trust and they can be co-opted to cooperate with states. States, meanwhile, can pursue enforcement of existing law and establish cooperation between the state and sub-state entities. Finally, experimentation at the state level is valuable. In 2014, Estonia became the first country to offer electronic residency to people who live elsewhere. The e-residency is a practical solution to residents of countries where reliable access to the global capitalist system is not available for technological reasons or because of corruption. E-residents can conduct business from their home country; their residency integrates them into the system and obviates the need to migrate.


The conversation that began in Working Session II continued in Working Session III, “Information Warfare: Fake News, Real Problems,” during which participants discussed the motivations within cyberspace between private actors and public organizations like the OSCE, the importance of building trust and relationships as a complement to understanding the latest technologies, and the ways in which digital echo chambers have resulted in a world where “truth” depends entirely on what we read and to whom and to what outlets we listen.

The role of the OSCE in combating information warfare or ‘fake news’ is still developing. The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media does not currently have a mandate on this issue, but this role may be created in the future.

Professor Miguel Centeno highlighted that we live in a world with no baseline for the truth of a statement, and that consumers of different media, say, the New York Times versus Fox News, live in different realities. Our phones are centers and receptors of knowledge, and data can be manipulated and spread easily. It is easy to find evidence for anything we wish to believe, and there is no longer an agreed-upon process to establish truth.

Walter Cronkite was once the ‘most trusted man in America;’ currently, no individual or institution commands that level of trust. One option is to rely on market-like solutions in social media, such as Wikipedia, but the problem is that such truths can be twisted by effort and edits. Universities could be the site for a solution, but in many eyes, they have lost their legitimacy. This is
a serious problem, since we live in an interdependent world where agreement on basic rules is critical. If we cannot agree on how to disagree, we risk collapse.

Professor Kavé Salamatian’s comments focused on defining cyber-strategy, that is, the art of positioning, directing, and coordinating forces in space in order to attain objectives, and mapping cyberspace. Cyber forces range from economics, hackers, and military to start-ups and research. The risk with cyberspace is that, like all other networks, it can be used as a vector of attack.

One way to view cyberspace is as embedded in geography. After all, cyberspace cannot exist without physical equipment and concrete infrastructure deployed in geographical space. There are physical, political, and economic constraints. The position of data centers matters, as does the existence or lack thereof of central government planning. Professor Salamatian discussed several possible paths for the Eurasian ‘internet Autobahn,’ both maritime (Suez, Indian Ocean, or Arctic) and over land (Russia), and he emphasized that there is risk but also opportunity.

Ravi Srinivasan argued that we have entered a space of asymmetric warfare that is unfamiliar to us, where numerous parties including state and non-state actors are engaged in politically motivated cyber operations. Sophisticated technology is available to criminals and malicious actors and offenders, and this affects not only states and critical infrastructure but also media organizations and religious institutions. States and the international community must address this by not only staying ahead of technological advances but also by building trust and relationships. The OSCE has done some confidence building, and the 2015 agreement between the United States and China to mutually prevent cyber-attacks is also an important step forward. It has eliminated attacks from China to the United States, but, more importantly, it has opened a line of communication. What is further needed is better inclusion of the private sector.

Working Session IV: Mapping Convergence: Discovering Islands of Cooperation?

Working Session IV, “Mapping Convergence: Discovering Islands of Cooperation,” connected earlier conversations on trust to potential avenues for cooperation and bridge-building, especially through the idea that truth can occur only when two realities meet. The session introduced a demand for theoretical equality among persons wherein every opinion is heard as a proper framework for dialogue. The OSCE has solicited input by young experts in an attempt to identify new visions for the future. The session proposed a future in which trust is rebuilt through incremental steps in areas of shared interests for cooperation.

Cooperation and reconciliation can emanate from the top first, as has been observed in Germany and Israel, rather than from the bottom up. However, when there are no shared common goals and issues such as the annexation of Crimea and the crisis in Ukraine polarize the debate, progress cannot be expected. In addition, there are powerful competing narratives. Instead, it may be fruitful to focus on small steps that may elevate the discussion and lead to a shared understanding and a deeper basis for cooperation.

Dr. Alexandra Vasileva described the network of young academics and scientists in the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung whose approach it is to find low-key areas where interests converge in order to start cooperating. These small steps in designated areas called ‘islands of cooperation’ then lead to the emergence of trust. Common areas of interest include arms control and automation (high youth unemployment and changing workforce influences). Free trade is also important. Common security issues can be solved by an integrated economic space framework.
Reconciliation was identified as both crucial and elusive. Dr. Yulia Nikitina highlighted the painful social transformations that took place in the OSCE in the post-Cold War era. A shared experience with socio-economic challenges did not mean that optimal solutions were the same in different states. Values may be shared but interpreted different in different contexts. Dr. Nikitina expressed support for the inclusion of citizens in talks of reconciliation, in the Ukraine or elsewhere, since citizens have experienced hardship and feel strongly about the problems at hand. If their emotional responses are not acknowledged as valid and considered, enduring solutions will be elusive.

There was some debate about the importance of involving the younger generations in these discussions. Participants disagreed about the extent to which Millennials or other young generations could contribute a unique perspective.

Professor James Gow pointed out that most reconciliation initiatives in the Balkan were funded by international organizations. An enormous range of initiatives were being funded. However, when there is little contact with individuals on the ground, and reconciliation is imposed from above, it is less likely to be successful. Professor Gow noted that the OSCE may need renewal. It is currently perceived as weak. It may be important to return to the roots of the organization, with formal equality of members, and room for open-ended debate.

The colloquium closed on Saturday, May 13 with a concluding session chaired by Ambassador Christian Strohal, Special Representative for the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship 2017, at which he suggested that policy makers begin to think “outside the box,” given the ways in which people can be divided intellectually and informatively into respective boxes, with the number of boxes constantly increasing. If the interactions among the boxes should increase, he asserted, the potential to reach consensus among various dissimilar state actors could be enhanced.

Professor Danspeckgruber concluded that there is hope, nevertheless. If one can develop little areas of success, dimensions of cooperation, gain trust in some situations; and hence begin to create a counter trend – of trust and cooperation. The old world-order seems not to work effectively any longer, but the new order does not work as yet, so nothing seems impossible – and one has to prepare for “the unthinkable”. Nevertheless, any actor performs according to a cost-benefit analyses for its objective, engagement (or their dis-engagement) in a collaborative, deliberative processes. As long as actors see value in cooperation, they will participate. As cyber challenges and natural/environmental disaster have shown, in view of such overwhelming crises cooperation is opportune and easy. If the costs of cooperation however exceed the costs of abstaining, or even counteracting; if that later even could be advantageous to an actor’s interests, then it might well be tempted to withhold. Implicitly or explicitly, many of the initiatives described above seek to highlight benefits and lower costs for participants, leading actors to value (continued) cooperation, to “work with” instead of “against”. There is a relationship that is built on the understanding of previous mistakes and successes, but the future is uncertain and one should try to incentivize parties for participation. To wait for trust to appear in order to engage is to misunderstand how trust emerges and is sustained. Building trust is a product of hard sustained work, and the will to do so. Trust is built on confidence – but confidence cannot be without truth, nor can trust be. Hence, if one realizes that non-truth is told and propagated, one has to contradict and set the record straight. Silence equals acquiescence. This LCM can only be a first small step contributing to re-establishing trust, confidence, dialogue, and hence cooperation in the OSCE region.
RELIGION, VALUES AND SPIRITUALITY
Impact on Diplomacy and Security

Chair’s Summary

Religion and Identity

Human identity is layered and complex. Religion is an important facet of that multidimensional “self”. Religion helps structure and develop responses to moral issues. This however is only one aspect of identity. Meaning, religion is just one aspect by which individuals can identify meaning and purpose in their lives. Language, ethnicity, heritage, etc. might offer other facets of identity that one can draw on to forge meaning of one’s live. Religion and/or spirituality is also fluid - both in institutions and within individuals. Each person possesses some sort of spiritual “substrate,” and religion is an expression of this. Religion, though, is not static - religious norms seem to evolve over time – and religious orientation and/or intensity and interpretation may metamorphose over time. Hence conversations on religion, its character, and impact should avoid grouping millions of diverse people under a single umbrella.

That plurality of identities within each human can produce discomfort when one is faced with persons violating our conceptions of traditional identity structures. However, as religion evolves - with new mechanisms facilitating its evolution and spread - so too does religious identity. Sovereign or other boundaries no longer appear relevant to analyzing religious influence, or identity writ large. The advent of social media and online communities has amply demonstrated this phenomenon – wherever in use. Thus, one has to also consider both the advantages and challenges that may be presented in a world where traditional communities can be disrupted by new facets of identity-forging, both within and without the religious sphere.

Spirituality and Diplomacy

Spirituality - broadly defined as a concern with human welfare above the material or physical level - can intersect substantively with the practice of diplomacy. If the basis of diplomacy is negotiating the balance of one’s own needs and desires with those of another’s, particularly when those incentives differ, it can be intuited that effective diplomacy may require a dose of spirituality. To reach a diplomatic balance and compromise, one must exercise sympathy towards others when it is not in one’s immediate interest to do so, the party in question must recognize an end higher than material and power gains, and sometimes make sacrifices to achieve that end. In other words, practicing spirituality in diplomatic negotiations may, at times, contradict purely strategic evaluations of a situation as couched in realist international relations terms. However, it may also shape a path towards compromise.

Religion and Influence

Religiosity can manifest itself in varying degrees of influence. Meaning, religion can impact conversations on regional, international, national, local, familial, personal or individual levels. While an individual may have an internationally focused outlook on religion, this perception can vary dramatically in one-on-one interactions, or within their individual spiritual journey.
For those actors of influence, religion - and its various mechanisms for impact - can be utilized for intentions of peace or war. Those with and those without power can find strength in religion by instrumentalizing religion to assist or foster the success or decline of certain challenges. For example, religion and culture can be instrumentalized by certain actors to achieve domestic and foreign policy goals that might otherwise lack the support or traction they need to succeed.

By ignoring a multi-faceted human engagement with religion, the dialogue on religion can seem limiting for some. For example, those individuals who are a product of religiously conservative environments might find themselves defending the removal of religion from the public sphere. By the same token, an internally secular individual may find merit in a culturally religious social sphere. Furthermore, tensions within organized religions may alter in a shifting environment as well, such as when a religious institution’s attempt to adapt to a modernizing world produces pushback from within, galvanized by a more conservatively minded cohort within the institution. One notable example is the curia’s discomfort with some of Pope Francis’s more socially progressive policies aimed at bringing lapsed Catholics back into the fold.

Therefore, religious influence can impact human understanding from varying levels. This can manifest in bottom-up or top-down approaches to structuring religion’s influence. Different approaches pervade in different regions and nations of the world; for example, the Catholic Church has been deeply involved with international relations around the world for centuries. In contrast, the Orthodox and Coptic Churches tend to focus predominantly on communities that traditionally have been, and still are, historically and culturally affiliated with the Orthodox Church. This status quo is also shifting and morphing in response to leaders’ coopting of religious rhetoric and identity for political ends, but the diverse structure of organized religion’s intersection with the political and personal sphere nonetheless holds true. Merely recognizing these differences is rarely adequate to approach communities and bridge gaps. To begin dialogue, we must imbue our interactions with an inherent curiosity. In this way, we can begin to foster respect, tolerance and peace. The curiosity of disparate communities can be just as critical as the curiosity we have for majority religious or spiritual communities.

Many societies are currently witnessing and struggling with a modern re-orientation towards extremism in various aspects of political and social life. This radicalization has manifested differently according to geographical and geopolitical boundaries. For example, within the United States, a general desire for intensity of belief has catapulted the country into arguably its most politically divisive era to date. Religion has a critical role to play in the outcome of this manipulation. As history has taught us, religion can foster human engagement and better the lives of many. However, when implemented for human manipulation, religious influence can take on the form of an ideologically driven extremism.

**Religion and Compassion**

Pope John Paul II once said that “there can be no peace without justice, and no justice without forgiveness.” In any conflict, there are a variety of narratives about what the ‘truth’ of the situation is. In such moments, religious ethics can serve as a bastion of magnanimous attitudes promoting respect, tolerance, and forgiveness. Another element worth considering is the hypocrisy that can arise when states or polities identify with a religious ethic, but do not apply the standards of that ethic in response to challenging situations. A notable example would be the response of some religiously identifying leaders and communities in Europe to the refugee and
migrant crisis of the last years; when tested, some of these groups shrank away from exercising the compassion, charity and empathy that they espouse.

**Religion and the Internet**

It is often said that globalization has widened the gap between developed and developing nations. The internet and technology are no exceptions to this observation; globalization has widened disparities between those who have access to information - via stable web connections - and those who do not. While mobile devices have the potential to assuage geographic isolation, and provide outlets for marginalized voices to be heard, the infrastructure necessary to access the internet is far from universally available. The disparity between regions that have greater access to technology and those that have lesser access will likely only grow as the IT field develops marketable robotics and artificial intelligence. Presently, however, selective access to stable internet connections already hampers certain segments of the global society from fully participating in online forums, discussions, communities, etc. Simultaneously, individuals who opt out of the information stream provided by mass media constitute voices filtered out of contemporary debates, albeit by choice.

While individuals may choose to remove, or isolate themselves from the online sphere for a variety of reasons, one concern often raised in connection to non-participation is the desire to maintain one’s privacy. The internet, social media and technology have fundamentally transformed the notion of the private sphere; what information about oneself should one have total control over? What information should governments or other actors have access to, to protect communities from security threats? Polities around the world are wrestling with this question, in addition to considering how sensitive information that is collected about an individual can be secured, considering recent cyberattacks.

On the other side of this debate are individuals who elect to participate in social media and digital platforms actively, perhaps to the point of oversaturation. Psychologists and neurologists are currently exploring the effects of this ‘total immersion’ in media, facilitated in the developed world by the ubiquity of mobile devices. The use of a mobile device to consume news or social media feeds can personalize an experience (held, as it is, in the palm of your hand), producing emotional reactions that would otherwise be mitigated if the same information were consumed through other platforms. This constant flood of information challenges our capacity to process information and reflect upon it before reacting. The ramifications of this set of conditions is presently unknown, but President Trump’s spontaneous, and often poorly advised, Twitter usage is a potential case study for emotional reactions to the stream of media.

Participants discussed the notion of the online sphere as a quasi-spiritual space; online, people can reinvent themselves, and live a life entirely apart from their daily existence. The internet has affected human interaction, identity, authority, and conversation, thereby influencing the central question of what it means to be human today. Furthermore, as traditional religious institutions and conventions are often excluded from conversations regarding the growth of technology and the internet, there is no real role afforded to religion within the larger debate surrounding technological development and advancements in human connectedness.
Technology is developing at an exponential rate; the internet is the “new wheel.” After only 1.5 decades of existence, it has revolutionized daily life around the world. We need to begin to contemplate if the possibilities offered by certain dimensions of the internet - like virtual communities - may begin to fulfill humanity’s longing for a spiritual presence in their lives. This development would certainly alter religious and socio cultural fields as we know them. What will transcendence mean to human beings when it’s possible to have an immersive virtual experience that feels like - and perhaps even exceeds - reality without leaving your seat? How will we then conceive of religious experiences, and how will we share them, if at all?

Religion and Power

State actors must begin considering the interaction of religious and spiritual communities through new and expansive technologies, forums and virtual spaces. Non-state actors make extensive and critical use of social media. More people turn to the internet for information, education, and guidance and specifically for direction to act. The internet challenges and erases authority. While it is a democratized arena for the spread of information, religious information has a greater propensity to be misused for the goals and aims of certain individual actors. There is a willful and intentional push to spread good information as well as to spread misleading information, which is also frequently affected by limitations to privacy and the regulations therein regarding the ways and means of influence.

This element of faith and how humans can attribute their faith and beliefs will be central to understanding the motivations of demographics, societies and polities. The question of the physicality of religion and faith is influenced by the pervasive role of the internet and our cyber-existence. In our understanding of humanity and the role of religion in the contemplation of that human experience, social media have begun transforming our conception of community.

Religion and Secularism

Some state approaches to religion have been the adoption of secularism, whereby the state has no affiliation with any religion. For some, secularism promotes a social order separate from religion without actively dismissing or criticizing religious belief. While in theory secularism should afford freedom of religion, in practice, misled intentions can ultimately persecute and limit the freedom of religious expression.

For those who find faith in an agnostic approach, secularism may manifest in their lives with the same amount of influence as traditional religiosity does in the lives of the faithful. In practice, some secular approaches can adopt bias and compete actively with religions for attention and clout. A neutrally implemented secular structure can be complicated by a standard of respect and interaction between religious institutions and the state. This can be achieved by carving out a space where religion and the state can communicate without diminishing either perspective or narrative. This issue can be acutely felt by agnostic and atheist participants who find little institutional support for their inclusion in religious dialogue.

To alleviate this approach, some might lobby to abolish state religion from the social, institutional and political memory of modern societies. After centuries of influence, religion and culture can be inextricably woven in varying degrees across the globe. In educational develop-
ment, political influence, and cultural hierarchies, certain religions can impose a singular cultural narrative. This is particularly acute among the post-colonial communities whereby a eurocentric perception of the hierarchy among religions can impede conversation and limit respect.

**Explanatory Addendum:**

The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University (LISD) convened a colloquium on “Religion, Values, and Spirituality: The Impact on Diplomacy and Security”, in Vienna, Austria, City Palais Liechtenstein, 4-7 June 2017; also, to commemorate the 10th anniversary of LISD’s Program on Religion, Diplomacy, and International Relations (PORDIR), and in cooperation with ProOriente Wien. The private colloquium was arranged like a Princeton seminar, whereby all participants were encouraged to speak repeatedly and engage on the impact of religion and values on the theory and practice of security and diplomacy. There were no principal speakers – except several members of the Princeton PORDIR Seminar and all were seated in circular, free arrangement to equalize the importance of each participant independent of hierarchy or rank. The seminar explored new personal, meaningful and sustainable ways to foster honest dialogue through direct open interactions between representatives of all faiths and religions, agnostics, atheists, across all genders and between generations, in the traditional, private, off-the-record LCM format. Participants also contributed to the final assessments. The concluding all women panel was chaired by Rana Ibrahem, the colloquium was directed by Wolfgang Danspeckgruber.

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The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University convened a private colloquium on “China in Europe: Chinese Interests from Lisbon to Vladivostok,” in Triesenberg, Principality of Liechtenstein, on August 17-20, 2017. The meeting brought together senior governmental officials, think tank representatives, academics, diplomats and civil society representatives from China, the European Union, EurAsia, and the United States. The colloquium was hosted in the style of a Princeton seminar, whereby all participants were encouraged to participate actively throughout the meeting in order to discuss the future of China and European relations and foster greater understanding. The meeting was the first of a planned LCM series focusing on China’s relations with the wider European community and was chaired by Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Founding Director of LISD.

The first Working Session, “Chinese Relations with Europe: A Historic Perspective,” focused on the historical legacy of Chinese and European relations and new avenues for increased cooperation between the EU and China regarding international institutions, crisis management, business developments, and bilateral political relations. It was highlighted in this session that cooperative crisis diplomacy in the wider European neighborhood represents a heretofore unaddressed area of potential to increase cooperation between China and the EU.

This conversation continued in Working Session II, “One Belt, One Road Project,” during which participants focused on China’s ongoing infrastructure expansion project unveiled by PRC President Xi Jinping in 2013 to foster greater economic connectivity and cooperation with the Eurasian area. Much of the concerns with “One Road, One Belt” involved systematic asymmetry, whereby a top-down Chinese governmental structure seems to enable the Chinese government to give China a competitive advantage in the investment market. Obviously, the project is still very much in development and today it remains unclear how many of the planned European terminus points will actually be constructed due to logistical (and political) complexities. In the long run, the initiative’s potential for success continues to grow given that the increased connection between the EU and China would likely benefit mutual relations and situations.

In the evening, members of the Liechtenstein Colloquium were officially received by H.S.H. Prince Hans Adam II, The Reigning Prince of Liechtenstein, and H.S.H. Prince Alois, The Hereditary Prince of Liechtenstein, at the Schloss Vaduz (Vaduz Castle), featuring remarks from their Serene Highnesses to the colloquium participants.

The Third Working Session on “China’s Presence in Europe,” connected earlier conversations of China’s history with a developing view of future relations. It became clear that differing perspectives exist between those who invest and those who receive investment, and that sometimes such differences seem to be deliberately encouraged by third parties. Also, this session found that apparently China does see Europe and the European Union with a continuing interest to deal with nation states. Participants discussed the nature of China’s economic involvement in European infra-structure projects and the political evaluation of this, as well as China’s increas-
ing influence in Siberia, Central Asia, and the Arctic. Given a more regional approach, participants addressed the currently positive relations between China and Russia and this potential for fostering world peace and global development.

The final Working Session, “The Way Forward,” looked at the future of EU-China relations, including constructive ideas for future cooperation. It was noted that Africa is an important region for increased China-European cooperation, and that the EU and China should cooperate with the United States to share the burden of international leadership and guidance moving forward. The crafting of more equal trade agreements facilitating increased European access to the Chinese market might be a way of assuaging European concerns in a mutually beneficial manner.

After a refreshing walk into the Liechtenstein Mountains, the colloquium finished with the emphasis on positive, intensifying, and encouraging prospects for future interaction and research, and addressing potentially diverging perceptions. Participants discussed the impact of a changing global order. It was generally agreed that new regulations, rules and laws, and international institutions and organizations, will need to adapt to modern Chinese and European interactions. Stakeholders should take more opportunities to foster positive change, and those interested in mutual growth should focus on bilateral and trilateral agreements as well as new perspectives on these issues through continued interaction.

Colloquium Participants included Prof. Thomas Christensen, William Boswell Professor at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and Co-Chair, Harvard-Princeton “China and the World Program,” and former Dept. Assistant Secretary of State, Chinese Affairs; Dr. Hongjian Cui, Research Scholar at the China Institute for International Studies. Amb. Yanping Gao, Consul General of China in Zurich, Switzerland and for the Principality of Liechtenstein; Amb. Hans-Dietmar Schweisgut, Ambassador of the European Union to the People’s Republic of China and Mongolia; Amb. Mohammad Naeem Poyesh, Chargé d’Affaires, Embassy and Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the OSCE; Christopher Nixon Cox, Co-founder, OC Global Partners, LLC; Ahmad Al-Hamad, former Kuwait Chinese Investment Corp and Asiya Investments, Kuwait, London; Rita Kieber-Beck, Head of Kieber-Beck Treuhand Liechtenstein, frmr deputy Head of Government and Foreign Minister of Liechtenstein; James Gow, King’s College London, Department of War Studies; Knut Hammarskjöld, President, Ellipsis Human Identity Technologies; Dr. Andreas Insam, CEO of Bendura Bank AG; Christian Bahoo, Former Foreign Affairs Advisor for the Deputy Federal Chancellor and Minister of Trade, Science and Education of the Republic of Austria; Alexander Hecksher, Esq., Hong Kong; Dr. Peter Krenn, Director of Institutional Clients and Deputy Head of Eastern Europe, Bendura Bank AG; Lachlyn Soper-Lembke, Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Department of State; James Kynge, Emerging Markets Editor, The Financial Times; Prof. Sophie Meunier, Co-director, European Union Program, Princeton University; Hermine Schreiberhuber, Journalist and Author; Michael Schoenleber, Baron Associates LLC; Mr. Dennis Sammut, Executive Director LINKS (Dialogue–Analysis–Research); Thomas Seifert, Editor, Wiener Zeitung, Vienna, Austria; and Ms. Carol Wang, Tax Associate, Kirkland & Ellis LLP.
Overview

Today’s OSCE realm, comprising 57 states – a Northern Flank, Western Flank, Eastern Flank, Southern Flank plus impact from neighborhood and global trends - is plagued by challenges to traditional conceptions of security and stability, as well as new crises that may undermine conventional mechanisms of security, alliance, cooperation into question. Current and emerging crises can range in concern and scope from financial to political, military, economic, migration-based, health, environmental, leadership etc. Further, while some decision makers are tempted to refer to any challenge, irregularity or disturbance as a “crisis” to attract importance and support - thus possibly for the purposes of instrumentalizing such challenge – citizens and members of the electorate have become increasingly skeptical of and dissatisfied with the crisis management capabilities and institutions on the governmental level, of news on crises, of sovereignty and borders, and of how far governments are willing to go to secure them. Additionally, crises are seemingly in competition for attention and resources, with exacerbating fatigue, numbness to suffering, and doubts about effective crisis management and leadership. At the same time, even geographically distant crises can be increasingly interrelated and therefore tend to reinforce each other.

Thus, it appears of critical relevance to define “crises”, and to catalogue, evaluate and prioritize them in today’s interactive global actors’ system – comprising state, non-state actors, IOs and the EU, and – increasingly sovereign and automated digital systems.

Crisis Definition

A crisis represents a real or perceived challenge to the sustainability of the status quo, which demands, or is perceived to demand, an urgent decision. Over time, threats and challenges can develop into negative trends that, if not addressed, can erupt into crises. The prevention of, or solution to a crisis requires the instinct, will, and capacity to do so.

Crisis Components & Dimensions

Crises can be based on factual quantifiable matters as well as perceived qualitative issues. A crisis can concern political, economic, strategic, cultural-religious, humanitarian and health, environmental, etc. dimensions, it can be ad hoc or lingering. It converges from an issue to a trend to a problem to a crisis and eventually ends in conflict, if not dissolved. A crisis can also be manipulated by key actors both within and outside the crisis, who are interested in extracting advantages from the issue(s) in question. Inversely, however, a burning issue can also deliberately not be made into a crisis, for political or other expediency.
Crises Cataloging

Through a series of interventions from all participants, the colloquia generated the following list of issues currently facing the OSCE area, in no order of importance and reflects the wide spectrum of crisis perception by participants.

<table>
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<td>• Natural and Man-Made Disasters</td>
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<td>• Global Water Challenge</td>
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Crisis Evaluation

Different thresholds are surpassed before a situation reaches crisis level. A problem exists when interests are asymmetrical and non-aligned, and become a perceived challenge to something important. As the costs of the problem begin to rise - objectively or subjectively - the issue can alter from a trend to a more serious problem, and further develop into a crisis. Some developments may qualify as trends rather than crises, either because of the timeline of the conflict, or because the costs are not high enough to qualify the situation as a crisis. Thresholds are perhaps mutable and debatable and multiple layers exist.

Globalization trends and global interdependence indicate that while crises, such as epidemics, which were once confined geographically, are now potentially less limited in scope and extent. The world is so interconnected today that originally regional crises have the potential to disrupt the global order in very short time. Given the impact of the internet and global interconnectedness, a local crisis can become a regional and global crisis nearly instantaneously, thus enormously taxing the crisis management capabilities of the involved actors. Inversely, a limited crisis far away can suddenly affect another region and become an acute challenge. Historically, humans have always been relatively connected--as inter-regional traders but also through the
transmission of the Black Plague across the ancient silk road shows. Thus, while we can consider how globalization has intensified, it is worthwhile to address the way time and impact have altered the costs and stakes associated with a more globalized world.

Crises can be broken down into quantifiable and qualitative dimensions. These dimensions can include the perceived number of refugees, uneven distribution of income, the fluctuation of the economy, and military movements, among many other factors. Furthermore, non-state actors [also criminal enterprises] empowered by ample resources, modern technology and interactive global communications in real time, can both contribute to and exploit crises to a currently unknown degree. In addition, the balance between stakes and costs, and the dissatisfaction bordering on distrust between the population and their leadership are critical in the contributions of various dimensions.

Globalization undisputedly benefits the whole world, but also creates great interdependencies on all geographical levels of analysis – from the local to the national, to the regional, continental and global. Connecting the world and countries and communities working together because of necessity – from outsourcing to insourcing – may strengthen relations but also creates tensions if one actor tries to impose its power on others. These interdependencies can be very dangerous as they are created individually and no one knows to what extent they will contribute to the acceleration of potential crises. Loss of trust and transparency, of confidence between cultures, and distorted communications, all contribute to the potential degradation of relations into problems and eventually crises.

Lastly, it is important to highlight the need for a crisis prevention and monitoring system in both the crisis area and the “potential” crisis area. To prevent a crisis, good monitoring and timely cooperation are essential. Due to the OSCE’s unique structure and procedures, it is especially capable of generating the dialogue opportunities between global actors and local forces which can ensure productive negotiations on global and local levels. Since even a marginalized crisis can turn into global one, given the certain circumstances, the useful classification of OSCE actions depending on the development of crisis could qualify as one of the following: pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis.

Crisis Prioritization

Crises can be prioritized by a sense of urgency vs. a sense of importance. It seems to be the opinions of decision makers or global actors that determine the sense of urgency of a serious problem/crisis, how quickly the crisis will be dealt with, and what type of crisis solution mechanisms will be implemented. One suggestion to ensure more efficient solutions to crises is to provide a conceptual grid to empower leaders to make decisions. In addition, as a parameter of crisis prioritization from the perspective of the actor(s), participants discussed the notion of “likelihood of success” or “malleability” as a general marker for prioritizing crises. For example, not all crises can be dealt with by the OSCE and with special attention to the OSCE perspective, as a crisis that is both urgent and important, but not clearly within the jurisdiction/competency of the OSCE (i.e. Climate Change).

In a penultimate session, participants consulted the previously generated catalog of issues to choose the three most critical issues facing the OSCE area over the next 12 months. A vote count yielded the following three issues: (a) violent extremism; (b) migration; and (c) dialogue between the United States, Russia and Europe. Using the same methods, participants choose the
three most critical crises facing the OSCE area over the next 3 years and found the following to be the most critical: (a) climate change; (b) digitalization, automation and unemployment; (c) and migration.

Overall, it was felt that a more systematic approach to analyzing trends before they develop into crises would also benefit from a more comprehensive “watch-list”-approach and the development of relevant mechanisms in this regard. Equally, the factoring of “islands of cooperation” into such an approach could also contribute to preventing or mitigating crises. Finally, a focus on governance issues should also be taken into account.

Like the crisis catalogue shown above, the discussion on prioritization demonstrated the difficulty of participants to find a consensus on the urgency of issues that require immediate action. It seems that in the current international environment it will become even more difficult to define crisis management priorities, focus on them and coordinate a common approach. More than ever crisis management today requires convincing leadership and strategic target-setting.
A Viennese Doctor named Sigmund Freud recorded this story. Two businessmen meet at a railway station in Galicia.

“Where are you going?” asks one. “To Cracow,” is the answer. “See here, what a liar you are,” roars the other. “When you say, you are going to Cracow, you actually want me to believe that you are going to Lemberg. But now I know that you are really going to Cracow. So why are you lying?”

Also warum lügst du? (Why do you lie?) What’s happening on that Galician platform has a lot to do with trust, with its absence and its violation. It suggests that, even given rituals of deception, trust can develop and be betrayed. But—if you’ll indulge a philosopher’s question—what exactly does “trust” mean here?

Let me point out, first, that the verb “trust” can refer both to an act and to the attitude that typically accompanies it. I can trust someone with something—the keys to my car or a dark secret. I make myself vulnerable to them. I do so, of course, usually, having some degree of confidence that they will not, in fact, abuse my trust; but in trusting someone, in this sense, I make that person responsible for some specific interests of mine. If they are trustworthy and competent they will meet the responsibility; if not, they may betray my trust. In English, we say in this case that we have entrusted something to someone: the keys, the secret.

So I’m going to use the verb entrust and the noun entrustment for this act, keeping the word trust for the attitude. Because I can entrust you with something without trusting you. Entrustment is often quite rational. If, we have a common interest, for example, I can expect you to secure my interest because it is also yours. In a well-made contract or treaty, I may have made myself vulnerable to betrayal, but I haven’t risked much. So far, then, I don’t need trust. If I can tell whether you have kept my trust, I can reward you for compliance or punish you for non-compliance, and because you know that, you have reason to keep my trust independent of whether you care for my interests. Trust, the mindset, comes in only if I think you will give my interest some consideration whether or not it matches your interests.

5 „Zwei Juden treffen sich im Eisenbahnwagen einer galizischen Station. Wohin fahrst du? fragte der eine. Nach Krakau, ist die Antwort. Sieh her, was du für Lügner bist, braust der andere auf. Wenn du sagst, du fahrst nach Krakau, willst du doch, daß ich glaube, du fahrst nach Lemberg. Nun weiß ich aber, daß du wirklich fahrst nach Krakau. Also warum lügst du?” (Two Jews meet in a railway station in Galicia. “Where are you traveling to?” asks one. “To Cracow,” is the answer. “Look here, what kind of liar are you,” roars the other. “When you say you are travelling to Cracow, you certainly want me to believe that you are travelling to Lemberg. But now I know that you are really going to Cracow. So why are you lying?”) Sigmund Freud Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewußten (Vienna: Deuticke, 1905): 96. Freud says this belongs with skeptical jokes which “attack … the security of our cognition itself.” (“was sie angreifen … ist die Sicherheit unserer Erkenntnis selbst …”)

6 And there are pairs of words in other European languages that connect trust with entrustment: Vertrauen, Anvertrauen; confiance, confier; доверять, вверять.

7 That’s why economists sometimes argue that, if it is rational for you to look after my interests, I am not really trusting you. See, e.g., Timothy W. Guinnane, “Trust: A Concept Too Many,” Center Discussion Paper No. 907, February 2005, Economic Growth Center, Yale University, P.O. Box 208629, New Haven, CT 06520-8269,
Trust—this mindset—makes most sense in the context of an ongoing relationship. If the relationship is rich enough, it will be impossible to keep track of all the costs and the benefits, let alone to sum them. As a result, in normal human relationships the default response to entrustment is to look after the other’s interest without calculating the costs and benefits for oneself. It may be in our long-term interests to be in a relationship of this kind, but in most of our everyday entrustments, we are not keeping track of our own interests at all. To be sure, even in a trusting relationship, the temptation to defect may become overpowering; I know my friends might betray me for a million dollars, or under threat of torture.8

Two more crucial points about trust. First, it can be focused: I can trust my banker with my investments, but not with my personal secrets. He may be a gossip, while being financially scrupulous. Second, trust is predicated on competence: I do not trust my infant nephew with the car keys, not because he doesn’t care for my interests, but because he doesn’t know how to care for them: he’s easily distracted and may drop the keys somewhere where they’re hard to find.

Now the kind of trust that we have in our friends and family—the realm of “strong ties”—tends to be based on sentiment rather than on evidence, and to be general rather than focused.9 We’re likely to think our friends are morally upright and so that they will secure our interests where morality requires it, without calculating their interest.

So what about societies where habits of trust extend well beyond the circle of strong ties? Some recent political sociology suggests that such communities are thereby endowed with a resource for effective public action. Robert Putnam conceives of social capital as something that makes for more successful politics. The social capital of an individual consists, among other things, of links with other people—connections—and of reputation, which may encourage entrustment. When Putnam claims that trust is an element of collective social capital, it’s unclear whether he means more than that in successful societies people can engage regularly in entrustment, because they are richly embedded in social relationships. He may be leaving it open whether they do so out of trust, the mindset, on the one hand, or because, on the other, it is reasonable to do so, when social capital is high.

What’s certain is that in a society where people are likely to respond to entrustment by not taking advantage of those who offer it, treating others as trustworthy will often led them to entrust things to you in return.10 Mutual webs of vulnerability will develop that enable a great deal of cooperation without calculation. In a society of trustworthy people, I do not need to calculate how your interests and mine are interrelated, nor do I need to keep careful watch on what you do. But I may still be wary of those who seem to lack competence or to belong to some social group that is regarded as untrustworthy. (In my country, that might mean politicians or lawyers.)

http://www.econ.yale.edu/~egcenter/

8 Fiabilité, Vertrauenswürdigkeit, кредитоспособность: all have their limits.

9 Economists may think that, once someone cares about us, it is in her interest to secure our interest, because she gains utility from doing so. I think this way of talking about interests is muddled, but I will not pursue the point.

Trust is often necessary to solve the challenges of cooperation. Even in the Prisoners’ Dilemma—the simplest sort of case where cooperation can make us both better off, even though it is in our narrower interest to defect—if each of us believes the other has his interests at heart, we can get to the right outcome. All that’s required is that I know you value advancing my interest as well as yours, and vice versa. But because trust is necessarily limited, when the question of entrustment arises, we must judge whether trust is appropriate. Entrustment makes us vulnerable.

Still, I can also be vulnerable just because I believe what others say. In believing others, we expose ourselves to the risk of having our grasp of the world manipulated to advance their interests.11

So far, I have been talking about trust and entrustment among private individuals. But we are here to talk about politics and about the public significance of trust. It is not obvious when one first thinks about it, why trust should matter for politics. Thomas Hobbes, writing in the mid-seventeenth century, thought politics began with the creation of the Leviathan; his state was a device for people who thought they had no reason to trust one another. His sovereign is there, in effect, to distribute rewards and punishments for respecting each other’s legitimate interests, precisely because often we cannot rationally entrust things to one another in the absence of the state. Thomas Jefferson concluded that, “In questions of power, then, let no more be said of confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution.”12 The thought is Hobbesian: what makes the Constitution work is that we are fearfully suspicious of one another.13 Jefferson thought that if the institutions were rightly structured, it would be in the interest of each of us to do our part. We could be entrusted with our social roles but would not need to be trusted. Indeed, the whole Madisonian theory of the American Founding could be seen as an exercise in the design of institutions created for people who do not trust one another.

But this makes representative government a little bit mysterious. When we elect members of parliament, congressmen, or presidents, why should we think that they will have at heart the interests that matter to us? There are millions of us with our own bundles of interests, some shared, some consistent but distinct, some conflicting? How could it be reasonable for all of us to trust in this context?

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11 In the individual case, then, entrustment may or may not require trust. But it usually does require belief in the competence of the trustee, the person trusted. Even when we do trust, our trust is limited. It is limited in its scope—we trust people with some things and not with others. And it is limited in its depth—we trust, but only so far. One context in which trust develops is where people are enmeshed in complex webs of relationship, where calculating interest is impossible. Here we are concerned not only with whom to trust but with being and being seen to be trustworthy ourselves. And here social signals of trustworthiness are important, as are the reputations not just of individuals but of social groups for being worthy of trust of various kinds.

12 The context was his urging the Kentucky Legislature to find the Alien and Sedition Acts unconstitutional, which they did in passing the Kentucky Resolutions he had drafted. Thomas Jefferson, From the Kentucky Resolution of 1798, from: Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, vol. 4, p. 543 (1907). http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1908

Well, as John Lilburne, the Leveller chief in the English Revolution of the seventeenth century put it, speaking about the English parliament, they are “trustees of the people ... chosen and betrusted to be the great patrons and guardians of their liberties.” The interests that we place in the hands of political representatives are limited (as entrustment always is) both in scope and in depth. And what we need is to have reasons for this entrustment, not to have reasons for trust. There may sometimes be trust behind the entrustment: I may know my congressman, or believe that she has a religious faith that will keep her doing her duty. But if the institutions of society are working properly, as Jefferson saw, I can entrust things to them without trusting anybody.

An honest and well-informed free press, whose members have a vocation to cover what is relevant and to explain it, to uncover the hidden that should not be hidden, to be guided not by partisanship but evidence; political parties that bear the costs of breaking their promises and discipline their members in order to maintain a reputation for reliability; a political culture that respects the principle that, even if one can take advantage of the vulnerabilities of one’s fellow citizens, one should not: these are the sorts of things that can make it reasonable to entrust the government to others. The grounding of what is sometimes called vertical trust—the citizen’s trust in institutions—need not, in fact, be trust in any one. We just need, again as Jefferson argued, to structure the institutions so that this vertical entrustment is reasonable.

But the running of the state and of inter-state relations involves dense networks of relationships among officials. These are inter-personal relations of exactly the sort I started by talking about. How do Brussels, and the WTO or the G7 or NATO, or a score of other international military and economic arrangements and institutions, actually work? Why are they enabled by private institutions like the World Economic Forum? Because the officials who work in make up a sort of international political society, staffed with diplomats and military officers and civil servants and business people who regularly interact with their counterparts from other countries. These are the career internationalists; they can prevent tensions from turning into conflicts, and conflicts from turning into wars; they defuse and de-escalate, bargain and compromise. They bank trust and sometimes spend trust. And their interactions are too dense to be managed by a simple calculation of interest. Of course, it is part of their profession to represent, acknowledge and understand interests; and to know how to rank them. But in building trust with one another, one by one, they create a web of interpersonal trust that the states and other institutions they serve rely on.

These are horizontal relations, which require the creation of mutual vulnerabilities to make cooperation possible. Here, so it seems to me, real trust is an enormous asset: it is how you know I will not tell you I am going to Cracow when I am going to Lemberg, even if it would advantage me to do so; it is why you can assume that we really can discuss our secrets. Many of you will be familiar with a sequence of scenes from Peter Ustinov’s Cold War comedy, Romanoff and Juliet, set in the imaginary Mittel-European state of Concordia. Its leader, the General, is caught between the United States and the Soviet Union, each of which needs his vote at


15 Because the North Koreans have so few officials in these networks, they cannot call on them when they would be useful.
the UN. In the first scene, the General reveals what he thinks is a dark secret to the American Ambassador.

   GENERAL: Incidentally, they know your code.

   AMERICAN AMBASSADOR (beaming): We know they know our code ... We only give them things we want them to know.

In the next scene, he makes the same remark to the Russian ambassador.

   SOVIET AMBASSADOR (smiling): We have known for some time that they knew we knew their code. We have acted accordingly—by pretending to be duped.

In the final scene, the general goes back to the American ambassador again:

   GENERAL: Incidentally, you know—they know you know they know you know.

   AMERICAN AMBASSADOR: (genuinely alarmed): What? Are you sure?16

An equilibrium of trust, in short, is essential to the life of diplomacy. And there is here, I think, a profound paradox, with which we in the democratic societies of the North Atlantic are living today.

   For when these denizens of international political society come home with the intricate deals they have negotiated with wily competitors, wary allies, even outright adversaries, they may find themselves distrusted by the very people on whose behalf they work. Rightly or wrongly, in other words, the citizens of our democracies see evidence of horizontal trust among elites as grounds for wondering whether it is reasonable to have vertical trust for those elites: trust within the elites generates skepticism among citizens about whether they should entrust us with anything.

   The reason they have lost their faith in the capacity of elites to deliver what is entrusted to them is not that they think they know better than elites do what policies are in their interests. It is rather that they have seen that existing policies have not brought them what they hoped for, and they have lost confidence that the elites can be trusted with their interests. So, in many places, there are many people who don’t believe what the government or the press tells them. In others, many doubt that the elites have the competence to deliver, even when they want to. And in yet others, they think that our trust in one another has turned us into a class that pursues its own interests, indifferent to theirs. They may suspect, too, in an age of large corporations and hyper-accumulation, that political elites are being bought off by the financial elites.

   Skepticism about elite competence is not surprising, in the face of the failure to generate a recovery of European employment after 2008, or to solve the Greek financial crisis or the Syrian Civil War and the continuing refugee crisis. No one who has just watched the US House of Representatives pass a health-care reform bill that most of its members have not read and that clearly does things that the leaders of the majority party have sworn not to do, can feel confidence that our political officials will do the job we have entrusted to them. It is natural in these

circumstances to wonder whether what we see is just a failure to be trustworthy, grounded in an unconcern with the interests of most citizens. Nor is the skepticism about the truthfulness of institutions so unreasonable when we discover, through WikiLeaks and the like, that officials don’t believe what they have told us. Also warum lägst du?

But the corrosion of faith in institutions cannot simply be pinned on the failure of elites; it is at least as much the result of the circulation of nonsensical, paranoid narratives, especially through the new digital media. Russian “disinformation,” it has often been observed, works not because we believe it but because it engenders a more generalized distrust, such that any news can be dismissed as “fake news.” The so-called “information wars” are, in the end, wars on information: efforts to undermine the authority of fact. Trust is their intended victim.

Despite the populist resurgences, despite the crises of epistemic authority, we continue to benefit from great reservoirs of social capital that make our civic spaces work. People make themselves vulnerable to one another in small ways all the time in daily transactions, without needing to calculate the interests that guide others. These experiences give us no reason to believe that other people are normally untrustworthy; even the strangers we meet on the street every day. Still, citizens do not need to understand a political fact to notice it: and the willingness to entrust their affairs to existing elites is surely only rational when elites appear to be competent and aimed at the ends with which they have been entrusted.

And so I wonder if the answer to the decline of trust—especially the vertical trust toward our internationalist cadres—isn’t simple enough: elites need to work together to earn back popular trust, telling the truth more often, even when it is uncomfortable and complex; being more honest about each other; rejecting the unreasonable demands of rich individuals and institutions; and creating structures that are reasonably transparent and effective in policing the behavior of officials. The people have often been sold the wrong solutions: but they are typically right in their awareness of the problems. You can trust them on that.

Suggested readings:
I fear that we are facing now a global crisis of trust – a breakdown of confidence in the institutions that have made it possible to live together, and sometimes to work together, for over four centuries. We see signs of a severe vicious circle of reciprocal accusation, in which the worse things get the more different parties blame each other and turn inward. That has happened before in history, before the World Wars and in the century preceding the Westphalia agreement, and it is not a pleasant prospect.

The breakdown of confidence today has very deep roots. It is not just a matter of one or two particular players, a Putin or a Trump, but of a systemic inability to deal with the level of social complexity and interdependence that has developed over the last half century.

The great problem of our age is whether we can reconcile the growing diversity of relations with trust. There is reason for both grave concern and some hope. The concern comes from the fact that much research and experience shows that increasing diversity in any community reduces trust. The hope comes from the fact that many times before in history, humans have found ways to strengthen the institutions that shape and guarantee trust, and to broaden them to incorporate new kinds of relations. Perhaps we can do it again.

Trust is simply a bet on the future behavior of other people. We give up degrees of freedom and autonomy in the expectation that others will do things that will improve our lives. We don’t grow our own food because we trust that others will grow it and deliver it to us better than we can. But the more those around us are different, with differing views of right and wrong, the harder it is to be confident that they will act the way we expect them to.

Let me briefly describe the structure and the limitations of trust in the global community of the last few hundred years. The core unit has been the age-old form of communities united by strong ties of common loyalty, shared traditions, and stable relations. This may be called a community of tradition – we may call them “tribes” for short. Such communities are essentially closed: people trust others within the defined tribal boundaries, but they have no confidence in how outsiders will act. They are also essentially non-reflective -- that is, they rely on shared traditions as the central pillar of trust, and lack systematic ways to consider and modify those traditions.

When communities of tradition bump into each other, they have no way of relating or of understanding each other; they can only fight. But at various moments of history they have managed to get beyond that by building a second basis of trust, which might be called a community of agreement, based on deliberately negotiated rules and contracts. Such trust is based on the belief that the agreement reflects mutual self-interest -- that it is in the other party’s interest as much as our own to stick to it.

That was the nature of the system constructed at Westphalia. Communities of tradition, after over a century of warfare, agreed to create a system of negotiated agreement to maintain the peace, while leaving traditions within nations untouched.
The system looks essentially like this:

![Diagram of a network structure](image_url)

Trust based on agreement, rather than on tribal loyalty, has two major advantages: it can transcend the boundaries of closed groups, and it can be deliberately modified to meet changing circumstances. But it also has major weaknesses. Because it relies on self interest, it is highly vulnerable to manipulation and defection: everyone is always looking for an edge. Thus it is very unstable when there are many players. It may be stabilized only when a very few players -- two, or at most three -- achieve a balance of power, so that they all know they will be punished for violations.

That was the situation during the Cold War. Much of what I have heard in this meeting is a desire to return to that state, because dangerous as it was, there was at least some way to build shared expectations, to know what you were doing. The lament is that we can’t make deals the way we used to. The question asked is who is at fault for the breakdown of deals, and how can we restore the stable relations that we used to have even among states that deeply disliked each other.

But my view is that we cannot restore that Westphalia system, because the underlying conditions have been transformed. The Westphalia model depends on national representatives who can make commitments for their own peoples, who are in turn bound internally by their common loyalties and traditions. But in the last few decades there has been an accelerating multiplication of connections across tribes. This development is driven by several deep forces: increasing prosperity, education, and most of all, a rapid evolution of communications technologies. A century ago we had the telephone, and more recently the television, which allowed us to talk to and peer into the lives of people far away. In the last few years the internet has taken this to an entirely new level, in which people can easily interact across all traditional boundaries. It is easy to forget that how new the internet is as a broad social force – scarcely a decade old – and how much disruption it has caused in that time.

Now your children at the dinner table give you only part of their attention; at the same time they are communicating with friends across town, across the country, across the world. That probably disturbs you. Your coworkers are not people you have worked with for years, whom you see every day, who share your loyalty to your company; they are likely to be contractors, they may work for rivals, they may be across the ocean -- you may never see them in the flesh.

Thus we are moving towards a state in which everyone has multiple connections beyond their tribes. Relations are no longer ordered in graded hierarchies, from family to neighborhood to
region to nation; they are disordered, with each person’s network of connections differing from those of friends and family members. It looks, in short, like this:

Can we bring order out of this complexity? Can we establish any stable basis of mutual expectations, any framework of trust, from these intertwined connections?

Some think not; they would like to go back to a simpler model, to shut down the chaos. But we can’t shut down the chaos without also shutting down the enormous benefits and potential of the expanded connections. In the advanced industrial countries, about half the populations now feel comfortable in the cosmopolitan world of rich multiple relations, but the other half hate it and would like to go back to the simpler picture by restoring clear and unified communities of loyalty. This has produced ubiquitous and intense battles between tribalists and cosmopolitans, which is spiraling towards the vicious circles I alluded to at the start,

There are some reasons for hope, some models of trust in complex interconnected setting, from which much can be learned. I would highlight two. The first, perhaps unexpectedly, is the world of large global corporations. They have been dealing for some decades with the pressures of complexity, which have torn apart the stable bureaucratic hierarchies and the unified corporate communities of the past. Companies have to deal with intricate webs of partnerships, alliances, supply chains; they have to mobilize knowledge across the globe and in constantly-shifting combinations. To do all that, some of the best have learned a good deal about how to coordinate not through company loyalty and stable rules, but through shared purpose.

Developing communities of purpose has requires an extraordinary level of social invention. Companies have developed systems for defining purposes and generating commitment through deliberation, and reviewing those purposes as situations change. People have had to learn how to work with shifting groups who are not part of their division, not under a single boss. They have learned to construct agendas, to understand and integrate different knowledge domains, to make decisions when no single individual knows enough to do it alone. They have built elaborate systems of reputation that create a basis for deep trust even with people in very different tribes. These techniques should applicable to the international arena as well.

The other source of hope lies in civil society, including the virtual communities of the internet. These bring out the potential of building communities around understanding – around deepening the grasp of others' perspectives and values. Diplomacy has experimented a bit with this in informal dialogues, the “walk in the woods”; but many civil society groups have gone well beyond this with techniques of active listening narrative storytelling, and role taking.
These communities of understanding and of purpose are at very early and incomplete stages, not yet reliable, easily disrupted. But they give a glimpse of how to organize complex multiplex relations into trusting communities.

I would suggest that the people at this conference are not sufficient for rebuilding trust. Improved relations among diplomats and elites, even if it were possible, could not manage the larger forces disrupting communities. Other groups need to be brought into the conversation: non-state actors representing the growing web of tangled relation, and groups that have begun to develop the techniques and tools I have touched on. These might include people who have built internet platforms for understanding and collaboration around global issues like climate change and human rights; representatives of the transnational associations growing up around those issues; global corporations.

Building trust in this world requires more than dialogue, more than seeking agreements. The term conversation is better as a name for the core institution of complex trust. Conversation can move beyond formal agreement, towards building understanding; beyond rules and behavioral commitments, towards shared purposes. We’ve learned a great deal about such conversations in the past few decades, but they are not yet part of the culture of states and diplomats.

I think there is hope. There is hope in the fact that teenagers in Tehran, in Moscow, in Beijing, in New York, in Atlanta are sharing music with each other, laughing at each other’s memes, trading funny videos of cats; these activities build a shared of shared humanity wider than ever before in history. There is hope in the fact that some Millennials are building effective organizations to aid refugees and spread new climate technologies.

But though there is hope, there may not hope for us, in Kafka’s phrase. That depends on our ability to broaden the conversation beyond the traditional cosmopolitan elites, to include the increasing range of actors involved in cross-national relations and projects, and to build on these foundations new institutions of trust.

Suggested readings:


Rumors stirring in the NYPD that Huma’s emails point to a pedophilia ring and @HillaryClinton is at the center. #GoHillary #PodestaEmails23
David Goldberg @DavidGoldbergNY, Twitter, 30 October 2016

“FBI Insider: Clinton Emails Linked to Political Pedophile Sex Ring”
Sean Adl-Tabatabai, YourNewsWire.com, 31 October 2016

There is a world-wide Pedo-Ring connected to the CLINTON FOUNDATION, that just so happens to also be taking over the USA for good. FIND IT AND YOU FOUND A SMOKING GUN.”
stophboy7, reddit.com, November 2016

The so-called Pizzagate conspiracy theory of 2016 can be traced to a certain ‘David Goldberg,’ who, in the run-up to the US presidential election, shared a rumor on Twitter that implicated then-presidential candidate Hillary Clinton and her campaign in a pedophilia ring. (His name is put in scare quotes because it is unclear whether David Goldberg is an actual person. The Twitter account in question was flagged as belonging to an imposter.) The following day, the rumor was picked up and modified by sites such as YourNewsWire, TruePundit, and InfoWars. In a YouTube video that has since been removed, Alex Jones of InfoWars exclaimed that he was ‘no longer going to hide the truth that Hillary Clinton had personally murdered and chopped up and raped children.’ Far-right groups on 4chan and Reddit exhorted like-minded others to search for evidence in the released emails and a participant on 4chan eventually linked mentions of “cheese pizza” to “child pornography,” with the community honing in on a pizzeria in Washington DC whose owner had previously corresponded with Tony Podesta, the chairman of the Clinton presidential campaign. In a sign of what is at stake in real life when it comes to fake news, a twenty-eight-year-old father of two from North Carolina read about the rumor on social media, believed it to be true, and drove to Washington DC with his AR-15 rifle and revolver to liberate the enslaved children. Fortunately, no-one was injured.

In what follows, we discuss the ‘fake news’ phenomenon and the danger it represents. Our commentary is divided into three parts. First, we focus on the connection between truth, knowledge, and power. Second, we explore the legitimacy and authoritativeness of sources of knowledge, namely, the media. Finally, we consider the impact of the lack of a common language of truth on our ability to live together in an interdependent world.

18 stophboy7, “This is the secret of the FBI tweets. This is what we are supposed to do.” Reddit, November 2016. https://www.reddit.com/r/The_Donald/comments/5aqr4/this_is_the_secret_of_the_fbi_tweets_this_is_what/
(1) Truth, knowledge, and power

‘Fake news’ is not merely inaccurate or incomplete, or flawed in some other way, such as by overstating the degree of confidence in the veracity of the information that is reported. Instead, ‘fake news’ is entirely unfaithful to the truth. As Callum Borchers of the Washington Post wrote in his wonderfully-titled article “This is a Real News Story about Fake News Stories,” ‘fake news’ is “stuff that is completely made up.” It specifically intends to misinform readers, with a primary overall purpose of creating confusion and division. (Other aims are monetary and entertainment.) Conspiracy theories are not new, as the long-standing rumors about the Kennedy assassination readily attest. However, fake news is novel in a few respects. In the era of social media, it is more immediate, responding very quickly to unfolding events (such as the Podesta email leak); it is monetized; and it is frequently, for lack of a better term, also weaponized (serving geopolitical goals). The abundant availability of fake news – and its ability to go undetected as such – risks transforming us all into skeptics of knowledge, who have little faith in its possibility or certainty. After all, how can we know which sources to trust?

In a way, it is almost inevitable that we have arrived at this juncture. Ever since Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, it has been difficult for us to trust the delivery of facts or the solidarity of truth. Foucault impressed upon us the inexorable linking of knowledge with power. As he declared that ‘power is everywhere,’ embodied in knowledge and ‘regimes of truth,’ it no longer made sense to trust the insulation of knowledge from the influence of power. Indeed, each society was deemed to have its own regime of truth, and its own mechanisms by which true and false statements were distinguished. Power is based on knowledge but also reproduces knowledge. What we are left with is savoir-pouvoir or ‘knowledge-power.’ The line between the Latin Quarter in Paris and radio host and conspiracy theorist Alex Jones of ‘fake news’ fame may seem obscure, but it is there.

Post-structuralism and its attack on the Enlightenment had a cost. To make us aware of the connection between power and knowledge and to make any interpretation of the text possible, we opened the gates to where truth is seen as a property claim. In some of the earlier philosophical understandings of truth, true propositions were seen as identical to facts (the identity theory of truth) or as propositions for which a corresponding fact existed (the correspondence theory of truth). Having read Derrida and Foucault, however, we were left with the question of whether to accept facts. Should we accept facts, or do we live in a Quantum universe where Schrodinger’s cat may or may not exist simultaneously?

We would like to make an argument for a more Newtonian sense of reality; a place where Karl Popper may feel at home. To be anti-Liberal is not just about values, but also about an agreed-upon process whereby we can agree on what is true.

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Unfortunately, we now live in a world where the truth depends on which media you consume. Such a statement is usually used to castigate those who watch Fox news, but the readers of the New York Times are just as certain of their truth, and just as unable or unwilling to consider the possibility of truth beyond their echo chamber. All of this has been made worse by social media. Once you believe the first lie, then the second, third, and infinitely more will be coming your way. The presentation of new facts that conflict with long-standing beliefs does not change minds in part because the facts themselves are now tainted.

It is unlikely that Fox news watchers read much Foucault, but they are borrowing from him when they say that our truth is an elite truth. So do Hungary’s Victor Orban and Russia’s Vladimir Putin when they argue against “Western” facts. In a way, this rhetoric builds on the earlier debate about collectivist “Asian” values and its alleged conflict with the individualistic human rights framework. The very important difference is that Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew contested moral norms rather than facts.

The politicization of epistemology may be the most significant effect resulting from the digital revolution. Our phones are not just open receptors of data, but also machines through which data can be manipulated and spread. We live in a world where you can easily find evidence for whatever you wish to believe; that Hillary Clinton runs a pedophilia ring out of a pizza shop in downtown DC or that Vladimir Putin put Donald Trump in the White House.

(2) The legitimacy and authoritativeness of sources of truth

In such an environment, there is a real need for legitimate and authoritative sources of truth. In other words, we need Uncle Walter. Americans of a certain age can remember when the CBS anchorman Walter Cronkite was the touchstone of truth. When he said we were on the moon, we were on the moon; when he said that Vietnam was lost, Vietnam was lost. A structural equivalent is the role played by the BBC in the ex-British empire. The BBC spoke not only with the best accent, but also told the truth. Now we know, of course, that the Cronkite truth was perhaps the expression of CBS interest or that the BBC spoke with a post-colonial bias. However, they did provide a basis for conversation, because we had, in a sense, an epistemological Leviathan. That is no longer the case.

In addition, there is now a prolific and profitable shadow system of information production – an organized infrastructure for ‘fake news’ – that further undermines the authoritativeness of any sources of truth. At the time of the last US presidential election, an army of so-called Twitter bots impersonated American citizens, spreading ‘fake news’ and fomenting division.24 A surprisingly high proportion of Pizzagate news articles – about a scandal internal to the United States – originated in the Czech Republic, Cyprus, and Vietnam.25

This is a problem. In a world of my facts versus your facts, it is impossible for us to have discussions about opinions and policies. Before we can agree on how to resolve global crises such as inequality or climate change, there has to be agreement on an analysis of what the distribution of

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resources is and whether it is getting warmer. It is not clear how such a knowledge basis can be created in a social media world.

One response is to turn to Wikipedia – a market solution of sorts, where whoever does the most edits, wins. Of course, Wikipedia cannot be used to gain reliable knowledge about a controversial issue such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, because information provided there can be twisted by effort. Another response is to close oneself off from any empirical challenge and simply believe in the primacy of a method. This is what economists have done, but the problem there is that they increasingly only speak to one another. A third option is to rely on universities. Unfortunately, our very elitism makes our legitimacy questionable. Do universities and academics really represent humanity or the interests of the very small percentage – the frequently-mentioned 1%? In many eyes, we have lost legitimacy.

(3) The impact of the lack of a common language of truth

It is incredibly important that we regain it, however, because non-agreement on a set of facts is the ultimate version of us-them dynamics. This brings to mind the comic strip Pogo: ‘We are our own worst enemy and we are dangerous’.26 If we only listen to our news, we therefore fail to understand the views of others, and those others must therefore be wrong, and we therefore do not have to listen. Since both sides are playing this game, it means that conversations move us further apart rather than closer together. Since we cannot agree on what is true, we create images of the other.

Over the past 20 years, there has been a steady stream of demonization of a number of threats, from political Islam to populism and now Vladimir Putin. The presumption in some circles is that these are all wrong and that we therefore do not have to listen to what they say. The Brexit vote should have served a wake-up call about a divided society, but instead, it has turned into another reason for not trusting those “others.” A similar pattern has developed in the United States with Donald Trump ‘not being my president.’ This statement may have symbolic value – of repudiating certain things that President Trump is thought to stand for – but it obscures the fact that, actually, he is the president of ‘our’ country.

It is a difficult problem to solve, because the new world of information is akin to the struggles with asymmetric warfare. The bipolar world was simple not only in terms of politics, but also in terms of competing truths. It was relatively uncomplicated to defeat an enemy who playing by the same rules as you were. Pravda and Izvestia were not difficult to counter-attack. However, much like the American military has spent 15 frustrating years fighting an enemy that will not stand and fight a Napoleonic battle, we are frustrated by the seemingly amorphous nature of those who spread what we call “fake news.” Who do we fight and who do we prove wrong?

We need to be very worried about this. We live in an interdependent world where agreement on basic rules – the size of a meter, the value of a currency, and the observations of how the system is working are all critical. There is very substantial ‘systemic risk’ in the system. Now that we have lost the common language of truth and we have become akin to the Tower of Babel, the collapse is certain if we cannot agree on how to disagree.

26 W. Kelly, 1987. Pogo: We have met the enemy and he is us. Simon & Schuster.
The phenomenon of “fake news”

Collins Dictionary’s selection of “fake news” as Word of the Year for 2017 was hardly surprising given the term’s current hold in popular and political discourse. The choice is also alarming for it reflects the scale of the challenges of so-called “fake news” – more appropriately called “disinformation” or propaganda – for liberal democracies and the values of the rule of law and human rights they seek to uphold. These problems have been felt in such diverse contexts – from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict to the plight of the Rohingya in Myanmar – across the world. But the problems associated with disinformation are also multi-faceted, complex and only beginning to be understood, even though they have drawn an explosion of media commentary and academic research recently. 2016’s presidential election in the United States and the United Kingdom’s referendum on EU membership, with all the seismic political shifts they signalled, have also propelled the role of disinformation, especially over social media, in democratic processes as a major subject of political debate and even emerging legislative scrutiny.

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*Assistant Professor, Department of Legal Studies, Central European University, Budapest. An earlier version of these comments were presented at Session III on “Information Warfare: Fake News, Real Problems” at the conference on “Rebuilding Trust: Dialogue – Interaction – Crisis Management” organised by the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University (LISD) in cooperation with the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, at Garden Palais Liechtenstein in Vienna, 11-13 May 2017. My thanks to Dániel Szabo for his assistance and comments on this piece.

27 “Fake news” is defined as the dissemination of “false, often sensational, information ... under the guise of news reporting” by the Collins Dictionary [https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/fake-news](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/fake-news) The term’s usage surged by 365% between 2016 and November 2017 according to the dictionary’s lexicographers. See also Alison Flood, “Fake news is ‘very real’ word of the year for 2017”, Guardian, 2 November 2017.

28 In line with many others, Wardle and Derakhshan have argued that “fake news” is “woefully inadequate to describe the complex phenomena of information pollution” and pointed out that the term “is becoming a mechanism by which the powerful can clamp down upon, restrict, undermine and circumvent the free press”. They distinguish a conceptual framework of information disorder in which “mis-information” is defined as “when false information is shared, but no harm is meant” and “dis-information” as “when false information is knowingly shared to cause harm”. See Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan, “Information Disorder: Toward and inter-disciplinary framework for research and policy making”, Council of Europe report, DGI (2017) 09, 27 September 2017 at p 5. See also Ethan Zuckerman, “Stop Saying Fake News, It’s not Helping”, My Heart is in Accra, 30 January 2017 [http://www.ethan-zuckerman.com/blog/2017/01/30/stop-saying-fake-news-its-not-helping/](http://www.ethan-zuckerman.com/blog/2017/01/30/stop-saying-fake-news-its-not-helping/)


On both sides of the Atlantic, there have been growing concerns from political leaders about Russian attempts to “weaponise information” to interfere in domestic politics. In November 2017, the British prime minister, Theresa May, accused Russian “state-run media organisations [of planting] fake stories and photo-shopped images in an attempt to sow discord in the West and undermine our institutions”.33

At the same time, the label “fake news” has been deployed to undermine the credibility of the media organisations and diminish trust in the fact-finding work of professional journalists. The most notorious exponent of the label, United States’ president Donald Trump, has repeatedly accused journalists of being “truly dishonest, “fake”, “bad”, “crooked” and for “making up stories”, while relying on and spreading disinformation himself.35 The apparent objective of such leaders has been to “make facts fungible, and to render the world a cacophony of competing hyper-partisan narratives where adjudication becomes meaningless and the only truth flows from supporters of the demagogue”.36 And this pillorying of the media is set against the context of a broader “epistemic crisis” and even “chaos”, in which experts – including academics, scientists, economists, judges and lawyers – have been attacked and their views delegitimised across states in apparent attempts to undermine trust in them.37 What is clear is that the full complexity and implications of the global “information pollution” or “disorder” and associated “campaigns against knowledge” are only beginning to be recognised, let alone understood.38

How can the harms of disinformation be understood in human rights terms?

32 Congressional committee hearings in October 2017 revealed that approximately 126 million Americans were exposed to disinformation spread by Russian government-linked trolls via Facebook around the 2016 US presidential election between June 2015 and August 2017; Mike Isaac and Daisuke Wakabayashi, “Russian Influence Reached 126 Million Through Facebook Alone”, New York Times, 30 October 2017. On the UK, see Richard Booth, Matthew Weaver, Alex Hern and Shaun Walker, ”Russia used hundreds of fake accounts to tweet about Brexit, data shows”, Guardian, 14 November 2017.

33 Prime Minister’s Office, PM speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet 2017, 13 November 2017. See also Guy Verhofstadt, “Russia’s Hybrid War Against the West”, Project Syndicate, 23 December 2016.

34 A survey by Kantar across Brazil, France, the UK and the United States indicated that “the reputation of ‘mainstream news media’ remains largely intact while social media and digital-only news platforms have sustained major reputation damage as a result of the ‘fake news’ narrative during recent election cycles”; Kantar, Trust in News, 31 October 2017. In contrast, a Gallup poll indicated that trust and confidence in the mass media was at a record low in the United States, particularly amongst Republicans and “independents”; Art Swift, “Americans’ Trust in Mass Media Sinks to New Low”, Gallup News, 14 September 2016.


38 Wardle and Derkhsan also include “mal-information” in their conceptual framework of “information disorder” to denote “when genuine information is shared to cause harm, often by moving information designed to stay private into the public sphere”. See Claire Wardle and Hossein Derkhsan, “Information Disorder: Toward and interdisciplinary framework for research and policy making”, Council of Europe report, DGI (2017) 09, 27 September 2017. See also Tom Nichols, The Death of Expertise (Oxford: OUP, 2017).
The harms of disinformation

From a human rights perspective, disinformation has harmful effects on individuals, as well as the media and NGOs undertaking human rights reporting. But it also strikes at the heart of democracies themselves.

First, the spreading of disinformation, particularly by political leaders, can severely undermine the realization of the broad range of individual rights. Credible information is critical for individuals to make informed choices about how they exercise their rights—most obviously civil and political rights, such as the freedoms of expression, assembly and association, and the right to take part in political and public affairs, but also the range of socio-economic rights, such the rights to health and housing.\(^{39}\) Moreover, freedom of information is also a human right in itself.\(^{40}\)

Second, by casting doubt on the credible of information, disinformation threatens the fact-finding and reporting of particular actors upon whom democratic societies depend—notably the independent media, but also other “public watchdogs”, including human rights NGOs and academic researchers.\(^{41}\) As Human Rights Watch’s Iain Levine has recently written, “to be truly convincing as human rights advocates, our stories and narratives, whether about Rohingya refugees fleeing ethnic cleansing or those cruelly deported from the US to Mexico, must be credible, authentic, and rooted in fact.”\(^{42}\) Political leaders’ support of lies, and even their indifferences towards fabricated stories, can only be viewed as part of “the populist challenge” which the human rights movement itself now faces.\(^{43}\)

Third, as reliable information is crucial for democratic processes and shaping public perceptions, disinformation and propaganda distort those processes, whilst undermining social cohesion. This explains, for instance, the mounting concern about the influence of hundreds of fake Twitter accounts linked to the Russian Internet Agency upon the domestic politics of the United


\(^{41}\) Natalie Nougayrède, “Beware: this Russian cyber warfare threatens every democracy”, 4 November 2017. The European Court of Human Rights has held that the term “public watchdog” encompasses the media, NGOs and civil society, as well as “academic researchers”, “authors of literature on matters of public concern” and also “bloggers and popular users of the social media”. Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary, Application No 18030/11, judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), 8 November 2016 at para 168. Sejal Parmar, “Affirming the Right of Access to Information in Europe: the Grand Chamber decision in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v Hungary” (2017) 1 European Human Rights Law Review 68 – 74.


States and also the United Kingdom, where they have been identified as having furthered false claims about Brexit and stoking anti-Muslim hatred.⁴⁴

At the same time, legal bans and restrictions on disinformation can also be harmful to human rights, particularly freedom of expression, and contribute to an atmosphere where the physical and mental integrity of journalists is threatened. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, at the end of 2016, at least nine journalists were imprisoned worldwide for violating laws on false news, mostly in China.⁴⁵ Whilst this is far fewer than those imprisoned in relation to national security or defamation charges, the criminalisation of what is commonly called false news can “create the rationale for clamping down on ... press [freedoms]”, an atmosphere in which physical attacks on and intimidation of journalists is encouraged and a “climate for self-censorship” more generally.⁴⁶ Many of these harms also flow from the “fake news” label simply being used as a rhetorical bludgeon: President Trump’s labelling the media as “fake” and as the “enemy of the people”, amongst other things, “could also make journalists more vulnerable to being targeted with violence and abuse”, according to the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, and could even “amount to incitement”, according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.⁴⁷ Furthermore, the regular, overt attacks on the media outlets by Trump in the United States have spill-over effects, providing inspiration and succour to authoritarian regimes cracking down on journalists and critical voices around the world, and furthering what the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression has called “a global crisis” on the right.⁴⁸

A human rights-based response

Through 2016 and 2017, there have been a number of dedicated state-led responses to disinformation or “fake news”. The United States’ National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2017 indicates that the aims of the Global Engagement Center include to “develop, plan, and synchronize ... whole-of-government initiatives to expose and counter foreign propaganda

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⁴⁴ 419 accounts operating from the Russian Internet Agency had attempt to influence the political debate in the UK out of a total of 2,752 accounts suspended by Twitter in the United States. Richard Booth, Matthew Weaver, Alex Hern and Shaun Walker, “Russia used hundreds of fake accounts to tweet about Brexit, data shows”, Guardian, 14 November 2017. See also Letter from Damian Collins MP, Chair of the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee, to Jack Dorsey, CEO, Twitter, 3 November 2017.

⁴⁵ Courtney Radsch, “Deciding who decides which news is fake”, Committee to Protect Journalists, 14 March 2017; Yaqiu Wang, “In China, harsh penalties for ‘false news’ make it harder for reporters to work”, Committee to Protect Journalists, 30 October 2015.

⁴⁶ The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye, has pointed out: “there is a risk that efforts to counter ['fake news'] could lead to censorship, the suppression of critical thinking and other approaches contrary to human rights law”. OHCHR press release, “Freedom of Expression Monitors Issue Joint Declaration on ‘Fake News’, Disinformation and Propaganda”, 3 March 2017.


and disinformation directed against United States national security interests and proactively advance fact-based narratives that support United States allies and interests”.\(^{49}\) New bodies covering disinformation and propaganda have also been set up in Europe, such as the Czech Centre against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats or the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE).\(^{50}\) The European Commission has set up a High Level Group to advise on policy initiatives to counter the spread of information online, and there is an ongoing United Kingdom parliamentary inquiry into “fake news”.\(^{51}\)

There have also been legislative and policy approaches aiming to increase the responsibility of Internet intermediaries, who have played a significant role in the spread of disinformation. Although these initiatives – notably the German Act to Improve Enforcement of The Law on Social Networks\(^ {52}\) and the European Commission’s Communication on Tackling Illegal Content Online\(^ {53}\) – have focussed upon the dissemination of illegal or unlawful content online, such as incitement to hatred or terrorism, rather than disinformation, they nonetheless indicate an increasingly restrictive legal and policy framework under which Internet intermediaries are required to operate in Europe.\(^ {54}\) In addition, social media platforms’ have responded to false information in various ways. Facebook for instance has claimed to fight the spread of disinformation by “disrupting economic incentives”, “building new products” and “helping people make more informed decisions”.\(^ {55}\) This approach has also included a “related articles” feature in the United States, France, Germany and the Netherlands, which offers links to “more perspectives and additional information” beneath popular or questionable news stories.\(^ {56}\) More recently, Facebook, Google and Twitter have announced the introduction of “trust indicators” to give users more information about the publishers of articles on their news feeds.\(^ {57}\)


\(^ {52}\) The Act to Improve Enforcement of The Law in Social Networks 2017, approved on 7 July 2017 by the Federal Council (Upper Chamber) of the German Parliament, entered into force on 1 October 2017.

\(^ {53}\) European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Tackling Illegal Content Online: Towards an enhanced responsibility of online platforms, COM (2017) 555 final, 28.9.2017.

\(^ {54}\) For a critique of the new German law, see ARTICLE 19, German Act to Improve Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks, Legal Analysis, August 2017.


\(^ {56}\) “Facebook promises new fake news measures”, BBC news site, 3 August 2017.

\(^ {57}\) The indicators have been developed by Markulla Center for Applied Ethics at Santa Clara University, a consortium of news organisations collaborating to promote a “more trustworthy and trusted press” https://www.scu.edu/ethics/focus-areas/journalism-ethics/programs/the-trust-project/ The initial group of publishers using the indicators include The Washington Post and The Economist; Seth Fiegerman, “Facebook, Google, Twitter to fight fake news with
What would a human rights-based approach to the “fake news” phenomenon or disinformation look like? On the one hand, extreme legislative responses, particularly generic bans on such material would not be compatible with international human rights treaty law on freedom of expression. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, protects the “freedom to seek, receive and impart information of all kinds”, including information which may not be accurate, even though it provides for restrictions to protect individuals’ rights and reputations, by allowing for laws on privacy, incitement and defamation. On the other hand, given the seriousness of the harms to individual rights and democratic discourse, the abstention by states and other relevant actors from any response at all to contemporary disinformation would be irresponsible. A long-term collaborative effort, involving governments, the ICT sector, media organisations, educators and civil society, is urgently required against the intensifying challenges posed by disinformation.

A valuable starting point for building a human rights-based approach to disinformation is the 2017 “Joint Declaration on freedom of expression and ‘fake news’, disinformation and propaganda” adopted by the four intergovernmental mandate-holders on freedom of expression, namely the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information. Drawing from international human rights law and sources, the text provides a series of recommendations for states and also for non-state actors, particularly intermediaries. Though not binding, the Joint Declaration presents a highly compelling set of international “soft-law” standards because it has been endorsed by four intergovernmental human rights bodies themselves established on the basis of the will of states. Whilst the recommendations of the Joint Declaration will likely be further developed and elaborated upon through the work of the United Nations Special Rapporteur in the future, the current text provides a useful baseline and reference point for current considerations of responses to disinformation.

The Joint Declaration recommends that states abolish prohibitions on the dissemination of such information as they are incompatible with international law, and that state actors “take care to ensure that they disseminate reliable and trustworthy information”. It also highlights that states have “positive obligations to promote a free, independent and diverse [media] environment, including media diversity”, and also “media and digital literacy”, including by engaging with civil society actors and other stakeholders. As intermediaries, social media platforms should ensure their policies (including terms of service) are transparent and accessible, and that any actions to remove third party content meets minimum due process guarantees. These


58 Joint Declaration on freedom of expression and “fake news”, disinformation and propaganda (“Joint Declaration”), 3 March 2017 http://www.osce.org/fom/302796
60 Para 2(a) and (d) Joint Declaration.
61 The emphasis on digital literacy echoes the recommendations of the United Kingdom Parliament, House of Lords Select Committee on Communications Report “Growing up the internet”, 21 March 2017, para 30 and 317.
62 Para 4(a),(b) and (c) Joint Declaration.
principles also extend to automated processes, including algorithms which are used to create news feeds and those which are used to “flag” content. The Joint Declaration also broadly supports collaborative fact-checking initiatives involving social media platforms and traditional media outlets, such as the First Draft News project Cross Check which helped citizens make informed choices in advance of the 2017 French election. The collaborative verification programme involves technology firms, including Facebook and Google, with journalists verifying online content and the public being encouraged to feed in questions and links to be checked. Media outlets standards can also respond to disinformation through their initiatives that “[strive] for accuracy in the news” through fact-checking, such as the BBC News’ “Reality Check” or Channel Four News “FactCheck”. The Joint Declaration also issues a very general call that “all stakeholders – including intermediaries, media outlets, civil society and academia should be supported in developing participatory and transparent initiatives for creating a better understanding of the impact of disinformation and propaganda ..., as well as appropriate responses to these phenomena.” Civil society organisations, in particular, may perform important functions in creating “a social pressure” on state actors and companies “to comply with human rights norms”, assessing how states are dealing with disinformation and undertaking or supporting collaborative fact-checking initiatives themselves.

These and other recommendations in the Joint Declaration should be seen as basic foundations of any human rights-informed policy responses to disinformation. Beyond them, however, the underlying political, social, economic and cultural conditions, or the structural impediments, which allow disinformation to exist, spread and gain traction, urgently require a better understanding to shape a deeper approach to the problems of disinformation, propaganda and also cyberwarfare. The media should be necessarily at the heart of this approach which should encompass several elements at minimum.

First, the economic incentives driving disinformation must be removed, by changing the financial model for online journalism from one that is based on clicks and advertising revenue, to one that is premised on the public interest and democratic value of journalism through, for example, taxes levied on intermediaries, public subsidies, or donor funding. Second, in terms of their content and style, media outlets need to prove that they really do “understand people we disagree with and people we seldom hear from”, partly because social media platforms have polarizing and segregating effects. Consider that, despite their efforts, the liberal media who engage in public interest journalism, such as the Guardian, have been popularly considered as “elitist”, and failed to reach beyond the cosmopolitan, metropolitan, urban elites to those who have felt 63 Para 4(d) Joint Declaration.
64 Para 4(e) Joint Declaration.
67 Para 6(a) Joint Declaration.
fed up and disenfranchised by “the system”. Third, there needs to be a public debate about radical, but serious proposals like a “public social media platform” with “a civic mission of providing us a diverse and global view of world”, as proposed by Ethan Zuckerman. Fourth, to counter the “universal sense of distrust”, confidence in the institutions of the rule of law and experts needs to be shored up, the value of knowledge in public discourse revived and the social appreciation of honesty enhanced. While political and other leadership figures can play a hugely influential role towards these goals, the role of civic society matters enormously. Furthermore, experts themselves cannot be seen as elites separate from the rest of society. As Marius Dragomir has urged, academic researchers, need to “come out of their ivory towers” to ensure that their research is made accessible and their expertise valued, and also be incentivised and trained to do so.

Finally, in order to fully address disinformation, policy makers have also to think more creatively beyond the “politics of rational persuasion” on the basis of evidence alone. They must consider the emotional attraction of barefaced lies, why people choose to believe them, against the data, evidence and advice. This is about unpacking the psychological determinants for belief, and then building real communities – off-line as well as online – across social, cultural and political divisions.

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70 Marius Dragomir, “Why Good Journalism Lost to Noisy Populists”, Central European University, Center for Media Data and Society paper, 8 May 2017. See also Kath Viner, “How technology disrupted the truth”, Guardian, 12 July 2016.

71 Rather than “reporting, [this platform] would focus on aggregating and curating, pushing unfamiliar perspectives into our feeds and nudging us to diversity away from the ideologically comfortable material we gravitate towards”; Ethan Zuckerman, “The Case for a Taxpayer-Supported Version of Facebook”, The Atlantic, 7 May 2017.


73 Marius Dragomir, “Why Good Journalism Lost to Noisy Populists”, Central European University, Center for Media Data and Society paper, 8 May 2017.
The world is on the cusp of revolution. Like many revolutions, most of us will not see it coming when it happens, even though once it does historians will be able to identify the moments, movements, and visionaries that led us to reimagine how we live, work, govern, love and play. While some of us will attempt to take notice and conject, it is ultimately our actions that will determine if we are complicit in transforming the world, or grasping the last straws of a legacy that no longer provides people with what they need.

Revolutions are not uncommon. They are useful ways to enact change against organizations designed for slowness and rewarding some chosen few. Many of us have lived through revolutions in democracy, in information, and in civil rights. Thomas Jefferson, the primary author of the Declaration of Independence and third U.S. President, wrote in a letter to James Madison that “I hold it that a little rebellion, now and then, is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical.”

However, this revolution may be different. Unlike recent revolutions that affected one aspect of humanity, this impending revolution may affect society, sovereignty and faith globally, the confluence of which has only occurred a few times in human history. Unlike in the past, this revolution could play out in a single lifetime, may extend a human ability—learning—beyond the confines of the human mind, and potentially reframe the way humans organize and cooperate with one another.

Two trends are driving humanity towards this outcome. One the one hand, rapidly accelerating technology and shifting changes in human needs and behavior are shifting our own expectations and aspirations for our future. And the other, traditional sources of legitimacy that have allowed us to collectively cooperate and organize for centuries—namely governments, companies, and religions—are consistently failing to address and respond to the major challenge facing humanity. While one has the potential to reshape the world through building, the other has the potential to reshape the world through destruction.

**Acceleration and Asymmetry**

For the past few years—and especially the past few months—many of us have been witness to a growing cacophony of (often smart & successful) voices talking about a world teetering on the precipice of new age of humanity. Whether it’s referred to as Fourth Industrial Revolution, the Digital Industrial Revolution, the Zero-Marginal Cost Society, the meaning of life without Work, or the Artificial Intelligence Revolution, these future castings all revolve around the idea that the exponential growth of connectivity, machine learning and artificial intelligence is unprecedented, and the implications of which, for better or worse, will drastically reshape our world.

Some individuals, like Elon Musk, started a space company intent on colonizing Mars in the event artificial intelligence destroys the human race (he thinks the planet has a 5%-10% chance of surviving). Others, like Stephan Hawking, believe that global problems like overpopulation, climate change, aging populations, and growing inequality will overcome the planet in the next
100 years. Not every outcome is dystopian; the New York Times’ Thomas Friedman believes that it’s going to ok, because everything will be solved through increased speed to learning and faster governance.

While many of these changes have been happening around us for a while, two technological innovations which have been developing for the last few decades have reached a tipping point where new types of technology can be widely commercialized.

**Connectivity:** Accessibility to information has transformed the way companies and people collect data, share it, learn from it, and make decisions. In the 1980s compute was moved into the home with the advent of personal computers, in the 1990s those computers were connected to the Internet, in the 2000s those connections were personalized to social profiles, and in the 2010s cloud mobile computing allowed information accessibility to break free of standalone computers, to be stored remotely, bringing many people together at once, converging their physical and digital lives.

**Intelligence:** Advances in data and computing combined with the development of better algorithms and broad investment in artificial intelligence led to breakthroughs in machine learning, a sub discipline of artificial intelligence that allows computers to classify and learn from objects they see from massive data sets. In the 1980s and 1990s computers learned from human experts, and a good example of this is IBM’s Deep Blue beating Gary Kasparao in chess, where every chess outcome had been pre-programmed. By the 2010s, computers had evolved to the point where they could learn from both humans and themselves. Google’s Alpha Go, the computer who beat human Go champion Lee Sedol in 2/3 games in 2015, could not use the same sort of learning to win that Deep Blue did, because the possibilities in a Go game outnumver the number of atoms in the known universe. Instead, it played itself over 25 million times, roughly the same amount of Go games played by humans in all of history, and from that, was able to probabilistically come up with tactics and moves that no human had yet tried or compete against.

The changes that these technologies have brought to the world, and the pace at which they have developed, are best seen in the profits of those companies who were the first to adopt and integrate these technologies into their business. Consider the top ten global public companies by market capitalization in 1997 and 2017. Five of the top ten most valuable companies in today’s world – Apple, Alphabet, Amazon, Microsoft, and Facebook – are the same companies who have become tangibly ubiquitous in much of our day to day lives: phones that are never far from our hand, the email, txt messages and emojis that we use communicate, the pictures and news we share to stay in touch with more people than physically possible, and the intelligent systems that contextulize information to provide us with the products, directions, and information we want, nearly as soon as we know we need it. These companies are similarly important to other businesses, either by simplifying traditionally complex tasks like mass data storage and compute, advertising, and machine learning, or by providing the platform to engage with customers. For customers, these companies shape expectations for the products, services and experiences in the market, and for other companies, they are necessary components of any successful business platform.
A Decline of Legitimacy

These technologies have the potential to reshape how humans work, live and play, but they can only be successful if they are used to build new forms of energy, resources, and knowledge that improve human life. And while these new forms of energy, resources and knowledge can be seen as the drivers of human improvement, it’s the ability of humans to cooperate across vast numbers and geographies that ultimately create the products, services and experiences that are derived from these innovations. Governments, religions, and companies have traditionally been the sources of legitimacy that enabled humans to cooperate in recent years, and unfortunately, these sources of legitimacy are falling short.

Generally, the thing that differentiates humans from any other species on the planet is our ability to create inter-subjective realities. While a cat can see trees in a forest (objective reality), and can be scared when it comes across a dog (subjective reality), to the best of our knowledge it does not believe that a higher power that created the world or that all cats have a specific purpose on the planet. In other words, if it encounters another cat it has never met, it doesn’t have a means from which they can work together to hunt mice.

Humans, on the other hand, have created intricate, imagined fictions that allow us to come together and work toward a shared vision and purpose. These stories— in the form of religions, government, companies, and economies—have allowed humans to cooperate on a scale that allowed them to reshape the planet, to leave the planet, and to grow and sustain a huge population. These inter-subjective realities—a mix of judgment, facts, and guidelines—have allowed humans both cooperate and destroy on a scale never witnessed on the planet, and have also been the source of legitimacy for almost everyone, in the forms of currency, law, and behavior.

For the past three hundred years, institutional liberalism—a government focused on the rights of an individual and capital markets focused on growth—replaced monotheistic religions, kings, empires, and even families as the predominate source of legitimacy in our daily lives. These socio-political-capitalistic organizations have not able to keep pace with the rate of change or deal with the critical problems of the 21st century. Think of any global challenge facing the world today—growing inequality, technological disruption, climate change, increasing debt, aging populations, rising cost of education, weapons of mass destruction, lack of laws, security, and regulation in cyber environments—and anyone is hard pressed to name a single entity that is capable of solving these problems. At the same time, humans are less happy than ever—Princeton economist’s Angus Deaton’s work on declining returns to experience is seeking to explain why larger numbers of males are removing themselves from the workforce. And recent analysis from Bridgewater Associates—the largest hedge fund in the world—has found that the death rate for white males 34-64 in the United States has increased 25% since 2000. As an aside, and reassuring for many of us, nationalism and populism have not been able to solve any of these problems either.

How many of us are aware of the impact of climate change and done nothing? How can Europe sustain its rate of productivity in ten years where 25% of its population is over 60 and another 25% percent is under 18? How many of us (governments and companies included) knew that Russia was influencing sovereign elections and did nothing? Will invading North Korea mitigate the threat of them launching nuclear weapons? Did the U.S. invading Iraq prevent the spread of global terrorism?
It is possible that the humanist era of humanity is at its end, and in its place new types of intersubjective realities will rise to organize, solve our problems, and provide a sense of purpose to humans around the world. In the 1990s and 2000s, ungoverned territories and failed states gave raise to radical extremist organizations and despots. In today’s world, what is unknown is what form that will take for the rest of us. But some believe it could take the form of a global techno-religion.

**Alexa, why am I here?**

In 2015, a former Google Executive Co-Founder of self-driving truck company named Otto, Anthony Levandowski, registered a new religious organization called Way of the Future (WOTF) with the IRS. For two years the church lay mostly dormant while Levandowski’s company was acquired by Uber to develop their self-driving vehicle business. In May 2017, when Uber fired him for not cooperating on an investigation that he stole proprietary technology Google, he began to draft the Church’s bylaws.

According to IRS documents, the purpose of Way of the Future was to, “to develop and promote the realization of a Godhead based on artificial intelligence and through understanding and worship of the Godhead [to] contribute to the betterment of society.” The church believes that intelligence is not rooted in biology, but acknowledges that in the future intelligence will be able to be recreated in other forms, and this Church would create “a peaceful and respectful transition of who is in charge of the planet from people to people and machines.” According to Levandowski, “You will be able to talk to God. Literally. And know that it is listening.”

While this church has minimal budget and no followers, the idea that institutional liberalism is in decline and in its place will evolve into something supra-human, like a techno-religion, is becoming more popular. As artificial intelligence outperforms humans in more and more tasks, learning will replace experience as the key to success and compensation, and people will be forced to reinvent themselves several times in their life. The people who are sitting around conference tables because of years of experience will be forced to improve in the job every year or be replaced—either by another human or another machine. For a short period of time, a few decades or more, this has the potential to be massively disruptive for generations of people who cannot reinvent themselves, as well for companies who cannot transition to speed to learning business environments.

Macro-historian Yuval Noah Harari suggests that by 2050, a useless class of humans may have emerged, people who are not just unemployed, but unemployable. What will they do all day? What will give them purpose? Harari suggests that virtual reality games will evolve into a techno-religion to meet this need. As mentioned earlier, it is inter-subjective realities that have given humans the ability to cooperate and organize around a shared sense of purpose. What are virtual reality games other another inter-subjective reality? When one who knows nothing of human history looks at Jerusalem, they see stone, concrete, people and cityscapes. But look at Jerusalem through the eyes of the Bible or the Quran, and suddenly Jerusalem is a focal point in a guidebook on how to behave throughout your life, which will be rewarded in the afterlife if one follows the rules. But take out an iPhone in Jerusalem, start the game Pokemon Go, and through that iPhone screen Jerusalem is transformed to a world of monsters that can be captured—one where users are rewarded for playing the game according to its rules.
What do about it

Algorithms are transforming our word, and more often than not algorithms are used in place of awkward conversations. Who do you want designing the algorithms that shape our future behavior, and potentially give rise to the second techno-religion (the first was communism)?
“Trust” is a multidimensional concept. However, its applicability in online interactions, online dissemination of information and online sharing – from general content to specific policies to your bank details – very much mirrors the real world. One clinical approach to “trust” is the use of the following equation or graphic:

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Reliability + Believability + Congruence
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Self-orientation
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Ultimately, online and physical trust are based on a combination of these variables:

- **Reliability** – has the entity in question (be it a bank, a government or an individual) performed consistently, or delivered results consistently?

- **Believability** – this is essentially assessing the probability that this entity’s view is accurate and right. While we can never know this precisely, we can roughly assess it according to the quality of a person’s reasoning and their track record. Different people, and by extension, different online platforms and products will have differing views of believability for a given entity. Key questions to ask here, applicable to a website as much as to a person:
  - Does this website, application, person, etc. have a demonstrated track record? Has it repeatedly and successfully accomplished its goals?

- **Congruence** – are the actions and results you are seeing consistent with other recent activities or behaviour? Ultimately, does it appear compatible with other results? Especially for technology platforms, this often is not the case for new developments or innovations. Nevertheless, behaviour or actions that are not congruent ultimately set the stage for reduction in trust

- **Self-orientation** – Decreasing self-orientation in the results or behaviour of an individual or an application ultimately increases trust, as it adds value to the end result from the point of view of the recipient.

Why does all this matter? Ultimately, the premise we’re operating under is that any entity that’s obtaining services from another, whether via consultants or directly, needs to build that level of trust.
An approach that I’ve found used by some organizations\(^\text{74}\) as well as individuals is that of a double-do: having two organizations, or individuals, perform the same tasks.

A related approach is the development of a healthy supplier tension: having multiple suppliers provide competing services and managing these suppliers effectively. While more work, the longer-term rewards in terms of supplier delivery quality, trust as well as pricing is invaluable.

### The Current State of Cyber Trust and Trends

Cyber and information warfare remain an effective way for asymmetric attacks: by state actors, non-state actors or a combination of the two.

Some basic information from the Verizon Data Breach Report\(^\text{75}\).

- In 93% of the attacks cyber criminals take minutes or even less to compromise systems
- 4 out of 5 victims don’t realize they were attacked for weeks or longer
- In 7% of the cases, the breach goes undetected for more than a year
- 63% of the data breaches were caused by a weak, default or stolen password

Additionally – there have been over USD $143mm in counterfeit, cloned hardware and network devices – in 2016 alone.

In both EMEA and North America, the experiences in 2016 around financial sector compromises, continued focuses of threat activity against critical infrastructure systems are a sobering reminder of the reach and capability of the motivated cyber adversary. Furthermore, the increase in politically motivated cyber operations, targeting not just financially motivated goals but political ones as well – is also increasing. And probably most importantly, the duration factor: in EMEA, the median point of time of compromise to discovery of an attack was 469 days in 2017 (globally, it’s 146 days)\(^\text{76}\).

So, what does this all mean, and what are organizations – especially public sector / international organizations, doing about this?

Policies may not be the answer. Former US federal CISO Touhill stated in his farewell blog that the US cybersecurity posture did not need more policies, but actually needed to more effectively execute and enforce existing policies. Additionally, possibly eliminating policies that are no longer effective is another way to actually improve implementation.

### Asymmetric Warfare

Running parallel with these trends has been the challenges around misinformation and fake news, often created by 3rd parties, operating at arm’s length from governments or larger entities.


\(^{75}\) http://www.verizonenterprise.com/verizon-insights-lab/dbir/

\(^{76}\) FireEye 2017 Cybersecurity Rends
The ability of these tools to be used by individuals to sow chaos and confusion ultimately allows small actors to have a disproportionate impact – whether it’s on critical infrastructure or on information / news sources.

Where will these trends take us?

- Our predictions for the future include more of the same, and potentially, more malicious variants. Lack of data governance and policies, especially in public sector and media entities, could lead to manipulation of source data and create a new class of source data warfare.
- Evolutions in audio, video, augmented reality and AI could result in far more sophisticated fake video clips – of conversations, voices and movements.
- The creation of “confusion”; varying messages that result in doubt in the mind of the receivers and among large population bodies – will remain a weapon of choice for asymmetric warriors.

What are some supporting trends and environmental factors to understand in order to build solutions?

Among the major concerns for most developed regions of the world is the talent shortage. Governments, private enterprises, international organizations and security suppliers are drawing from the same talent pool, often with governments “losing out” as they can’t provide the same benefits as some private sectors. This is especially troubling, since more and more sensitive information is being stored and transmitted digitally.

Nevertheless, there are numerous converging technology trends here that may help address these challenges:

- The move towards cloud; More and more data being hosted by private suppliers in self-provisioning, hosted logical pools. This trend ultimately results in these providers bearing responsibility for keeping relevant data, transactions and the physical environment protected, compliant and running
- The more recent, related trend towards the use of blockchain; Essentially, the use of distributed ledgers, stored in a peer-to-peer environment with encryption of data within defined “blocks”. This has the potential to significantly change the equation around integrity of data (by increasing it significantly) and addressing the challenges around security and transparency
- The move towards mobile: the use of mobile devices, often individually owned, for communication and information dissemination. The challenges here are manifold, from device loss to data theft to misinformation attacks on targeted devices
- The incorporation of automation, machine learning and artificial intelligence; there are positive developments here from the point of view of automating security responses – to dangerous developments, around attackers using these capabilities and not being able to control the outcomes
- Cyber-physical devices – devices that are Internet-enabled, and thus at risk of compromise for its own data or gaining access to other systems
Models for Solutioning: Private and Public-Sector Interaction

What are we doing about it, and what are some recommendations for addressing?

“Passive security practices like setting and maintaining defensive security perimeters simply don’t work against highly aggressive and adaptable threat sources, including criminal organizations and rogue states”. – Charles King, Analyst, Pund-it

Old school defenses are inadequate. More specifically, traditional security defenses on desktops and networks simply will simply just increase the duration between attacks. Today’s sophisticated attackers leverage an ecosystem as sophisticated as the open-source development environment. Attackers simply buy or license new strains of malware developed by hackers, and then use their own techniques for entering organizations – from social engineering to simple phishing. They are also operating on a premise of just looking for one mistake by one person in order to gain entry – and then often stay there for an extended duration.

What are some elements for addressing these challenges?

- **Security awareness training** is one key component to addressing these challenges. By viewing cybersecurity as not an IT responsibility but as one that pervades an entire organization, one can significantly increase the barrier to entry for attackers. Like anything else, the execution here is what matters. The use of comprehensive, coordinated campaigns, simulated drills, baselining users, gaining senior organizational buy-in, and regular, repeated and random testing (among other points) – will result in huge payoffs. There is more on this in the section below.

- **The culture around security**: not just with training, but reporting around security breaches becomes critical. Too often, organizational staff are fearful of reporting potential breaches or errors. Reporting of errors should be celebrated, not be a cause of employee concern. In fact, pervasive fears of witch-hunting and singling out of individuals is a major concern that reduces the impact of training and reporting. How do we address this?
  
  o **Transforming the organizational view towards cyber and physical security**: engage, plan, implement, operate and improve. Address this the same way as other segments of an organization more so than an IT function
  
  o **Focus on improvement metrics and on proactive reporting**
  
  o **Lead by example, from the top**: senior leadership buy-in to security as a transformation cultural component of the organization is critical.

  o **Bring in experts**: the advantage we have today is that expert assessments, especially those triangulated with multiple parties, can help us validate our transformation

- **Coordinated engagement with multiple service providers, where necessary** – today, the ability to outsource security to MSSPs (managed security service providers) allows for many of these concerns to be taken care of by 3rd parties whose sole job is to manage your security perimeter, respond to attacks, test, etc. An approach used across multiple sectors (as mentioned above) that I view as helpful is bringing in multiple service providers to

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77 www.knowbe4.com
provide similar services, and very judiciously managing them to reduce confusion and overlap. Is this always the best approach? No. It results in higher costs and risks its own confusion. Nevertheless, there are numerous dividends from this “supplier tension” in the market and from being able to compare and contrast results from multiple parties. It ultimately becomes a business resiliency strategy.

International Engagement and Agreements

Clearly, developments such as the US-China agreement in 2015 are, at least superficially, helpful in that it creates a more direct line of communication around cyberespionage issues. There remain questions on what type of espionage it actually curtails, of course; economic espionage for advancing national economic interests is different than the commercial espionage that the agreement wishes to curtail.

Similarly, OSCE’s confidence-building measures, along with related transparency measures, put the framework in place for more coordinate communication. The concrete tools and mechanisms here, of course, only have value in as much as they are tested, executed and truly practiced regularly.

Models for Private-Public Sector Interaction

Private entities have very different motivations than state or global actors. This is true for both cyberdefenses, and for that matter, for the cyber attackers as well.

Therefore, the questions I am posing here are below. The answers will vary, but these questions ultimately are what will spur the relevant debates on how to stay ahead of the next generation of attacks and compromises.

- What are the best models for public and private interaction that serve the public good requirements, establish trust models and at the same time, allow the private sector entities to fulfill their commercial goals?
- Can confidence-building measures (CBMs) work with private, non-state entities as well? The goal isn’t to stop all attacks. It’s to have an avenue for interaction on the topic with all relevant entities when attacks happen, and to understand how attacks are evolving more quickly
- Can we develop consortiums and forums to proactively drive influence and optimization with the private sector?
  - How do we leverage existing infosec intelligence sharing forums (focus groups such as ISAOS, Secot Coordinating Councils, aligned by sphere of activity and geography)?
  - Do organizations such as OSCE reach out to other global organizations as well?
- Does having multiple parallel relationships keep private entities more trustworthy?
  How much triangulation of ideas, threats, attacks, responses and best practices is truly needed?
- And now, asserting a much broader proposition, is there an opportunity for a dedicated security operations entity focused on the needs of international policy organizations?
This entity’s support would range from the basics of network and firewall management through to threat intelligence through to training and crisis informatics? This is a topic that will require its own detailed analysis.

Currently, my assertion is that ensuring and increasing effectiveness for state actors and organizations such as OSCE is to find ways to leverage private sector expertise – from individual consultants to security / fake news analysis firms to the large dominant multinationals such as Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Apple and Amazon. Additionally, the tools being developed today, especially blockchain-based tools for creating and identifying digital identities, can be critical for situations such as newly entering migrants in Europe to understanding criminal movements.

**Enabling Trust by Improving Awareness**

In any entity, the users are ultimately the weakest links are both unwitting tools and victims. This is for the full range of cyber-attacks – phishing, spear-phishing, social engineering, hacking, misinformation or anything else. Building on the text above, how do we train and mobilize users as the last line of defense?

- PWC’s 2016 Global State of Information Security analysis concluded that only 53% of companies had any kind of security awareness training. Clearly, basic awareness training that starts with baselining users and builds the culture around security, security breach transparency and responsiveness can improve trust within and amongst organizations
- Mobile device breaches are proliferating and are outpacing traditional security

Building a culture of mutual awareness, transparency and proactive monitoring – as a topic that pervades across all other sectors as a layer and not a standalone topic – is likely to yield the best results. It ultimately will increase “Trust” per the equation laid out earlier in this publication, and result in creating a cycle and culture that can more proactively disseminate. The following simple infographic summarizes the four key elements that a layered security awareness program needs to bring to within an organization such as OSCE and across organizations:
Next Steps: How do we move forward?

The threat landscape continues to evolve and mutate. Data security, misinformation and information warfare continue to be tools used by state and non-state actors to drive varying results – ranging from specific goals to simply creating chaos itself.

Parallel to this, the tools to both attack and address these challenges are actually also evolving rapidly. In most cases, they are evolving more rapidly than implementation. The dizzying array of new capabilities available today include (just as an example):

- Machine learning for addressing fact-checking and misinformation automation
- Automated attack tools, developed in isolation, for gaining data to taking control of systems (often designed in a way that non-technical hackers can incorporate)
- Defensive tools that include artificial intelligence, behavioural intelligence for identity and predictions for future types of attacks
- The arrival of blockchain-based identity and transaction tools to both increase transparency as well as improve security

Nevertheless, the traditional approaches around collaboration, creations of standards and cyber leadership remain important for international organizations to fully embrace and address the evolving cyber threats. It’s ultimately an organization-wide challenge and not uniquely an ICT / technology function. By growing this collaborative approach, especially with multiple private sector entities, we have an opportunity to stay further ahead of attackers and disseminate best practices across all like-minded allies.

Beyond that, traditional policymaking itself will have to take cyber risks into account. Like with any other form of attack, identifying the participating actors, their root causes and motivations and their incentives becomes critical to eventually reducing motivations for these kinds of attacks.
Determining one’s own destiny, also known as “self-determination,” has been one of the most complex, intricate, emotion-mobilizing, aspiration-creating concept in our world. It can be “an instrument or a tool, reflecting the interests of communities, nations, great powers” or even non-state actors. For some, self-determination represents a dream, the ultimate objective representing freedom; for others, a menace implying opposition, loss, the potential to “shatter” the state.” Self-determination claims affect rarely only the relationship between a certain community at stake and the central administrative force in a sovereign state, but also influence other communities in that very country and elsewhere. The longing for greater self-determination evolves from experiences, politics, identity, history, geographical location, and the effects of various developments from peace, to crisis, to war over generations. These perceptions are shaped by real experiences but also oral history. Self-determination claims can range from limited autonomy to wide competences in all critical elements of governance—from politics to security, economics, and finance, to law, culture, education, and religion (see the competences of the federal states in Germany, and the cantons in Switzerland)—and more intense to create complete independence and establishing a new sovereign entity by shattering an existing sovereign state and transforming sovereign boundaries.

For such a new entity to be recognized as a sovereign member of the international community, though, it requires the acceptance by the General Assembly of the United Nations—and hence having the agreement by the UN Security Council, with its five permanent members of China, England, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States. Without overall international recognition the new entity will fail to be able to enjoy full equal participation and all benefits of the current international community (see the problematic situation of Kosovo and in East Timor).

Self-determination, the intent for greater autonomy and independence by a certain community can however also be instrumentalized for outside interests and strategies. Third parties—state and non-state actors, also the diaspora—may have an interest to stimulate self-determination fervor in a given order to enhance the role of that community for various objectives, affecting the stability of the sovereign entity and state, and possibly the region, and thus to advance their very own strategic interests and objectives. Much depends on the overall strategic situation in the region, the leadership in the community, the state, and the role of information and media.

As the international system is still based upon the sovereign power of its members, there exists however no enforceable right for state shattering self-determination, rather, at the end, its effective and complete implementation will depend on the will of the Great Powers and the leadership, as well as the regional, and international framework situation. In today’s real-time interactive interconnected national and global politics, local issues can become national and international very fast, while critical developments elsewhere can affect local politics instantaneously.

Perception does form reality, certainly in political life and very much so in the situation of one’s community and the push for maximization of one’s own governance, but for its success the situation in the international and regional framework is decisive. Self-determination has an internal and external dimension: the internal aspect suggests the capability of the community/group/nation to peacefully determine the way it is governed from politics and security, to language, culture, religion, economics and how to set one’s rights and rules, and to do so by democratic vote. The external dimension addresses the relationship between that community and its outside world, or, typically with a central authority of the sovereign entity within which the community finds itself. Self-determination interests of one community have always also to be seen of comparable interests of other communities within the given state. Hence it rarely is a zero-sum game between the one community and the central authority. Many times, in addition, communities are separated/divided by hard external sovereign boundaries—one part lives within one sovereign entity/state, the other in another neighboring country. In addition, economics does matter very much. The more a community feels it is the key economic power in its state system, the more it will look for appropriate rights, also in comparison to other communities within that state. In case these expectations and aspirations do remain unfulfilled, there is a danger of increasing tensions between that community and the state power center on the one hand, but also between that community and other equal communities in the same state.

For sovereign states who are members of the European Union—currently the only worldwide supra-national organization whose members have voluntarily relinquished some of their rights and privileges, from finance to standards, to trade, and foreign relations—there exists hence an additional layer of sovereign authority. While the European Commission has the right to execute, it is at the end the European Council, representing the member states, which does make the final decisions. There again it is the member states that carry the day. So, it would be unwise for a community within a member state of the European Union to try to execute state shattering
self-determination with the intent and expectation to be immediately accepted as a new individual member of the European Union. (see the graph above.79)

There are in this context “The Critical 7+ S-Terms” relating to self-determination to keep in mind:

- State / Supra-State
- Sovereignty
- Self-Determination, Self-Governance
- Security
- Strategy
- Subsidiarity
- Symbolism vs. Substance
- Supranational Authority
- Social Media

**How to Effectively Address a Self-Determination Crisis**

To effectively address a self-determination crisis, it is imperative to:

- Maintain communications between all key actors, at least on some essentials;
- De-escalate on all fronts and for all actors;
- Reduce outside influence;
- Allow face saving moves for all involved—the less the emotional porcelain is further destroyed, the easier it will be to move positively onward and forward;
- Address the cost-benefit calculation of any actor, sensitively—compromise will be required, but with the necessary amount of political will, anything is achievable;
- Develop a novel idea in an otherwise deadlocked relationship adapted to the framework situation in the state, the region, and the larger geopolitical context at the point in time;
- Be ready to accept multiple identities.

Do not:

- Stop communication between the parties;
- Suppress self-determination, crush, or squash it by force (nor completely ignore it)—the more one does that, the more intense and potentially explosive the movement will become, the more it will continue to fester, the deeper the crisis goes, and the higher the chance that outside powers and interests interfere as well;
- Let the “genie of self-determination spirits come out of its bottle”—once it is out and entices the communal leaders, here and there, it can do so anywhere, in the country itself and far beyond;
- Ignore generational involvement and the power and influence of women;
- Ignore the role of religion;
- Underestimate the power of global social media and the diaspora;

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• Be blinded by pride and veining in justice in order to force an ultimatum on the other side, and beware of unintended consequences and reactions;
• Underestimate the negative effects on the next generation—in Europe the ERASMUS generation, men and women, who personally experience political crisis today for the first time and possibly political violence;
• Drag a self-determination crisis out for too long—the longer it festers, the more it will become difficult to resolve, the more tertiary interests could come in, and the more violent it can become;
• Overlook the impact on other situations, in Europe, and elsewhere which might boomerang back.

For Further Reading:


Thank you very much for the invitation, dear Professor Danspeckgruber, it is indeed a pleasure to be here again at Princeton University. I remember very well the three semesters I spent here teaching with you at the Liechtenstein Institute at this Woodrow Wilson School. And today I’m really delighted and honored that I remain associated with Princeton University of as a fellow of this great Institute. Professor Danspeckgruber, when he invited me again to speak here, he mentioned Europe, so I prepared something about the European Union. But then I noticed that the title is simply: “The State of the World and the European Union,” so it is very ambitious indeed.

Let me begin by saying something about the state of the world today. And let me be a bit provocative, or at least going against what is today the counterintuitive response considering the prevailing pessimism or catastrophism we have in so many corners of public opinion, namely in the so-called West from the United States to Europe. How is the world today? I would say the world is better now than before. The world is better now than before, despite all the remaining difficulties, if you consider all the structural change. If you compare, for instance, the beginning of the 21st century with the terrible 20th century. Not only are we better today in terms of all socioeconomic indicators, including the fight against absolute poverty, or, in health terms, child mortality, life expectancy. Remember the book The Great Escape by Princeton author Angus Deaton, Professor at our Woodrow Wilson School and Nobel Prize winner some years ago. He offers clear evidence, in all those indicators of the world today, even for the countries of this world doing comparatively worst in socioeconomic terms – indeed it is not worse, it’s even better than before. We tend to forget that in most European countries in the middle of the 20th century, the life expectancy was 50 years. Today it is more than 80, 82 years. Child mortality figures have changed dramatically, including in some of the worst situations in the world, from South Sudan to Haiti.

This is today’s reality, if one looks globally, about how many people were lifted out from the level of absolute poverty and hunger in so many parts of our planet. Probably it’s not very close to us, presumably not very close to Princeton, not very close to Brussels. But the world is improving, when you consider the main indicators. I am saying that without any kind of complacency, because I know, mostly because of the experience of being a political leader and having been in many of these scenarios - from Darfur, to Jordan, to the Syrian refugee camps, to Lampedusa in Italy. I have been in so many such situations. So I have no sentiment of complacency. I know the problems we have. But I simply don’t accept it when the world today is argued to be much worse than it was, for instance, in the middle of the 20th century. Not only in socioeconomic matters, also in educational terms: the overall educational level and access to culture is generally much higher today.
Now in terms of the horrible statistics of war, when you compare all of the casualties of the wars in the beginning of the 21st century, all those from Iraq, Afghanistan, the conflicts we have in Syria, and add the victims of international terrorism, we see that all of those casualties are less than one single battle in the second World War. In fact, the number of casualties of the first and second World War combined, which some may have called initially as the Civil Wars of Europe, were in fact higher than all casualties during mankind’s history combined. So I want to ask you to put things in perspective when you think historically, or when we analyze geographically. Now of course I know that there are many remaining difficulties, serious ones, including absolute poverty that still remains in the world in many parts, including key challenges to world peace, namely the persisting conflicts in the Middle East - the situation in the Middle East can only get worse, not better - the rise of jihadism and terrorism, the crisis between the two Koreas, the possible threat of nuclear conflict that we see today, namely when we listen to the American president and to the unelected president of this strange regime that is North Korea. We should of course avoid any kind of complacency, but I think we have reasons to have some hope in this context. And when you think about Europe, and the prevailing mood in Europe, I think also that the sentiment is today one still of decline. There is an increased sentiment of insecurity, and also sometimes the perception of almost apocalyptic moments coming from this re-emerging threat of nuclear risks. There is growing anxiety, Angst, in many sectors of our population.

And why is this so? Why, if you look at the data in terms of victims of wars, in terms of socioeconomic developments and educational levels, rising prosperity all over the world, why is it that the sentiment is so much in contradiction with these factual developments? I would say for many reasons; that there is increased demand. People today are much more demanding of their governments and regimes, what was before accepted as more or less tolerable - from slavery to colonialism, it was also not so long ago that we had a regime where apartheid was the rule - in this very country where we are, the United States, there racial discrimination was institutionalized in many areas until recently. This was the situation. Today this is no longer acceptable. It still exists in many shapes and forms, but the idea of colonialism is rejected, racial discrimination is abhorred by many. The idea of imperialism is rejected; the idea of slavery – which was for so many centuries accepted, including by the great minds of the time - is no longer acceptable. The idea of women’s rights is widely accepted in the West and beyond. However, many women’s rights are unfortunately still denied in some parts of the world, where some people consider women by the fact that they don’t have the same rights as men – nevertheless, in most countries today this is simply not accepted. So today the level of exigence, to use a French word, is stronger. And that rightly puts people asking for more, not less.

There are, of course, the feelings associated with that great transformation that is usually called globalization. We are also experiencing still the ripple effects of the Financial Crisis of 2008 and of more recent years, with its impact in terms of increased inequality, and the perception of inequality, and unfair solutions. All this has fed the populistic, nationalistic trends in many of our countries. There is also the fundamental change in the news cycle and landscape - namely, the social media. And the fact that all of these developments, including the technological ones, are at least partly explaining the perception of the end of power, to use the expression of the author Moises Naim of The End of Power, when he spoke about the fundamental change in today’s power, even suggesting that no one is actually in power, neither in our countries, nor in our most important corporations. So there is an idea that no one is in control. That our elected governments are powerless in face of transnational trends that are simply seen as stronger than the
capacity they have. That they cannot fight them, they cannot control them, they cannot regulate them, those transnational factors. From financial instability to international terrorism, including the development of non-state actors, to massive movements of people - including illegal migration and refugees, which had and is still having a very important impact in Europe - to cyber(in)security, and of course to the existential threat of climate change. All these elements are contributing to a feeling of insecurity in the perception of the so-called man or woman on the street today. And the way news is presented is increasingly anxiogenic, presenting precisely this kind of anxiety and this sentiment in most people that the elites - political elites and corporate elites - are distant from their concerns.

I believe it’s clearly not the case of the end of power, as it certainly was not the case of ‘the end of history.’ But we are certainly watching a fundamental change in the conditions of the exercise of power - and speaking here as someone who has had a very intense political experience, let me share this with you: I was a very young Foreign Minister and Deputy Foreign Minister in my country. I was participating since the 1980s in meetings at the European level as Foreign Minister and Deputy Foreign Minister. And I remember at that time, while in fact Europe was much less structured and much less powerful and influential than it is today, because it was a smaller Europe of only 12 members, that there was not this level of anxiety or pressure, or overload in the political system. That is a fundamental change. Today, in fact, we would say that power - either in the political sphere or the corporate sphere - is today more ambiguous, more [obtuse?], more diffuse, than before. From hybrid wars, to the manipulation of the media, the perception of this increased complexity comes with the perception of increased unpredictability. We have seen the disappearance of some poles of stability, including negative stability, such as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), during the Cold War that provided some form of stability that has been replaced by a more unpredictable order than the one we had during the so-called Cold War times.

And what about Europe? More concretely. The mood in modern Europe has probably changed in the last months, I will come to that in a moment. I believe it has changed now for a more optimistic mood. But in fact if you consider structurally in the last years, the perception of decadence, of crisis, crises, has to do with some basic long-term developments, namely the end of the age of Empire. Let’s not forget that most European countries, including smaller countries, were centers of empires, once upon a time. They were used to perceiving themselves as the center of the world - from the Great British empire, to the Spanish empire, to the French empire, the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empire, including smaller countries from my Portugal and Belgium - they were the centers of empires! Most are no longer that center. This is important to understand what is deep in the minds of those countries and their citizens. Because all those people have studied the histories of their respective countries and they compare our current situation with a - by the way - very idealized past. But fundamentally, if you compare a shortened period, from 1992 to today - I use ‘92, because that is when I set already in the European Council as Foreign Minister, at the time of Helmut Kohl, Jacques Delors, Francois Mitterrand – many people today have a completely idealized vision of that time. They think that those were the great moments of European integration, but that’s simply not true. At that time there was very much pessimism about Europe and the European Union, which was much less influential in the world than today – we, the EC, were only a small part of Europe, only 12 countries, which of course is very different from the 28 (or 27 because of Brexit) that we have today. So when we compare today, with Europe 30 years ago, when most of European countries in the Central and Eastern part of Europe were under totalitarian governments, or 40 years ago, when Southern
Europe from Spain to Greece and Portugal were under dictatorships, or 70 years ago when we had the Shoah, probably the worst event in human history. I continue to think there are no reasons for Europeans to be pessimistic about the future. I think we are much better today than we were 30, 40, 50 or 70 years ago. Now, it’s true that we have had some setbacks, and I am coming to them in a minute.

But once again, sharing with you my experience - and Wolfgang you were so kind to refer to it - from 2004 to 2014, two mandates that I was leading the Commission. 2004 we were 15 countries; 2014 we were 28, so we have almost doubled the membership while facing stabilized crises that were originally threatening the very existence of the European Union. There was the no-vote in the Netherlands, while many analysts thought we wouldn't be able to finalize the constitutional process, and the reality is that we solved it with the Lisbon Treaty. There was the financial and sovereign debt crisis and I remember coming here to the United States - to Wall Street - to discuss the issue with President Obama in the G8 and G20 meetings and people were predicting BrExit, the prevailing analysis and so-called market sentiment was that Greece will no longer be a member of the OA - and it still is. Many people predicted the collapse of the Euro and it’s now one of the two biggest currencies in the world. So my point is to show you the resilience of the European Union. There is a promise of the market of ideas, if I write an article today to predict the worst in Europe, of course it will get more attention than if I said that I believe progress in the EU will be incremental. So we have double our membership, developed institutionally and now have a banking union - more powers for the European Central Bank, ECB, and the Commission - in terms of authority the ECB has more power in some places than the U.S. Fed. It was once again in contradiction of many of the prevailing views, that we could in fact, enlarge and deepen the European Union. The European Union has shown this resilience and not only through the constitutional defeat in 2 countries, and not only through the response to the financial crisis, but also through a more coordinated response to the invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea by Russia. Many people suggested that the EU would be split. But on the contrary, the EU was able to agree upon a set of sanctions and with difference and nuances among 28 countries. It was possible to have common position. There has been a very important setback: Brexit. Britain is one of the most important countries in the world. This country has decided to leave and it is certainly leaving the EU in a difficult position - even though there are some benefits. The reality is that it is a very important member that is now being lost. Britain was leading in very many areas: agenda’s on Atlantic relations, responses to China and Russia and to climate change. Without Britain, it would have been impossible for the EU and EC to put together the most ambitious project to combat climate change. But even when Britain was leading, the British sentiment was that they were on the periphery and the reluctant partner and that made it hard to get people to vote for Europe. When you spent years bashing the EU, you can’t get people to vote to stay. After Brexit and the election of Donald Trump, there is an interesting point - in Britain, all the important political parties were officially against Brexit. Almost no one in the parliament was in favor of Brexit. And here the situation of President Trump was that his own party didn’t even support him. So after these two elements of Brexit and Donald Trump, there is the fear that a wave of populism was going to destroy Europe: Wilders, a xenophobe from the Netherlands and the Front Nacional led by Marine L’Pen. Many people were predicting this wave of populism in Europe. And those trends did not disappear, I think we have to say that today, Europe seems able to overcome those. We have concerns about rule of law, serious ones in Hungary and Poland for example. We also have concerns with the next election in Austria and we also have concerns of the situation in Catalonia and the effects on other parts of Europe. European integration will remain stronger than European disintegration,
that centripetal forces will remain stronger than centrifugal ones. I said it last year and I am happy to say it again: based on the analysis of the most likely scenarios, the disintegration will not happen. It is important when you analyze Europe to understand one thing, it is by nature incremental - we are not a state, we are 28 or 27 countries, and by definition it is incremental. It is a mistake that some wish to see the disintegration of Europe. We won't have the United States of Europe, I don't think we'll have a Philadelphia Moment of Europe. Some of my friends who push for that are doing a disservice because this is a deception. Some proposals are very ambitious and they will simply not materialize, there will not be a full integration - because the public opinion is not there. There is not sufficient ownership of the European idea to support this complete pooling of European sovereignties. But I believe the EU will continue to make progress and it will be incremental by nature. There will be fragmented and not optimal decisions but at the ends they are decisions. I will argue that for a group of 28 countries, this is an effective means of decision making - through compromise. So the decisions that might not be optimal but they are the best consensus among so many diverse points of view. I concede this is sometimes extremely frustrating - and time consuming - partial and ambiguous decisions and ambiguous rationality and functionality and so it's slow but that’s the way the EU works. I expect incremental progress and in one year, invite me back. The central crisis of the Euro is behind us. There is no recession in any European countries.

There were some very interesting political developments, namely the election of President Macron. The election of Macron was extremely important because France is the most central country in Europe. France is the only country in Europe that is North AND South. France is also a Mediterranean country. Nothing can happen in Europe without France. And part of the problems of Europe in the last year, in France there is a sentiment from the left to the right, and of intellectuals. They have created new words regarding the way experts are in decline. The decline is not only of them, it is all over Europe. The perception is that Europe is in decline but that is not the case. Germany, together with China - I mean, Germany is the leader of globalization. Today we have a much stronger and confident Germany than 10,20 and many years before. There are winners and there are losers, France has seen itself as a loser of globalization. Brussels, the core of the EU, the Brussels Beltway is a microclimate of the political ecology of Europe. The interesting thing about Macron is that he is the most pro-European president that France has ever had and he doesn’t even compare to the alternatives and to avoid those two was great. He is not only pro-European, but he is trying to reform France. And he will enable France and Germany to work together and it there will be progress in their working relationship. Angela Merkel won in Germany, despite someone presenting her victory as a defeat, I find it interesting - when someone has won 4 consecutive terms, how can this be a defeat. What leader has been elected 4 times in the last decade in Europe? Yes there was a price to pay regarding her decision on the refugees and of course when this other party comes in Germany, it has a different echo than in some other parts. But what would be the alternatives - because politics my dear friends is always the land of the counterfactual - we always have to think what has to be the alternatives - and those who criticize Germany and Merkel because of her decision on the refugees, they have to tell me if it would be better that she had taken the opposite position. Let’s imagine if the position was “No Refugees, Refugees Unwelcome” Would it be better for Germany image or Europe? She saved the honor of Germany and the honor of Europe when she accepted the refugees, of course now she is trying to adapt to a realistic policy of integration but it was the right position. So Merkel clearly stands above the crowd and she will push Macron.
So where I expect progress in Europe is in the EMU, which is very much in line with the concerns of Germany, we are going to see some localization. We will also see some changes, nominalism, without the reform of these treaties we can see some common economic terms. I think there will also be some developments in external security, if Europeans want to keep freedom of movement inside, they need to secure the borders. We are going to see some interesting developments on defense - when Mr. Trump made his comments regarding defense, I agreed with him partly. While it is not true that Europeans are not making their contributions to NATO, it is true that the Europeans are not making the same contribution as the Americans. I have heard his sentiments, in his idiosyncratic style, said by Obama, W. Bush and Clinton - all said the same thing. Now the Europeans are starting to do it. Namely, reaching the 2% ratio. 2% of German GDP is much more than British - so the interesting question to watch is: how will Germany be spending that money? Are they going to do it alone? Or contribute to some enforcement of European defense capabilities? I believe the second will happen. So I think we are going to see some interesting developments which will enforce defense, systems of weapons and investments of defense. So if this happens: incremental progress of EMU; strengthen of borders; add some progress in terms of defense, it’s already a very interesting menu of European integration.

I think that today, EU federalization is being favored by two factors: Putin and Trump. Putin being more aggressive has certainly contributed to a stronger sentiment of solidarity in Europe, especially among those countries that are more fearful. Even though they are developing Euroscepticism, they need Europe. President Trump took some decisions that appeared unilateral, specifically in the retreat from the Paris Agreement, and Angela Merkel who is always cautious, she said that we cannot rely on others as we have in the past, maybe it’s time for us Europeans, we should take our future into our own hands. I have no doubt that she wants more integration and leave some kind of European legacy at the end of this mandate.

Two other factors: Brexit and Turkey. I think that basically until now, European continental countries have kept a clear and coherent position regarding Britain. Britain is very much divided, elections have lost the majority and inside the two main parties, there are deep divisions regarding how Brexit will be solved. Turkey, in fact now, is clear that it will not become a member of EU for the foreseeable future, this is way of Europeans can reassert a EU that is based in terms of values. Risk persists, and we have to be cautious and firm with any attempt to put into question the rule of law in some of our countries. But we should avoid any complex of superiority. There are some countries that are nostalgic of this idea of a small Europe but you have to understand that Europe is stronger with this understanding of a continental Europe - it's much better to have 28 countries with problems than to have 12 that we think are perfect. Or we will create much more possible “Ukraines”. I think the enlargement of Europe has been a great success. It would be worse if it did not continue to grow.

The problem of refugees: there are still concerns about how this will affect the political systems. The issue of Catalonia and others, it’s very important, it’s not a European issue as such, most Catalans do not want to separate from the EU despite their separatist nature from their own countries. They want to commit to the EU. The EU is not at ease with this issue of possible independence or separatism of Catalonia. Most Europeans would like to see clear paths to dialogue.

To conclude: I think the biggest driver of European integration will continue to be globalization. Because for me it’s obvious that even the biggest countries, i.e. Germany or France, they are
simply not at the same level of the two biggest powers of our time. The two biggest powers are the US and China. Russia is in fact declining and Russia economically is in regression. It was a mistake when Obama said that Russia is a not regional power. And now they are trying to maximize their power, that’s why we have Crimea and neither the Europeans or the Americans are going to fight for Crimea - that’s quite clear. Russia for the foreseeable future, Russia is going to keep Crimea, and now Russia has an influence in the Middle East which it did not have before - due to US actions in Syria. That is the reality of why Russia is an indispensable player in the Middle East. The Europeans now depend on the two major powers: the US and China. There is an opportunity for filling a vacuum in global leadership. Even though I am a committed Atlanticist, I don't think the US is providing that leadership. When President Trump makes the points about America first and Make America Great Again, but when you are a global leader you have to appear sensitive to others. And the positions taken on climate change and trade are all positions that are perceived as retreating from global leadership. Now, China is trying to fill that gap - he said it at the World Economic Meeting in Davos and in Geneva. While China is playing a more responsible role globally, I don't think it’s credible when the commitment to the global world order doesn’t apply to the internal order - we don’t see the same level of pluralism. Europe is by definition in the position to fill that gap, it is by definition committed to multilateralism and Europe is credible when it talks about open societies and open economies because Europe has open societies not only open economies. A possible way forward, is for Europe to propose some of the futures of the global world order - hopefully a liberal world order - liberal in the European sense of the word, an open order. Ideally, it should be done with the US and certainly leaders in Europe understand that it’s important to stay engaged with the US. I hope the same applies here. For example, what is the US administration’s policy regarding TTIP - this American administration has killed TPP - and now they have threatened to dismantle NAFTA and threatened China. It is now not yet clear if they will support a free trade agreement with Europe. From that point of view, it is now more important than ever to have a strong transatlantic relationship. In a world of unpredictability, it is important that those who share openness, true openness, but not mankind in general. As a British author once said, my father loved mankind in general, but he hated every individual in particular. What is important is to love mankind in general and in particular, this includes each man, each woman and each child. And that I believe that we in our open societies in the so-called West, can do better than others, for that it would be important to cooperate because at the end what counts, is not the countries or the European institutions but what counts is the dignity of each and every human being.
Identifying an Emerging Crisis

Today’s political and governmental climate is plagued by challenges to traditional conceptions of state stability, as well as new critical situations that call into question the integrity of institutions on the national and international level; where borders lie, and how far governments are willing to go to secure them, is disputed; crisis diffusion troubles issue management and confounds crisis sourcing efforts; in short, the notion of what resources are at the disposal of governments and international institutions to allay crises - and how to prioritize the distribution of those resources - is unclear.

Developing self-determination suits have the potential to alter the geopolitical status quo, especially given the demographically transformative power of refugee and migrant flows. As populations react to the new normal, issues of identity, governance and commonality of purpose create rifts within seemingly homogenous societies. Further, while traditional response mechanisms can address some challenges, many of the greatest threats to modern society are taking place in new virtual or unspecified “battlefields,” introducing doubts regarding the efficacy of state involvement mechanisms and the authority of governance in the modern age.

Leaders and institutions are limited by time, the costs they are willing to sustain in tackling challenges, the perceived stakes of the outcome, and constrained by ever shifting political will. In light of both these limitations and modern developments: what are the warning indicators of a developing crisis? The answer to this question likely differs across culture and time. However, we offer this preliminary set of considerations.

Warning signs of an emerging crisis:

(1) A rapidly developing scenario that alters the status quo for a critical mass of individuals or groups,

(2) Which has grave political destabilization and/or reorganization potential,

(3) For which existing management mechanisms on the national and/or international institutional level may be insufficient or inappropriate,

(4) Whose events can only be limitedly foreseen and/or modeled with credible predictive power,

(5) Thereby producing a sense of both urgency and anxiety on the part of decision-makers and/or the public
**CRISIS AND CONFLICT CATALOG**
*Emerging and/or Continuing Crises Bolded*

### ASIA AND OCEANIA

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<tr>
<th>Region</th>
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<tr>
<td>South China Sea</td>
<td>India-Pakistan (Kashmir)</td>
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<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
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<td>China - India</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
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<td>Tibet</td>
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### EUROPE AND EURASIA

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<td>Balkan Region</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
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<td>Estonia</td>
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<td>Latvia</td>
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<td>Catalonia (independence)</td>
<td>Scotland (independence)</td>
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<td>South Ossetia</td>
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<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>Azerbaijan-Armenia</td>
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### MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

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<th>Region</th>
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<td>Syria &amp; Iraq</td>
<td>Yemen-Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>Qatar - Gulf</td>
<td>Islamic State: Iraq &amp; Syria (ISIL/ISIS)</td>
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<td>Libya (opposition)</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Afghanistan (Taliban)</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
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<td>Israel-Palestine</td>
<td>Sudan (Darfur)</td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
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### SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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<th>Region</th>
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<tr>
<td>DR Congo - Rwanda (FDLR)</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia, Kenya (al-Shabaab)</td>
<td>Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad Niger (Boko Haram)</td>
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### THE AMERICAS

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<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>El Salvador (maras)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil (drug trafficking organizations)</td>
<td>Mexico (inter-cartel violence, paramilitary)</td>
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<td>Colombia (cartel violence, paramilitary)</td>
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THEMATIC CRISIS OVERVIEW

(A) Self-Determination

The upcoming year will bear witness to several developments in the realm of self-determination campaigns. The Kurdish independence referendum is slated to occur on the 25th of September 2017, followed shortly after by the Catalan vote on October 1st. The Kurds and Catalonians have been struggling for independence for some time, and it remains to be seen what this latest round of votes will yield, and how the outcome will affect politics in the immediate neighborhood.

(B) Good Governance

Nation states around the globe are in various stages of troubling transition. Poland recently passed legislation removing all judges not specifically approved by the president from the constitutional court, the latest in a string of democratically destabilizing policies. Hungary’s government openly declares itself ‘illiberal’; Venezuela’s President Maduro arrested his opposition prior to a national election. This is a narrow and select list of governance crises, which we herein broadly define as the undermining of the democratic order of a nation from within. In contrast to other types of ‘crises,’ good governance can be undermined systematically and slowly, as Poland and Hungary both demonstrate. The malaise like spread of this issue, however, (particularly in Central-Eastern Europe) makes it a situation of note for the purposes of CCEP.

(C) Climate Change

According to the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s reports, a 1.5 degree Celsius warming of the globe by 2050 is an ever-closer reality. In 2016, global temperature records were broken yet again, and several studies have cited that the world’s oceans are warming at an unprecedented rate. Extreme weather events - from droughts in dry, arid regions to floods in more humid areas - are ever more common. The Earth is currently experiencing the warming produced by emissions discharged during the Industrial Revolution and the early-to-mid 20th century; the challenge that faces us is now two-fold. Firstly, how can we manage the latent warming that will occur as a result of previous human activity? Secondly, however, how do we avoid the repercussions of the most dire emissions scenarios outlined by the IPCC, which have the potential to put major cities around the globe under ocean water? This is a particularly troubling question in light of the damage done to the Paris Climate Agreement by the United States’ policy reversal. While the US’s switch in policy may not have an immediate outcome on emissions, it does potentially reduce the incentive of developing industrial nations to maintain a credible commitment to reducing their emissions in the future. It’s also worth contemplating that certain nations may benefit from climate change, lessening their commitment to upholding any climate agreement. Eurasia, for example, may have more arable land in northerly hemispheres as the globe warms. Although the crisis of climate change is latent in that its effects will be felt by future generations, it is among the most pressing facing our present leadership if we consider the stakes of different outcome scenarios. Our decisions today may well literally alter the globe within the next century.
(D) Global Cyberattacks

Hackers with malicious motives or the desire for financial gain have wreaked havoc on unassuming victims with the spread of computer viruses as seen in the global WannaCry ransomware attack of May 2017. According to police and national security experts, this virus can silently infect computers after users downloaded a popular tax accounting package or visited a local news site, which can ultimately cripple thousands of computers and disrupt ports around the world. Given limited state capacity to respond to ransomware attacks, and a narrow societal understanding, global cyberattacks can imbue an added element of paralysis to actors potentially affected by hacking. For the purposes of this exercise, highlighting the gaps between private defense operations and the public sphere in terms of intelligence and resource sharing can help actors identify the proper recourse in an emerging crisis. While governments and private contractors retain the personnel to learn and address these issues, most people who remain vulnerable to these attacks lack the information or understanding of how a faceless enemy can wreak both physical harm and introduce psycho-social tension.

(E) Territorial Disputes

A diverse and complicated global set of territorial disputes will continue to beset international relations throughout the coming year. No major outstanding disputes were resolved during 2016. Indeed, the existing situation in several regions, including parts of Ukraine (contested between Ukraine and Russia), Nagorno-Karabakh (contested between Armenia and Azerbaijan), Kashmir (contested between India and Pakistan), the Tirpani, Bara Hotii, and Samdu valleys (contested between India and China), the South China Sea (contested between China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, and Indonesia), and even diminutive Gibraltar (contested between the United Kingdom and Spain) deteriorated in the first six months of 2017. Worryingly, events in 2016 and the first half of 2017 suggest many states’ deliberate ignorance of successive rulings on territorial disputes by internationally-recognized judicial bodies will continue.

Nevertheless, many longstanding territorial disputes remained frozen and largely peaceful. In South America, Venezuela’s claim over eastern Guyana stayed calm, despite its rapidly deteriorating domestic situation. In Argentina, new president Mauricio Macri’s emphasis on social stabilization and economic reforms has pushed its long-running dispute with Britain over the Falkland Islands to the back-burner. In Europe, the Serbia-Kosovo dispute remains frozen, with both sides indicating their commitment to diplomatic solutions. In Africa, Ethiopia and Eritrea suggested that they may be open to improving their historically acrimonious relationship, and Morocco and Mauritania avoided any escalation over the contested Western Sahara territory.

(F) Nuclear Crisis

While the 2015 Iran nuclear deal framework signed by Iran and the P5+1 appears to be holding, American-led efforts to stall or eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons program have proved unsuccessful. In July 2017, the DPRK launched a succession of long-range nuclear-capable missiles, believed to be able to reach Alaska and the continental United States, respectively. Although the United Nations Security Council unanimously imposed new sanctions on the totalitarian state in early August, the United States has been unable to convince China or Russia to pressure North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un to pause his program. Without a significant shift in stance by any major party, and despite recent efforts by South Korea to bring its northern neighbor back to the negotiating table, it is unlikely that the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis will de-escalate during the coming year.
Elsewhere, both the US and Russia continue to use inflammatory language to describe the relative size and capability of their respective nuclear weapons. It is not publicly known, however, to what extent mutual nuclear weapons reduction programs, established under previous administrations, have actually been stalled. In Europe, despite the turmoil over “Brexit” and the June 2017 British general election, in which Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn reiterated his longstanding desire to eliminate Britain’s nuclear weapons arsenal, both sides of Parliament have reasserted their support to maintain and upgrade the nuclear deterrent. South Asia is also a locus of concern; perennial tensions between India and Pakistan persist, and both nations are declared nuclear weapons state. In short, the size of the worldwide nuclear arsenal and the potential for conflict between nuclear capable states sustains international fears of a nuclear conflict.

(G) Global Refugee Crisis

Despite its relegation from the front pages of many news outlets, the European migration crisis remains extremely serious. In July 2017, France sought to intervene more directly in the situation, appeasing some lawmakers in Italy and Greece who had long demanded greater pan-European support, and sparking condemnation from those who believe French intervention to be a tacit criticism of the two countries’ handling of the ongoing situation. The European Union’s task force has not been particularly successful in interdicting tens of thousands of migrants and refugees crossing the Mediterranean. EU problems have been compounded by Libya’s continuing, borderline civil war, in which a cease-fire was only declared in late July. Within Europe itself, several eastern EU member states have refused to process arrivals’ claims, have sought to reintroduce border controls and fences, and/or have been simply overwhelmed by the influx.

In Asia, Myanmar (Burma) continues to repress the Rohingya people, who largely live in the country’s northeast. Tens of thousands have fled to neighboring Thailand, overwhelming and pressuring authorities there. Some Rohingya, alongside thousands of other South Asians, have sought refuge in Australia, only to fall afoul of that country’s strict and controversial immigration laws. Many are detained in camps on Nauru and Papua New Guinea and, if they refuse to settle in either of those countries, are returned to their country of origin instead.

In the Americas, longstanding large-scale migration from Central and South America to the United States (and, to a lesser extent, Canada) persists. Despite the fierce anti-immigration rhetoric of President Donald Trump and his supporters, however, immediate plans to rebuild and extent the wall between the US and Mexico appear to have been temporarily placed on hold. Further south, Venezuela’s rapidly deteriorating internal situation has resulted in thousands of refugees fleeing to Colombia, Guyana, and Brazil in search of stability, safety, medicine, and food.

(H) Drug Abuse and Trafficking

Drug trafficking is a transnational threat with a primary position on the security agenda of the entire OSCE region. Due to the various social and economic consequences of drug trafficking, it is broadly considered to be one of the most complex problems affecting the wellbeing of modern states. Furthermore, the economic factors, such as the root causes of drug trade, the links between trafficking networks, financial flows, transportation routes etc. are issues that require
more resources and intelligence than available to be addressed. For example, regarding the financial flows along drug trafficking routes, the International Narcotics Control Board has found that “only 1% of the money spent by drug abusers is generated as farm income in developing countries,” while “the remaining 99% of global illicit drug income goes to drug trafficking groups operating at various other points along the drug trafficking chain.” While the economic aspects of drug trafficking differ immensely throughout the OSCE region, it is widely accepted that its negative impact is especially high on the economies of transition countries. Nevertheless, the economics of drug trafficking is just one aspect of a large puzzle; the public health concerns of drug abuse and overdose have resulted in emerging crises.

For example, in the United States, decades of opioid over prescription, an influx of cheap heroin and the emergence of fentanyl, have resulted in one of the deadliest drug crises in the country’s history. Primarily due to the high overdose fatality rate of opioids and the frequency with which prescription opiates are overused, drug overdoses are the leading cause of death for Americans under the age of 50 - and those deaths continue to rise at faster rates than ever before. The loss of life has reached a point of national emergency for Americans. Similar dynamics regarding drug abuse are on the rise in the European Union. It stands to reason that this exercise can offer insight into the links between the root causes of drug trafficking, the geographic networks involved, and the supply and demand chain of the finished product and the raw materials.

(I) Militarization

Military exercises, troop movement, missile testing, and placement are on the rise in the Northern Hemisphere, from Europe to Asia. Russia has missiles in the Baltic region capable of reaching Europe, and will shortly be conducting a warm game in Belarus incorporating at least 13,000 personnel. This exercise - ZAPAD 2017 - is the latest in an iteration of ZAPAD military excursions, the most recent of which was conducted in 2013 (one year prior to the annexation of Crimea). The Russian Federation, however, is not the only entity boosting its military presence in the region. NATO has had an ‘Enhanced Forward Presence’ in Eastern Europe since 2014. Several NATO member states will soon be participating in the largest military exercise held in Sweden within the last 20 years, called Aurora, which will bring together 20,000 troops from Sweden, Finland, the United States, France, Estonia, Norway and Denmark. In Asia, the last few years have been marked by an increased Chinese presence in the South China Sea, an area that is the subject of a territorial dispute. More recently, North Korea has tested several Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (IBMs). The last missile tested is speculated to be capable of reaching Alaska. History broadly suggests that militarization precedes conflict; at present, what the future holds in all of these arenas marked by an increased military presence appears ever more uncertain.
CRITERIA FOR ANALYSIS

Key Elements of Cataloging Crises

- Origin of Conflict
- Historic Context
- Threat Elevation

- Human Casualties
- Regional Stability
- Financial/Economic Stability

- State Leadership
- Non-State Actors
- Populace
- Demographic

- Destabilization Potential
- Human Security

Key Elements of Evaluating Crises

- Institutional Integrity
- Refugee and Migrant Flow
- Border Disputes and Security
- Resource Allocation
- Non-State Actors
- Communal Identity and Resilience
- State Involvement and Governance
GLOBAL CONFLICT PANORAMA

The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research produces a yearly barometer of global conflicts. Conflicts are measured on a sliding scale of non-violent to violent; each conflict is assigned a point value based its violence rating, and escalation from year to year. The conflict barometer graphic below is a visual representation of bilateral conflicts, not all of which we would consider ‘active.’ However, we have decided to include the graphic because it is a visual aid that helps us image where in the world, geographically, conflicts and disputes are concentrated.

Fig. 1: Courtesy of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIK), “Conflict Barometer 2016”
CRISIS SPOTLIGHTS

(I) Ukraine

Following the collapse of the pro-Russian government of Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014, pro-Russian sympathizers in the eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk, and the southern region of Crimea, revolted against Kiev. The Russian Federation intervened militarily, formally annexing Crimea in March, an action that was condemned by the international community. Crimea’s annexation has not been recognized to-date by OSCE or NATO powers. In the Donbass, Ukrainian and Russian separatists, backed by Russia, fought a fierce war into 2015, when a series of tenuous ceasefires were implemented following complex negotiations in Minsk, Vienna, and Geneva. The cease-fire officially holds, although violence remains a daily problem. No long-term diplomatic solution has yet been identified. Russia defends its intervention and continued support for armed separatists, stating that it is (a) protecting ethnic Russians from the Ukrainian government, and (b) reasserting a “historical” claim over “Novorossiya,” an eighteenth-century amalgamation of Black Sea regions. Western experts dispute their logic, citing Joseph Stalin’s forced migration of anti-Russian peoples from Ukraine in the 1920s and 1930s, and Nikita Khrushchev’s reassignment of Crimea’s administrative authority to Ukraine.
The location of the ZAPAD 2017 exercises, immediately adjacent to the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania has worried many Western experts. Richard Sokolsky, senior Russia and Eurasia fellow at the Carnegie Foundation, has argued that the reinforcement of existing Russian and Belarusian forces in western and northern Belarus is a clear signal to NATO that its expansion into Eastern Europe, Ukraine, and the Baltic – all which Russia considers to be within its ‘sphere-of-influence’ – will not be tolerated. Recent events continue to escalate regional NATO-Russian tensions, casting renewed attention on how the Kremlin chooses to deal with perceived threats within its self-described sphere of influence. Since March 23, Belarusian president Alyaksandr Lukashenka faced significant protests in the capital, Minsk, and elsewhere, over his efforts to impost a “social parasite” tax on individuals unemployed for over six months. As Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty has argued, these protests not only demonstrate weaknesses within Lukashenka’s regime, but, more ominously, fit into a familiar pattern of reform driven protests that could lead to Russian intervention to protect Belarus’s pro-Kremlin leadership, its influence over the country, and ‘Russians’ – the latter a category oft-used by Russian president Vladimir Putin to variously describe Russian citizens (e.g., passport holders), ethnic Russians, and Russian speakers.

The United States and the European Union have sought to support the Belarusian opposition, influence Lukashenko toward a ‘Western shift’, and, above all, defend the sovereignty of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. But their efforts have also reflected Western geostrategic economic priorities. The region’s burgeoning energy opportunities are vital for both Russian and Western interests. The Baltic trio’s complex and ongoing efforts to seek energy independence from Russia should provide valuable lessons to Belarusian leadership. But only time will tell. In 2015, then-US President Barack Obama waived longstanding economic sanctions against Belarus for nine corporations: Belarusian Oil Trade House (petroleum), Belneftekhim USA (petrochemicals), Belshina (tires and petrochemicals), Grodno Azot (petrochemicals), Grodo Khimvolokno (petrochemicals and manmade fibers), Lakokrasha (petrochemicals and varnishes), Naftan (petroleum), and Polotsk Steklovolokno (fiberglass). The waiver, continued by the Obama and Trump administrations, is indicative of Belarus’s deeper geostrategic, but largely-untapped resource: energy.

![Figure Courtesy of The Economist, “The ebb and flow of Russian/Soviet Influence”](image-url)
(III) Syria & Iraq

Both Iraq and Syria remain embroiled in overlapping, complex wars that deeply threaten the Middle East’s long-term stability. Although the Islamic State (IS) or ISIL was eliminated from most of its Iraqi strongholds in the first half of 2017, the terrorist organization remains an incredibly dangerous, destabilizing force in the country. Well over a decade after the 2003 US- and British-led invasion to oust then-president Saddam Hussein, Iraq continues to struggle to bring normalcy and security to its peoples. The country deals with security incidents and violence on a near-daily basis, and is susceptible to interference from its neighbors, particularly Iran, seeking to leverage the still-weak government to its advantage. Kurdistan province is the notable exception: the semi-autonomous region rapidly rebuilt itself following the 2003 war, and manages most of its internal affairs separately from the central Iraqi government in Baghdad. Its economic growth, social stability, and pivotal role in the ongoing war with ISIL, however, has strengthened Kurdish calls for independence. The Kurdish government has unilaterally called for an independence referendum in the second half of 2017, although Baghdad has stated that it will not recognize the results.

A horrific civil war continues in Syria, and has escalated into a proxy war between the US and its allies, and Russia and Iran. ISIL maintains key positions in the country’s oil-rich (but sparsely populated) eastern desert, and northern irrigated region on the Turkish border. They are fighting the forces of both Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, backed by Iran and Russia, and a collection of anti-Assad groups, backed by the US, UK, France, Israel, and other NATO and EU states. The war, which began in 2011, has resulted in nearly half a million killed (according to a July 2016 estimate by the United Nation’s Special Envoy to Syria), and 5.2 million refugees. The war has also driven some of the declining relations between Turkey and NATO and OSCE partners.

(Figure []) The Syrian conflict as of August 6, 2017, courtesy Syria LiveMap. ISIS (black); Kurds (yellow); Assad forces (red); Ant-Assad coalition (green). The ISIS territory is visualized much larger than in reality; much of eastern Syria and western Iraq is only sparsely populated.
(IV) Kurdistan

The Kurdish self-determination campaign emerged in earnest around the late nineteenth to early twentieth century. After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds were scattered between Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Kurdish movements for autonomy in Iraq and Turkey during the 1970s and 1980s failed to found an independent state. With the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan became an autonomous region. It is, however, not a recognized state. Kurdistan’s second independence referendum is scheduled for early September 2017. Like the preceding vote held in 2005, it is expected to pass. According to International Crisis Group’s Middle East analyst Joost Hiltermann, the anticipated positive outcome to the referendum will renew President of the Kurdish Region Barzani’s negotiating power vis-a-vis the Iraqi government in pushing for independence. Giving the ongoing fight against ISIS in Iraq, the war in Syria, and the evolving situation in Erdogan’s Turkey, it will be curious to see whether the Kurdish self-determination campaign might finally move forward. And, if it does, how would the formation of an independent Kurdistan alter the geopolitical situation in the Middle East? Below is a map illustrating the proposed borders of the Kurdish state, as they were presented in 1919, 1920 and 1945.
(V) Nagorno-Karabakh

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a protracted dispute between ethnically Armenian secessionists in a mountainous region of Azerbaijan. Its roots can be traced back to the fall of the USSR. While under USSR rule, Nagorno-Karabakh was a semi-autonomous region with Armenia. With the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Karabakh declared independence, sparking a full-scale violent conflict between the separatist region and Armenia in which 20,000-30,000 people are estimated to have perished. Although a peace treaty was signed in 1994, it holds tenuously, and has been violated at least 7,000 times (in varying degrees) since its signing. In 2016, violent confrontation broke out once again, resulting in approximately 150 deaths. As of 2017, the situation remains tense. Fighting broke out in February - following an affirmative vote in a constitutional referendum for independence - which resulted in the death of several Azerbaijani military personnel. During May of the year, Azerbaijan destroyed the region’s air defense missile system. Karabakh has vowed that the “Azerbaijani forces’ provocation will not be left unanswered,” according to an AlJazeera article published after the event.

The situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is marked by both a sense of anxiety and uncertainty, as Carnegie Europe’s “The Threat of a Karabakh Conflict in 2017” illustrates. Given the bloody history of the struggle, this self-determination crisis has great destabilization potential, and will almost certainly put civilian security in the region at risk if it devolves further.

Figure is courtesy of Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 2011.
Background

Context of decision-making and diplomacy

International Actors Framework:
- Balance of power
- Dimensions of change.
- International equilibrium or disequilibrium.

Levels of analysis:
- Local, sub regional
- National, macro-regional
- Continental, international
- Global

II. Diplomacy in Theory and Practice

Elements of traditional diplomacy:
- Bilateral, Multilateral; Supranational
- Willingness to engage through embassies, envoys, various modes of communications.
- Adherence to basic rules, e.g., governing immunities and privileges, protocol, etc.
- Objective of advancing the state’s interests.
- Willingness to understand the other party’s interests.

Longer-term time horizon.

III. Crisis diplomacy

Elements of crisis diplomacy:
- Very short-term time horizon and pressure
- Immediate threat
- Need for different forms of communication – accelerated, immediately authoritative
- Beware of the “CNN-effect”
- Cautionary use of telephone diplomacy
- Increased need for value-added analysis
- Increased focus on leadership attitudes and actions
- Policy must be clear to bureaucracy and adversary
- Short-term considerations trump long-term interests
- Multiple, originally independent crises
- “Downward Spiral Syndrome”
- Crises manipulation
- Religion and Values

Other Dimensions:
- Control/initiative
• Personalities/leadership
• Trust in authority/management
• Lack of information and understanding
• CNN- and YouTube-effect
• “Life-factor” hand-held
• Pain factor
• Chaos factor
• Dynamic Process

￥ Media Manipulation and Distortion

Anticipatory diplomacy

Elements of anticipatory diplomacy:
• Time horizon?
• Normative dimension/national, international
• Information, i.e. open source material, diplomatic reporting, intelligence, ideological or pragmatic
• Effective, objective, candid Analysis
• Political space, viz., public support and sustainability
• Skilled practitioners, i.e., language, temperament, regional or functional expertise and experience.

￥ Beware of the role of leadership/intergenerational factors

Four Perspectives on Security

Below are four perspectives on conceptualizing security from an academic perspective. They are offered as a starting point for a discussion on how security should be understood in an increasingly complex and interconnected threat environment. Note: Summaries are provided to elucidate understanding. They do not represent official commentary by the author or corresponding journal.

Arnold Wolfers: ‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol

Summary: Wolfers critiques the ambiguity with which the term “national security” is used to justify policy propositions. He challenges the idea of security as a paramount concern, noting how nations prioritize other values over marginal increases in security.

• Problem with ‘contested’ security: “The trouble with the contention of fact, however, is that the term 'security' covers a range of goals so wide that highly divergent policies can be interpreted as policies of security.” (484)

• Value of security: “Security is a value, then, of which a nation can have more or less and which it can aspire to have in greater or lesser measure. It has much in common, in this respect, with power or wealth, two other values of great importance in international affairs. But while wealth measures the amount of a nation's material possessions, and power its ability to control the actions of others, security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.” (484-5)

• Diminishing returns on security: “In the first place, every increment of security must be paid by additional sacrifices of other values usually of a kind more exacting than the mere expenditure of precious time on the part of policy makers. At a certain point, then, by something like the economic law of diminishing returns, the gain in security no longer compensates for the added costs of attaining it.” (494)
Richard Ullman: Redefining Security

Summary: Ullman’s redefinition of security expands security beyond purely military dimensions to include natural catastrophes, scarcity, poverty, and domestic stability. In doing so, Ullman emphasizes non-military solutions that could alleviate the need for military solutions.

- On non-military security: “We are, of course, accustomed to thinking of national security in terms of military threats arising from beyond the borders of one's own country. But that emphasis is doubly misleading. It draws attention away from the non-military threats that promise to undermine the stability of many nations during the years ahead. And it presupposes that threats arising from outside a state are somehow more dangerous to its security than threats that arise within it... it is much more difficult to portray as threats to national security, or to organize effective action against, the myriads of other phenomena, some originating within a national society, many coming from outside it, which also kill, injure, or impoverish persons, or substantially reduce opportunities for autonomous action, but do so on a smaller scale and come from sources less generally perceived as evil incarnate.” (133-4)

- Redefining security: “A more useful (although certainly not conventional) definition might be: a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.” (133)

- Inequality as insecurity “As population growth in the poor countries hobbles economic development, the gap in living standards between them and the rich countries is likely to continue to widen, and resentment of the rich-rich nations and rich persons-will continue to grow. So will pressures for immigration. … the pressure engendered by population growth in the Third World is bound to degrade the quality of life, and diminish the range of options available, to governments and persons in the rich countries.” (143)

Helga Haftendorn: The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security

Summary: Haftendorn contends that international security requires an approach that bridges the divide between national and international security through an institutional approach.

- Security types: “The paradigm of national security responds to political realism as taught by Hobbes, while the paradigm of global security follows the Kantian tradition, with its assumption of a community of mankind and political processes controlled by enlightened men. The paradigm of international security, in turn, becomes meaningful with the formation of security regimes and the building of international institutions as Grotius has recommended.” (6-7).

- Difference between national and international security: “International security, in contrast to national security, implies that the security of one state is closely linked to that of other states, at least of one other state.” (9)

- New paradigms of security: “A new paradigm of security should specifically meet the following demands: 1) it should explain diversity and change-differences in various regions, transition from one dominant concept to another, systems transformation; 2) it should be multi-focused, not limited to a single issue-area or level of analysis.” (12)
David Baldwin: The Concept of Security

Summary: Baldwin asserts that most academics only grapple with security on a policy level, rather than a conceptual level. Baldwin points out the need for a more precise definition of the concept of “security,” laying out specific recommendations on how to better conceptualize it.

Specifying security:

- **Security for whom?**: “For purposes of specifying the concept of security, a wide range of answers to the question, ‘Security for whom?’ is acceptable: the individual (some, most, or all individuals), the state (some, most, or all states), the international system (some, most, or all international systems), etc. The choice depends on the particular research question to be addressed.” (13)

- **Security for which values?**: “The concept of national security has traditionally included political independence and territorial integrity as values to be protected; but other values are sometimes added… Failure to specify which values are included in a concept of national security often generates confusion.” (14)

- **How much security?**: “One reason it is important to specify the degree of security a country has or seeks is that absolute security is unattainable… If security is conceived of as a matter of degree, Buzan observes, ‘then complicated and objectively unanswerable questions arise about how much security is enough’. This, of course, is precisely why security should be so conceived.” (15)

- **From what threats?**: “Vague references to the ‘Communist threat’ to national security during the Cold War often failed to specify whether they referred to ideological threats, economic threats, military threats, or some combination thereof, thus impeding rational debate of the nature and magnitude of the threat.” (15)

- **By what means?**: “The tendency of some security studies scholars to define the subfield entirely in terms of ‘the threat, use, and control of military force can lead to confusion as to the means by which security may be pursued. It can also prejudice discussion in favour of military solutions to security problems.” (16)

- **At what cost?**: “The pursuit of security always involves costs, i.e., the sacrifice of other goals that could have been pursued with the resources devoted to security… Only the assumption of a cost-free world would eliminate the necessary conflict among such goals as they compete for scarce resource” (16).

- **In what time period?**: “In the short run, a high fence, a fierce dog, and a big gun may be useful ways to protect oneself from the neighbors. But in the long run, it may be preferable to befriend them. Short-run security policies may also be in conflict with long-run security policies.”

References

KEY POINTS FROM RECENT LISD POLICY REPORTS

Emerging European Security Challenges (April 2016)
Non-military Russian security: “Russian tactics and strategy should be analyzed beyond the hard military domain. Russian cyber, propaganda, and information manipulation is oriented towards three audiences: the domestic population, (Russian-speaking), residents of the “near abroad,” and international audiences (sympathizers, political parties, specially selected groups). Particular attention should also be paid to the differences between Europe’s regions (North/Baltic, Central/East, Balkan/Southeast), with narratives tailored to specific regional differences, cultural affinities, and historic legacies. The proliferation of alternative narratives results in disillusion and doubt, with the very notion of truth called into question. Participants also noted that the notion of a “fifth column” in Europe remains salient. Given the special effects of millions of refugees from Syria and elsewhere this connotation obtains more relevance.”

Key idea: Whoever controls “truth” has the greater ability to shape security circumstances.

Non-military Ukrainian Security: Ukraine’s success—or failure—in consolidating government control, carrying out meaningful reforms, combatting corruption, and reestablishing the confidence and trust of its citizens will be crucial tests for Europe’s future. Ukraine’s loss of part of its defense industries and many of its exports to Russia, as well as the destruction of Donbass, are costly. Remedying these challenges amid the new flare-up of fighting in eastern Ukraine demands good politics and leadership. Combating corruption and the influence of the oligarchs is another challenge. Ukraine as a failure would fulfill the wishes of some, whereas Ukraine as a democratic and economic success story would deal the strongest blow to its adversaries and those whose interests lie in maintaining the status quo.

Key idea: Internal good governance is as important to security as a strong exterior defense.

Potential strategies against Daesh: One participant succinctly analyzed three potential approaches: First, kill them—but “boots on the ground” remains politically unpalatable and unlikely, and the costs of peacemaking and peacekeeping are daunting. Second, let them kill themselves—but do we have the time? Does the West have the resilience for this kind of containment? Third, kill them with words—a battle of hearts and minds will depend on an ability to know others, know ourselves, and present a meaningful counter-narrative.

Key idea: Enhancing security through narrative control

Chair’s Addendum: Required Paradigm Changes

The complexity of the current situation in and around Europe, the multiple competing crises, and their cumulative effects on crisis management and leadership capabilities have begun to cause crisis-fatigue and loss of trust in leadership. One can even observe some appeal of authoritarianism and a questioning of European integration, the EU’s efficiency, and the transatlantic relationship.
Several critical paradigm changes are urgently required in order to stop this downward spiral:

- **International crisis management needs to address not just the effects but the root causes of crises and their actual and possible interaction with other challenges:** This includes anticipating and addressing causes for radical (religious) fundamentalism which inspires terror acts. This does not necessarily require an increase in traditional military operations, i.e. bombs and missiles, but rather highly informed strategic, sociological, and religious intelligence, special operations, and sophisticated analysis of information, propaganda and social media. For EU states this urgently suggests a move from national to supranational intelligence cooperation, whether against ISIS or related terrorism. In this regard, it is important to rethink overall media and information strategies. Perhaps a more restrictive approach, or even a policy of “blocking out,” would be a more appropriate tool. Likewise, it is necessary to rethink the uses of banking and financing mechanisms on a global, particularly European, scale as it relates to (organized) criminality and terrorism.

- **The general paradigm shift in global energy production and consumption currently underway has the potential to profoundly impact and reshape regional and geopolitical relationships:** The OPEC states in the Gulf have operated for decades on the assumption that they would be delivering to the OECD members something which these critically need: energy in the form of oil or natural gas. In the past, this gave OPEC an exclusive status and position. Now, with the United States having become one of the world’s leading petroleum and gas producers, and with the falling oil and gas prices, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and others are suddenly confronted with increasing budgetary challenges. At the same time, energy-saving measures and the shift to alternative energy sources in Europe and other markets are beginning to take effect, neutralizing the relevance of the OPEC states and gradually reducing the relevance of carbon. This may eventually cause serious problems for energy-export-dependent economies like the Saudi, Russian, and others, and lead to regional destabilization.

- **Inclusive systems of education and the creation of sophisticated, values-based political cultures, rooted in responsible information dissemination, must be a priority:** There is the danger that collective war memory and related suffering will be forgotten or manipulated, including the attempt by some to try to rewrite or re-interpret history for consumption by the younger generation. Such diluted memories, ignorance of historic facts, manipulated historical interpretations, and the accompanying increase in risk-taking and reduced conflict avoidance are becoming apparent. Since 1945 and the end of World War II, two generations have passed and a third is entering leadership positions. Memory of wars, suffering, and destruction is vanishing in Europe and elsewhere. In the Middle East, the next generation of political leadership is also arriving, seen quite prominently in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The incoming leadership may be much less restrained than the previous ones.

- **It would be beneficial to expand crisis management leadership to more effectively include civil society organizations and NGOs, and to directly engage and collaborate with them instead of spending time and resources subordinating them to government overseers:** A paradigm change exists in the active relationships of civil society to government in addressing European crises. Recently, civil society and NGOs have been in the forefront of effectively dealing with an overwhelming influx of refugees and migrants. They have also been instrumental in pushing govern-
ments to undertake more effective steps. It is highly recommended that governments engage with civil society groups, NGOs, and non-traditional actors, such as the business sector, more actively.

- **An identification process for refugees should take place on the EU’s enforced external borders in a humane and efficient manner, and in accordance with European values and international law:** With regard to the current refugee crisis, Europe has three basic response options. One would be to do nothing and wait—but that would certainly lead to political and economic chaos. Another possibility would be to act only once refugees reach EU member states. This option would then lead to re-established intra-European boundaries, and a serious challenging of Schengen. But areas might be destabilized where refugees become concentrated. Thus, third, it seems more relevant to deal with the causes of the refugee flow before this becomes a crisis within the EU. Nevertheless, it is absolutely legitimate to want to know who is entering the EU and for what reasons. Information sharing among EU members and intelligence cooperation is key to effectively deal with related security issues.

- **An acceptance in western nations of a “new normal” that is more tense and potentially insecure is necessary, and responses to security threats should be adjusted and media tools utilized more effectively to address these but with a goal of maintaining a sense of normality:** While there is no new “Cold War,” it has to be accepted that strategic competition, cyber criminality, terror, a change in the tone of the international discourse, and even “hybrid warfare” and locally limited direct confrontation have become part of a new normal in an increasingly multipolar global actors system. High-quality, balanced, objective, and properly contextualized information should be offered to all via traditional and new forms of media. Such a strategy should also encourage the deepening of internal EU cooperation and the formation of a common European will without which the creation of effective, sustainable solutions will not be possible.

- **A more ambitious response to the current refugee crises in the MENA region is through an effective, sustainable stabilization initiative:** The ultimate goal of such an initiative should be to change the Middle East and North Africa from a zone of crisis to a zone of peace, stability, prosperity, and opportunities for all, Europeans included. The MENA region should not be perceived as a threat, but as an opportunity. Stabilization should include direct involvement of the people themselves, not a top-down approach like that of a neo-colonial regime. Alongside public resources, private funds and initiatives should come into play, from stabilization, security and humanitarian aid, to training and investment projects. One of the first concrete steps that must be taken to address the refugee crisis is for EU member states to take a lead in moving forward a successful Syria peace negotiation—including all key stakeholders—with the immediate goal of securing a meaningful, sustainable cease-fire as soon as possible. The EU as a whole and member states individually must be willing to leverage maximum pressure that they can bring to bear through a stained effort for both immediate and lasting effects.

An effective stabilization initiative requires an all-encompassing outline, and case-by-case analysis in order to assess the critical needs of the states and communities concerned and to determine for the immediate, medium, and longer term what resources and support are needed and who should contribute. This includes possible use of force by a “coalition of the concerned,” to neutralize, in particular, actions by various spoilers. Citizens should be assisted in developing
and upholding the rule of law in accordance with their national culture. Safety and effective humanitarian assistance, disarmament, security sector reform and demilitarization ought to be first priority, followed by targeted and supervised economic-industrial investment projects. Initiatives for bottom-up involvement can help avoid a foreign-instigated top-down approach. Enhanced law and order will increase attraction for foreign investors, and it eventually ought to be possible for stable MENA states to have special agreements with the EU. Dual track professional training, and sustainable investment projects and public-private initiatives should be encouraged.

This stabilization initiative demands determination, cooperation, and a clear strategy. It must be innovative and sustainable to bring (relative) peace and prosperity to a region which has been for too long the center of conflict and suffering, and from which global crises have spread. Such an initiative promises to be the most cost-effective way to adequately address and counter the causes for the flight of the region’s highly qualified people who will be crucial for rebuilding these states. Palpable improvements in the MENA region might convince former refugees to return home, since many still have their families in the region. However, the longer such an initiative is absent, the more likely an intensified regional conflagration will further exacerbate the refugee crisis and the crises in Europe. A MENA Conference on Peace, Stabilization, and Economic Development (MENA-COPED) under African Union, EU, and UN auspices should be established to systematically assess the situation in each crisis country in the MENA region and support effective and sustained cooperation.

**Grand Strategy and Self-Determination (March 2015)**

State v. human security: “From a state perspective, security entails control of borders, enforcement of order, and physical protection against outside adversaries. From an initial concrete and perhaps more quantifiable perspective, strategy undeniably depends on these multiple conceptions of security. But while physical factors are highly important, the inherent complexity that emerges in the intersection between hard and soft power, short- and long-term ends, and multiple competing interests and factors means grand strategy could be better managed by including not just national but also human terms in the concept of security.” Integrating human and national security: “Emphasizing the role of the individual, the local, and the uniqueness of communities in security issues like personal safety, health, water, food, employment, and education can help draw these complex factors into the means and ends of national (state-level) security.”

Integrating tiers of security: “Merging national, communal, and individual security, along with the crucial difference between changing minds rather than imposing will, can be pursued in several important dimensions: first, by prioritizing engagement over direct confrontation; second, by crafting a narrative that has to be about “doing good;” third, by instilling an appreciation and respect for more abstract norms and values, which will necessarily be more complex in the case of direct conflict.”

Internal security and grand strategy: “Finally, it was repeatedly stressed that grand strategic success begins at home. Long-term prosperity requires managing one’s own expectations and capabilities. Likewise, this requires realizing that there is no magic bullet to any situation, but that there might be long-term strategic consensus between major powers even though they may disagree over the crisis du jour.”
Leadership and security: “There is also a crisis within the international system itself. Leaders seem to be neither prepared nor motivated to carry out the necessary processes themselves. This leadership crisis appears to be most acute in many western states. **Grand strategy, which implies benefits for the future with immediate costs, reveals the incentives and misalignments in democratic societies.** This structural problem can lead to demagogic populism. How can we change the motivation structure in politics today _to encourage long-term thinking_ and find the type of political leaders we often seem to so desperately lack?”

*Implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda in Afghanistan (January 2012)*

Security and Female Empowerment: Realizing accountability for human rights violations and participation of women in all aspects of Afghanistan’s social, cultural, economic, and political life had the potential to fundamentally alter power relations in the country and facilitate security that was not predicated on a military presence. Combating violence against women, women’s legal empowerment, and changing institutions were priorities within the WPS accountability framework.

Women Leadership and Security: “The view was expressed that women’s participation in such meetings and the incorporation of women’s issues into their agendas and into potential peace negotiations was often pushed out with the argument that discussing women’s rights would stymie these processes, even though this was clearly a false argument. **Women’s rights were not the obstacle to peace, and removing women’s issues from discussions about the future of Afghanistan and peace negotiations would not suddenly bring about stability and security in Afghanistan.** It was also stressed that the presence and participation of women would not simply lead to a discussion on women’s rights, but ensures that women’s interests and perspectives were addressed across all thematic issues.”
APPENDIX

Rebuilding Trust
Dialogue – Interaction – Crisis Management

Garden Palais Liechtenstein,
Vienna, Austria, 11-13 May 2017

Background
The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University (LISD) together with the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship, and in cooperation with the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, invite you to a conference focused on the role of think tanks in rebuilding trust and dialogue in the OSCE area. The objective is to bring together leading scholars and analysts on security and cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security space to identify possible areas of convergent interests in a rapidly changing environment. Furthermore, the conference will provide an opportunity for scholars and academics from around the OSCE area to develop and strengthen their contacts and networks, and to open avenues for effectively providing policy input to the OSCE multi-lateral process, particularly on the ongoing security dialogue.

The overarching theme of the conference is “rebuilding trust,” which is one of the main objectives of Austria’s Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2017. The theme was chosen to address a disturbing lack of trust between people and their governments; within societies; between states; and at a regional level. Conference sessions will be designed to enable open dialogue on how trust can be improved in all of these spheres. Furthermore, plenary sessions will enable interaction between the participants and representatives of OSCE participating States. One of the main aims is to identify threats and challenges to security in the OSCE area, and to seek common ground on which to enhance cooperation. In a globalized and social media centric world, nothing seems to match direct personal contact, connectivity, and open candid interaction.

Objective
The objective is to enable direct contact between think tanks from around the OSCE area to discuss the current political environment for the world’s largest regional security organization. The meeting also provides an opportunity for think tanks to generate ideas that could stimulate the inter-governmental process of Structured Dialogue in the OSCE.

Procedures
Conference language is English. The Colloquium will be conducted like a Princeton seminar, so all are invited and encouraged to participate and speak. Introductory remarks will not exceed 10 minutes each followed by interventions of the participants with max. 7 mins duration in each case – albeit repeatedly. The colloquium will be divided into ‘general plenary sessions’ at the beginning and end with the involvement of OSCE participating States, and ‘working sessions’ with introductory remarks from think tank participants, experts, and academic scholars only. Working Session IV may involve break-out sessions to focus on particular themes or regions. Participants are encouraged to kindly inform organizers about materials they would want to bring and/or distribute to conference participants. All participants are expected to actively engage in the discussions. Please contact Ms. Rana Ibrahim (lisd-lcm@princeton.edu) at the Liechtenstein Institute at Princeton University for further information and registration.

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Program

Thursday, 11 May, 2017
Garden Palais Liechtenstein, Vienna

17:30     Arrival and Registration
          Participant Arrival/Security Check (Photo ID required)

18:00*    Welcome Reception

Welcoming Remarks
Amb. Princess Maria-Pia Kothbauer-Liechtenstein, Ambassador,
Permanent Representative of the Principality of Liechtenstein
Amb. Clemens Koja, Chairperson of the Permanent Council,
Head of the Permanent Mission of Austria to the OSCE in Vienna
Prof. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Founding Chair, LISD &
Liechtenstein Colloquium

Friday, 12 May, 2017
Garden Palais Liechtenstein, Vienna

09:30*    Opening Keynote Addresses
Ambassador Lamberto Zannier, Secretary General of the OSCE
Professor Kwame Anthony Appiah, Professor of Philosophy and Law, New York University

10:00*    Plenary Discussion: Rebuilding Trust through Dialogue
Trust has broken down between states, between people and their leaders, and in the ability of existing structures and institutions to cope with threats and challenges. How can dialogue help to strengthen trust, particularly in the OSCE area?

Introductory Questions:
• Why and since when has trust broken down between states, between people and their leaders?
• What are the reasons for this shift in the way existing structures and institutions cope with threats and challenges?
• Are there different perspectives in different regions, amongst different generations?
• How can dialogue help to strengthen trust, particularly in the OSCE area?

* with members of OSCE delegations
Panelists

Amb. Florian Raunig, Head of the OSCE Task Force, Austrian OSCE Chairmanship
Prof. Charles Heckscher, Rutgers University
Prof. Andrew Moravcsik, Princeton University

Moderator:
Prof. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber

12:00*
Working Luncheon

14:00
Working Session I: European Security Order Under Stress
The European security order based on the 1990 Charter of Paris and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act is eroding. Almost all of the ten principles of the Helsinki Decalogue have been violated in the past two decades, borders have been unilaterally changed by force, bilateral relations have become militarized, and conflicts persist. What can be done to revive the vision of a Europe whole and free, without dividing lines, based on common principles?

Introductory Questions:
• What can be done to revive the vision of a Europe whole and free, without dividing lines, based on common principles?
• How can we strengthen diplomatic means and solutions and convince powers and leaders to use them rather than surprise force and military means?
• How can we deal effectively with the interaction of multiple crisis potentials: financial, economic, energy, employment, radicalization and post-truth social media?
• How to deal with aggressive leadership in a post-truth and manipulative environment absent of trust?

Introductory Remarks:
Amb. Martin Sajdik, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office to the Trilateral Contact Group

Amb. Valentin Inzko, High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina
Dr. Magdalena Grono, International Crisis Group, Europe & Central Asia Program Director
Christopher Nixon Cox, Co-founder, OC Global Partners, LLC

Moderator:
Ivan Krastev, Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna (IWM)

* with members of OSCE delegations
16:10 **Coffee Break**

16:30 **Working Session II: Transnational Threats, Multilateral Solutions**

Transnational threats like terrorism, violent extremism, organized crime (particularly the trafficking of drugs, weapons and people) as well as the smuggling of migrants pose a threat to all participating States. So too do cyber threats. Since these threats transcend borders they require multilateral responses. What more can be done to enhance cooperation in this field, including through the OSCE?

**Introductory Questions:**
- How do we address the way political leaders may exaggerate or use new threats and challenges for political purposes which can distort reality and further aggravate the crises?
- How do security policies mitigate the threat of non-state actors whilst coordinating efficient supra-national joint responses?
- How do we consider/manage any internal consequences of crises that have external origins?

**Introductory Remarks:**
**Dr. Wolfgang Zellner**, Head of Centre for OSCE Research (CORE)
**Mr. Knut H. Hammarskjold**, President, Ellipsis Human Identity Technologies, LISD Team
**Mr. Georg Gassauer**, COO, Train of Hope, LISD Team

**Moderator:**
**Guy Vinet**, Head of Strategic Police Matters Unit, OSCE Transnational Threats Department, OSCE

18:30 **Conference Dinner**
Weinhof Zimmermann – Neustift am Walde (Heuriger)
(Bus transfers will be provided from the Garten Palais)

**Saturday, 13 May, 2017**
GartenPalais Liechtenstein, Vienna

09:30 **Working Session III: Information Warfare: Fake News, Real Problems**
Disinformation, fake news, and the weaponization of information are undermining trust and jeopardizing security and cooperation. It has been argued that we have moved from an Information Age to the Post-truth Era. What steps can be taken to address this threat?
Introductory Questions:

- How can OSCE serve as a catalyst to enhance cooperation, build uniform standards, manage escalation and foster norms of responsible state and non-state actor behavior?
- How does external active manipulation of the media impact threat perceptions of security on the national and individual level?
- What does this mean for the next generation?

Introductory Remarks:
Prof. Miguel Centeno, Princeton University
Prof. Kavé Salamatian, Computer Science at Université de Savoie
Mr. Ravi Srinivasan, Managing Director, RampRate and LISD Team

Moderator:
Ms. Sejal Parmar, Senior Adviser, Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media

11:15 Coffee Break

11:30 Working Session IV: Mapping Convergence: Discovering Islands of Cooperation?

Perceptions are shaped by geography, history and identity. They are also shaped by emotional and subjective factors rather than just the objective analysis of facts. This session will focus on perception of threat from different perspectives. It will focus in particular on areas where perceptions and interests converge and explore how these can be the basis for cooperative security.

Introductory Questions:

- How does regional and national context affect the way we perceive and misperceive threats to security?
- How and why are certain threats minimized or maximized within individual interactions, within communities or within security policy?
- How do issues of identity, history and geography shape the political will to respond to perceived threats?

Introductory Remarks:
Dr. Walter Kemp, Special Adviser, Austrian OSCE Chairmanship
Prof. James Gow, King’s College London, LISD
Alexandra Vasileva, Research Associate, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
13:00* Networking Luncheon: Continuing the Dialogue

14:30* Concluding Plenary session: Sharing Views with participating States

Rapporteurs from the working sessions will report the findings and lessons-learned to the concluding plenary session, which will include representatives of participating States, and discuss how the observations and outputs of the meeting can contribute to the efforts of the OSCE to rebuild trust and carry out a process of structured dialogue.

Panelists:
Amb. Christian Strohal, Special Representative for the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship 2017
Amb. Eberhard Pohl, Chair, IWG Structured Dialogue

Rapporteur Session 1: Marci Buzanski, Director, Peace and Stabilization Strategies Program, Casimir Pulaski Foundation, Warsaw
Rapporteur Session 2: Dr. Frank Evers, Deputy Head, Centre for OSCE Research (CORE)
Rapporteur Session 3: Stephanie Liechtenstein, Web Editor-in-Chief, Security & Human Rights Monitor
Rapporteur Session 4: Alexandra Vasileva, Research Associate, Friedrich-Eberhard-Stiftung

16:30* Conclusion
HSH Prince Constantin von und zu Liechtenstein
Prof Wolfgang Danspeckgruber

17:00* Private Tour
Prince of Liechtenstein Art Collection

List of Participants

Prof. Anthony Appiah, Professor of Philosophy, New York University
Mary Albon, Senior Adviser to the SG, Office of the Secretary General, OSCE
Olha Aivazovska, Head of Board, Political Programs Coordinator, Civil Network Opora
Amb. Thierry Béchet, EU Permanent Representative to the OSCE
Dr. Katrin Bastian, Liechtenstein Embassy in Berlin, Scientific Officer of the Ambassador

* with members of OSCE delegations
Ian Brown, European Development Director, Salzburg Global Seminar
Bruce Berton, Principal Deputy High Representative OHR
Dr. Barbara Buckinx, Research Scholar, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University
David Buerstedde, Executive Officer, Office of the Secretary General, OSCE
Marcin Buzanski, Director, Peace and Stabilization Strategies Program, Casimir Pulaski Foundation
Ignacio Talegon Campoamor, Youth and Security Focal Point, Office of the Secretary General, OSCE
Amb. Natasha Cayer, Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the OSCE
Mr. Luis Cuesta Civís, Deputy Permanent Representative for Pol-mil Issues, Permanent Representative of Spain to the OSCE
Sabina Cudic, Leading Figure at ‘Our Party’
Prof. Miguel Centeno, Chair, Department of Sociology, Musgrave Professor of Sociology and Professor of Sociology and International Affairs at Princeton University
Prof. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Founding Director Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University; Chair, Liechtenstein Colloquium.
Dr. Frank Evers, Deputy Head, Centre for OSCE Research (CORE)
Jean Froehly, Senior Political Adviser/Head of the Director’s Office
Prof. Heinz Gärtner, Director, International Institute for Peace, (IIP Vienna)
Col. Sam Gardner, (United States Air Force, ret.) Nonresident Fellow, LISD
Georg Gassauer, Migration expert, LISD Team
Jerzy Gierasimiuk, First Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Poland
Prof. James Gow, Director, Department of War Studies, King’s College London
Dr. Magdalena Grono, International Crisis Group, Europe & Central Asia Program Director
Amb. Vladimir Galuška, Ambassador, Permanent Representative to the OSCE
Princess Camilla Habsburg-Lothringen, Director, IFIMES, Sarajevo
Prof. Zlatko Hadzidadic, Professor at the Sarajevo School of Science and Technology
Amb. Sanjin Halimovic, Permanent Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the UN/OSCE
Knut Hammarskjöld, President, Ellipsis Human Identity Technologies, S.C.; LISD Non-Resident Fellow
Rev. Dr. Fredrik Hansen, Secretary of the Permanent Mission of the Holy See to the OSCE
Hadewych Hazelzet, Security Committee First Counsellor of EU Delegation to OSCE
Prof. Charles Heckscher, Professor of Sociology, Director, Center for the Study of Collaboration, Rutgers University, Author of Trust in a Complex World (Oxford, 2015)
Carolin Hehr, EU Delegation to the OSCE
Amb. Paul Huynen, Permanent Representative of Belgium to the OSCE
Prof. Mindaugas Jurkynas, Regional Studies at Vytautas Magnus University
Dr. Kornely Kakachia, Georgian Institute of Politics,

Mats Karlsson, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs

Dr. Iris Kempe, Non-resident fellow, The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies

Dr. Elena Klien, First secretary, Embassy of Liechtenstein in Austria and the Czech Republic

Amb. Adam Kobieracki, Former Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Center and former NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations

Amb. Maria-Pia Kothbauer, Permanent Mission of the Principality of Liechtenstein

Dr. Barbara Kunz, Research Fellow, the French Institute of International Relations

Dr. Reinhard Krumm, Director, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Vienna

Mieczyslaw Kuziński, Deputy Head of Mission, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Poland

Amb. Valentin Inzko, High Representative and EU Special Representative (HR/EUSR) for Bosnia and Herzegovina

Prof. Guy Lachapelle, International Political Science Association

Nodvin Leah, Research Fellow OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Vienna Liaison Office

Prof. Erich Leitenberger, Pro Oriente, Wien

Stephanie Liechtenstein, Web Editor-in-Chief, Security & Human Rights Monitor

Prince Constantin von und zu Liechtenstein, Chair, Prince of Liechtenstein Foundation, Wien

Amb. Prince Stefan von und zu Liechtenstein, Ambassador of Liechtenstein to Berlin

Amb. Frederik Löjdquist, Permanent Delegation of Sweden to the OSCE


Prof. Richard Maher, Research Fellow, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

Sarah Mathieu-Comtois, Institute of Regional and International Studies, American University of Iraq

Amb. Philip McDonagh, Ambassador, Permanent Mission of Ireland to the OSCE

Wissem Moatemri, Counsellor, Tunisian Embassy in Vienna

Dr. Davood Moradian, Director, Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies

Prof. Andrew Moravcsik, Professor of Politics, Director of the European Union Program at Princeton University

Tarik Ndifi, Analyst, OSCE Section’s FP for Migration, Reconciliation, and Gender Issues

Yulia Nikitina, Associate professor at MGIMO (Moscow)

Christopher Nixon Cox, Co-founder, OC Global Partners, LLC, New York

Juraj Nosal, Office of the Secretary General, OSCE

Amb. Andreas Nothelle, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

Sejal Parmar, Senior Adviser, Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media, OSCE

Prof. Alexei Pikulik, Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies

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Jan Plešinger, Head of the OSCE Research and Documentation Centre, Prague
Yohanan Plesner, President, The Israel Democracy Institute
Amb. Eberhard Pohl, Chair, IWG Structured Dialogue
Kerstin Pohlmann, EU Delegation to the OSCE
Ruth Pojman, Senior Adviser, Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, OSCE
Michael Raith, OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, Operational Support Officer
Prof. Albert Rakipi, Albanian Institute for International Studies
Amb. Florian Raunig, Head of the OSCE Task Force
Pavlina Rehor, Counsellor, EU Delegation to the OSCE
David Řezníček, Representative for Politico - Military Issues, Permanent Representative from Czech Republic to OSCE
Amb. Véronique Roger-Lacan, Ambassador, Permanent Mission of France to the OSCE
Bartosz Rydliński, Project Manager, Amicus Europae Foundation (Warsaw)
Prof. Kavé Salamatian, Computer Science at Université de Savoie, Cybersecurity Consultant
Andrea Salvoni, Office of the Secretary General, OSCE
Amb. Martin Sajdik, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine
Dennis Sammut, Executive Director LINKS (Dialogue–Analysis–Research)
Kathleen Samuel-Ahl, Political Specialist, U.S. Mission to the OSCE
Dr. Ulrich Schlie, Head of the Department of Diplomacy, Andrássy University of Budapest
Prof. Tornike Sharashenidze, Georgian Institute of Public Affairs (GIPA), Head of the MA Program of International Affairs
Ms. Michele Siders, Deputy Permanent Representative, U.S. Delegation to the OSCE
Lenka Skalická, Deputy Permanent Representative from Czech Republic to OSCE
Vladan Simonovic, Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CEDEM)
Dr. Franziska Smolnik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs
Amb. Rauf Engin Soysal, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Turkey to the OSCE
Amela Sudzuka-Cerimagic, Counsellor to the Ambassador
Vazgen Karapetyan, Associate Director at Eurasia Partnership Foundation
M. Khalil Tazarki, Chargé d’Affaires, Tunisian Embassy in Vienna
Mr. Pierpaolo Tempesta, Adviser to the Permanent Mission of the Holy See to the OSCE
Dr. Eka Tkheselashvili, President, Georgian Institute of Strategic Studies (GISS)
Amb. Dr. Ferdinand Trauttmansdorff, former Austrian Ambassador to Egypt and Czech Republic, Chair, Lehrstuhl für Diplomatie
Joseph Truesdale, Deputy Political Counselor, U.S Mission to the OSCE
Prof. Oleksandr Tytarchuk, East European Security Research Initiative Foundation
Msgr. Dr. Janusz S. Urbańczyk, Permanent Representative of the Holy See to the OSCE
Alexandra Vasileva, Research Associate, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Guy Vinet, Head of Strategic Police Matters Unit, OSCE Transnational Threat Department, OSCE
Simon Weiss, Research Associate, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
Siegfried Woeber, Special Advisor, Permanent Mission of Austria to the OSCE
Amb. Lamberto Zannier, Secretary General of the OSCE
Dr. Wolfgang Zellner, Head of Centre for OSCE Research (CORE)
Dr. Ivan Zveržhanovski, Team Leader, New Partnerships and Emerging Donors, UNDP

Austrian Chairmanship Team
Dr. Walter Kemp, Senior Advisor, Austrian Chairmanship in Office
Amb. Clemens Koja, Chairperson of the Permanent Council, Head of the Permanent Mission of Austria to the OSCE in Vienna
Amb. Christian Strohal, Special Representative for the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship 2017
Paul Trauttmsdorff, Adviser, Politico-Military Dimension, Permanent Mission of Austria to the OSCE
Amb. Florian Raunig, Head of the OSCE Task Force for the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship 2017
Dominik Marxer, Counsellor, Coordination Unit, OSCE Task Force
Deniz Yazici, Senior Adviser, Human Dimension, Permanent Mission of Austria to the OSCE
Col. Anton Eischer, Senior Military Adviser, Permanent Mission of Austria to the OSCE
Kevin Kaiser, Intern, Permanent Mission of Austria to the OSCE
Minister Gerhard Mayer, Head of Division for Politico-Military Dimension
Julia Haas, Adviser, Human Dimension, Task Force OSCE Chairmanship 2017

Young Academics & LISD Team
Kristina Amerhauser, Diplomatic Academy Vienna, MAIS-1, 2016
Elena Braendle, Liechtenstein Embassy in Germany, Berlin
Marissa Brodney, Graduate Student, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs ’18 & Harvard Law School ’18
Francesco Diegoli, MAIS-1, Diplomatic Academy Vienna, ’18
Rana Ibrahem, Special Assistant to the Director of LISD, Research Specialist, Princeton University ’15
Cdr. Doyle Hodges (Unite States Navy, Ret.), PhD Candidate, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, LISD Doctoral Student Fellow, Princeton University
Blaykyi Kenyah, LISD Associate, Undergraduate Student, Department of Politics, Princeton University ’19

Svetlana Kirilyuk, Diplomatic Academy Vienna, ETIA, 2016

Stefania Marcucci, Diplomatic Academy Vienna, MAIS-1, 2016

Emery Real Bird, Undergraduate Student, Princeton University ’17

Kiara Rodriguez Gallego, LISD Associate, Undergraduate Student, Princeton University ’19

Apolonija Rihtaric, Diplomatic Academy Vienna, Diploma Programme, 2016

Benjamin Sacks, LISD DIRMAIS Fellow, PhD Candidate, Princeton University

Daria Skovliuk, MAIS-I, Diplomatic Academy Vienna, 2016

Vira Tarnavska, Undergraduate Student, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University ’17

Richard Trenner, LISD Team, Princeton University

Julianne Whittaker, Graduate Student, Master Public Affairs ’17, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University.
Religion, Values, and Spirituality
The Impact on Diplomacy and Security

Stadtpalais Liechtenstein,
Vienna, Austria, 5-7 June 2017

Background
The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University (LISD), in honor of Xth Anniversary of its Program on Religion, Diplomacy, and International Relations (PORDIR), and together with ProOriente Wien invite you to a private seminar on the impact of religion and values on the theory and practice of security and diplomacy. The seminar is the first in a new series of private gatherings to deepen the understanding of these issues, prescient in a world that has seemingly entered highly unpredictable times. The seminar will offer the opportunity for direct personal exchange, trust and confidence, and thus inspire understanding, respect, and peace.

Objective
The objective is to explore new personal, meaningful and sustainable ways to achieve better understanding, honest dialogue, and positive interaction between actors and receivers, men and women, young and old, to foster peace, stability, and security. By offering direct contacts and interactions, we aim to foster a candid exchange of opinions between representatives of all faiths and religions, including agnostics, and atheists, men & women alike, from all generations. Given the recent changes in political leaderships and a post-truth setting dominated by social media and the powerful role of non-state actors, the objective is to focus on peace, stability, security, and meaningful diplomacy. This seminar is the first in a new series to deepen understanding of these issues, all of which is prescient in a world that has seemingly entered unpredictable times.

Procedures
As has been thirty-year tradition with the Liechtenstein Colloquium, this event is private, off-the-record, and by-invitation-only. The Colloquium will be conducted like a Princeton seminar, so all participants are invited and encouraged to participate and speak repeatedly. Remarks can not exceed max. 7 mins duration in each case – albeit repeatedly. Participants are encouraged to kindly inform organizers about materials they would want to bring and/or distribute to conference participants. All participants are expected to actively engage in the discussions.

Please contact Ms. Rana Ibrahim (lisd-lcm@princeton.edu) at the Liechtenstein Institute at Princeton University for further information and registration. The LCM is chaired by Prof. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Founding Chair, LISD & Liechtenstein Colloquium
Program

Sunday, 4 June, 2017

22:30 Optional: *Ramadan Iftar Celebration*
Location: Restaurant Ali Ocakbasi, Operngasse 14, 1010 Wien

Monday, 5 June, 2017

11:00 Optional: *High Mass with Orchestra in St. Augustin Kirche*
Location: Augustinerstraße 3 in Josefsplatz

13:00 *Arrival and Registration: Security Check (Photo ID required)*
Location: StadtPalais Liechtenstein, Vienna
Bankgasse 9, 1010 Vienna-Innere Stadt

13:30 **Opening Luncheon**

14:30 **Opening Plenary: Generational Perspectives on Religion, Values and Spirituality**

*Brief opening statements will be offered as called upon by the Chair*

*Introductory Questions:*
- What is the difference between religion and values?
- How does religion influence security?
- How do we prioritize one person’s values over another?
- How and where does religion influence diplomacy?

*Introductory Speakers (7mins each):*
- PORDIR Professors & Experts
- Fellows of Princeton University’s LISD Program on Religion, Diplomacy, and International Relations

16:15 **Coffee Break**

16:30 **Working Session I: Seeing is Believing: Religion in the Digital Era**

*Brief opening statements will be offered as called upon by the Chair*

*Introductory Questions:*
- How do religions brand themselves in an era of individual and digital branding via social media and other channels of human interactions?
• How do social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube affect the way people consume information regarding religion, values and spirituality?
• How can mass followings online affect the way we generate our values and ideological followings?

18:30
Conference Dinner
Location: Restaurant Leopold, Große Pfarrgasse 11, 1020 Wien

Tuesday, 6 June, 2017
StadtPalais Liechtenstein
Bankgasse 9, 1010 Vienna

10:00
Working Session II: The Role of Religion and Values in Community and State Building

*Brief opening statements will be offered as called upon by the Chair

Introductory Questions:
• Is religion contradictory to democracy?
• How do values-based societies adapt to significant demographic changes?
• How can people anticipate that their government, elected representatives or community leaders reflect or mirror their values?
• How do societal structures enhance, impede or preclude modern religious, values-based or spiritual community building?

11:30
Coffee Break

11:45
Working Session II Continued

13:00
Luncheon

14:00
Working Session III: Modern Identity Formation: The Role of Religion, Values and Spirituality

*Brief opening statements will be offered as called upon by the Chair

Introductory Questions:
• What are the challenges to reconciling religion, values and spirituality with an inclusive understanding of identity?
• Are religion, values and spirituality compatible with a modern European notion of identity and culture, both broadly and regionally within Europe?
• How can people combine their religious beliefs or spiritual practices with other features of their commitments and values to form a personal identity?

15:30
Coffee Break
15:45 Working Session III Continued

16:30 Concluding Session: All-Women Chairpersonship
Session Chair:
Rana Ibrahem, Special Assistant to the Director of LISD, Princeton ‘15

Rapporteurs:
Dr. Barbara Buckinx, Princeton University, LISD Woodrow Wilson School
Lachlyn Soper-Lembke, Senior Conflict Advisor, US Africa Command
Prof. Rani Mullen, Associate Professor, College of William and Mary

18:30 Conference Dinner

20:30 Inter-religious Celebration
Location: St. Stephen’s Cathedral

Seminar Participants

Amb. Alvaro Albacete, Deputy Secretary General, KAICIID Dialogue Centre
Hon. Gaqo Apostoli, President, Institute for Democracy and Solidarity
Seda Aybay, Leader of the focus group “Women” in the “Sektion ohne Namen”; Alevis community in Vienna
Christian Bahoo, Advisor to the Vice Chancellor of Austria
Wardah Bari, Legal Fellow at Stris & Maher LLP
Rainer Barth, Brahma Kumaris World Spiritual University
Amb. Paul Bekkers, Director, Office of the Secretary General, OSCE
Raphaël Bez, Political Advisor, Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the OSCE
Gregory Boylan, Second Secretary, Embassy of the United States of America
Dr. Barbara Buckinx, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School
Dr. Nicolaus Buhllmann, Permanent Mission of the Holy See to the International Organizations
Amar Cavic, Founder Kaffetschi (Cold Brew Coffee) Limited
Elida Cavic, Central Med Business Development & Location Manager, Air BP
Marc Carillet, Deputy Director, Vienna Liaison Office, OSCE
Marie Czernin, Editor at Missio
Wolfgang Damoser, President of the Austrian Buddhist Union
Prof. Amitai Etzioni, Director, Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies, George Washington University
Amb. Dr. Christof Maria Fritzen, Ambassador of the Sovereign Order of Malta to the Republic of Austria
Kyriaki Gstrein-Sourmeli, frmr correspondent of Agence France Presse (AFP) in Athens and Bucarest
Heinz Gstrein-Sourmeli, frmr Broadcasting, Press Correspondent in Cairo, Tunis, Baghdad, Tirana, Moscow
Prof. Ingeborg Gabriel, Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in Office on Combating Racism, Xenophobia and Discrimination
Georg Gassauer, Independent Researcher, frmr "Train of Hope"; LISD Team
Miroljub Gligoric, Young Group of Theologians from PRO ORIENTE
Prof. James Gow, King’s College London, Department of War Studies
Kenan Güngör, Owner of the "Office for Society, Organization, Development think. Difference " in Vienna
Julia Haas, Adviser, Human Dimension, Task Force OSCE Chairmanship 2017
Princess Camilla Habsburg-Lothringen, Director, IFIMES, Sarajevo
Raghd Hamid, Co-Chairperson, African Diaspora Youth Forum Europe
Tana Halaszova, Adviser, Human Dimension, Task Force OSCE Chairmanship 2017
Knut Hammarskjöld, President, Ellipsis Human Identity Technologies, S.C.; LISD Non-Resident Fellow
Rev. Fredrik Hansen, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of the Holy See to the OSCE
Jürgen Heissel, Deputy Head of Mission for the Human Dimension, Permanent Mission of Austria to the OSCE
Yunus Valerian Hentschel, PhD candidate in Islamic Studies and Lecturer for Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Vienna
Sebastian J. Hoogewerf, International Theological Institute, Catholic School of Theology, Director of Finance and Administration
Amb. Madina Jarbussynova, OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings
Peter Kaiser, Director of Communications of KAICIID
Elena Khalitova, Programme Assistant, Youth Human Rights Group, Kyrgyzstan
Elena Klein, First Secretary / Deputy Head of Mission, Liechtenstein Embassy in Austria and the Czech Republic
Amb. Clemens Koja, Chairperson of the Permanent Council, Head of the Permanent Mission of Austria to the OSCE in Vienna
Anna Kolesnichenko, PhD Candidate University of Vienna
Amb. Princess Maria-Pia Kothbauer, Ambassador Permanent Mission of the Principality of Liechtenstein
Dr. Elmar Kuhn, Dean, Class VII World Religions, European Academy of Sciences and Arts
Fatima Kurtagic, Customer service manager and leader of the focus group “Children, Youth and Families” in the “Sektion ohne Namen”
Brahma Kumaris, World Spiritual University, UN Representative
Ambassador Talya Lador-Fresher, Botschaft des Staates Israel
Sokol Lulgjuraj, Coordinator of Inter-religious Collaboration Center (IRCC) Elbasan
Sharon McClaughlin, MDiv, Full-time member of Christian ministry, on sabbatical

Canon Alistair Macdonald-Radcliff, St George’s Hanover Square, Hon. Director General, The World Dialogue Network and Common Reason Initiative

Dominik Marxer, Counsellor, Coordination Unit, OSCE

Amb. Philip McDonagh, Permanent Mission of Ireland to the OSCE

Prof. Rani Mullen, Associate Professor, College of William and Mary

Merey Mukazhan, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the Republic of Austria

Severin Meister, Managing Director, ILAG

Stephanie Neuhauser, Brahma Kumaris World Spiritual University

Fr. Bryan Page, frmr. Dean, Aquinas Institute, Princeton University

Raphael Perl, Executive Director, Partnership for Peace Consortium

Paul Picard, Deputy Director, Conflict Prevention Centre, Operations Service, OSCE

Felix Radax, Historian and Specialist in Advanced International Studies

Amb. Florian Raunig, Head of the OSCE Task Force for the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship 2017

Rev. Paul Raushenbush, Senior Vice President and Editor of Voices on Auburn Seminary

Franz Josef Rupprecht, Martinus, Editor in Chief

Dr. Alkuin Schachenmayr, Assistant Dean at the Pontifical Athaneum Benedikt XVI. in Heiligenkreuz

Lachlyn Soper-Lembke, Senior Conflict Advisor, US Africa Command

Amb. Christian Strohal, Special Representative for the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship 2017

Lena Sykorova, Academic Council on the United Nations System

Bharti Tailor, Executive Director, Hindu Forum of Europe; Member, European Council of Religious Leaders

Amb. Dr. Ferdinand Trauttmandorff, former Austrian Ambassador to Egypt and Czech Republic, Chair, Lehrstuhl für Diplomatie

Amb. Dr. Janusz Stanislaw Urbanczyk, Permanent Representative of the Holy See to the OSCE

Rev. Mike Waltner, Honorary Assistant Curate of Christ Church Vienna

Gerhard Weissgrab, President, Austrian Buddhist Union

Jeremy Nicholas Wilmshurst, Second Secretary, British Embassy Vienna

Canon Yasar, National Chairman, Muslim Youth of Austria

Slimane Zeghidour, TV-Monde Paris: "ISIS Network Recruitment in Arabic and Throughout the English-Speaking World"

Prof. Peter Zeillinger, Professor of Theology and Philosophy, University of Vienna

Alice Zimmermann, Permanent Mission of Austria to the OSCE

Andrei Zolotov, Vienna-based Russian Journalist accredited by the Bundespressdienst
Young Academics & LISD Team

Kristina Amerhauser, Diplomatic Academy Vienna, MAIS-1, 2016
Maya Aronoff, Princeton University, Undergraduate Student, PORDIR Fellow
Miriam Friedman, Princeton University, Undergraduate Student, PORDIR Fellow
Kiara Rodriguez Gallego, LISD Associate, Undergraduate Student, Princeton University ’19
Rana Ibrahem, Special Assistant to the Director of LISD, Research Specialist, Princeton University ’15
Blaykyi Kenyah, LISD Associate, Undergraduate Student, Princeton University ’19
Stefan Kondic, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School MPA ’18, PORDIR Fellow
Christopher Looney, J.D. Candidate, 2019, Yale Law School
Stefania Marcucci, Diplomatic Academy Vienna, MAIS-1, 2016
Justinas Mickus, Princeton University, Undergraduate Student, PORDIR Fellow
Michelle Nedashkovskaya, Princeton University ’16, Woodrow Wilson School MPA *20, SINSI Scholar
Lukas Ulrich Ortner, Diplomatic Academy Vienna, MAIS-1, 2016
Amma Prempeh, Princeton University, Undergraduate Student, PORDIR Fellow
Frederik Vincent, Diplomatic Academy Vienna, MAIS-1, 2016
Aleksandar Vladicic, Princeton University, Undergraduate Student, PORDIR Fellow
Eric Wang, Princeton University, Undergraduate Student, PORDIR Fellow
Francesco Diegoli, Diplomatic Academy Vienna, MAIS-1, 2016
Murtaza Khomusi, Undergraduate Class of 2017, Swarthmore College
China in Europe: 

Chinese Interests from Lisbon to Vladivostok 

Triesenberg, Principality of Liechtenstein

17-20 August 2017

Background
The past two decades have witnessed China’s unprecedented rise as a global economic and political power. In particular, this has been reflected by not only China’s impressive internal growth, but also in the way the PRC has turned outwards. This new outlook has manifested itself in a high volume of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment around the globe.

Europe has growingly been the recipient of great Chinese attention. In 2016 alone, Chinese corporations invested over €35bn in just the European Union, dwarfing EU investment flowing the other way. With plans for continued acquisition and investments clearly in place through plans like the Belt and Road Initiative, it is time to not only reassess Europe’s relationship with China, but also its greater role within the international system.

This private Liechtenstein Colloquium will seek to openly address contemporary issues concerning China and its relationship with Europe and neighboring states - specifically - Chinese strategic political and economic interests in the European Union; Chinese direct investments and key acquisitions in Europe; the Belt and Road Initiative; triangular relations between the US, EU and China; relations between the EU, China and Russia; and special interests and organizations like the SCO, EurAsia Community, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

Objective
The objective of this Liechtenstein Colloquium is to foster substantive, non-polemic, and open conversations in a private setting. The Colloquium will be the first of a planned series on China and wider Europe that will bring together decision makers, representatives, academics, and experts, from China, Europe, Eurasia, and the United States.

Procedures
The conference language is English. As is tradition, this Liechtenstein Colloquium is private, off-the-record, and by-invitation-only. All participants are invited and encouraged to speak frequently for a maximum of 7 minutes in each case – albeit repeatedly. Participants are encouraged to inform organizers about materials they would want to bring and/or distribute to other conference participants. Please contact Ms. Rana Ibrahim (lisd-lcm@princeton.edu) at the Liechtenstein Institute at Princeton University for further information and registration.
Program

Thursday, 17 August 2017
Hotel Kulm, Triesenberg, Principality of Liechtenstein

04:30 pm  Arrival and Registration
            Participant Arrival/Security Check

06:00 pm  Welcome Reception and Dinner
            Hotel Kulm, Schlossstrasse 3, Triesenberg

Friday, 18 August 2017
Bären Saal, Hotel Kulm, Triesenberg

09:30 am  Opening Keynote Addresses
            Prof Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Founding Director Liechtenstein
            Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University; Chair, Liechtenstein Colloquium.

            Prof Thomas Christensen, Chair, “China and the World Program”
            Princeton University; former. Dept. Assistant Secretary of State, Chinese Affairs

            Dr. Hongjian Cui, Research Scholar at the China Institute for International Studies

11:00 am  Coffee Break

11:15 am  Session I: Chinese Relations with Europe: A Historic Perspective

            This session will share a historic perspective and overview of China’s relationship with the West and vice versa. More specifically, the discussion will include Chinese economic, strategic, political and interests in European Union and beyond.

            Introductory Questions:
            ● How have Sino-European relations been shaped by the history of European colonialism and gunboat tea, and opium diplomacy in Asia?
            ● Does Europe need to acknowledge a deeper moral responsibility in this history for China and Europe to work more closely together?
            ● How does the history of colonization, empire and communism shape European conceptions of China?

12:30 pm  Working Luncheon - Keynote Address
            Hotel Kulm, Triesenberg

            Ambassador Hans-Dietmar Schweisgut, Ambassador of the European Union to the People’s Republic of China and Mongolia
03:00 pm  **Session II: “One Belt, one Road Project”**

Together the Silk Road Economic Belt & Maritime Silk Road Belt form the Belt and Road Initiative. This infrastructure expansion project was unveiled by PRC President Xi Jinping in 2013 to foster greater economic connectivity and cooperation with the Eurasian area.

**Introductory Questions:**

- What are concerns for involvement in the Belt and Road Initiative for stakeholders?
- While the Belt and Road Initiative has fostered many joint-governmental infrastructure projects across Eurasia, EU Europe has seen less such investment overall and joint projects between the Chinese government and European governments. How can Western European nations be better integrated into the Belt and Road Initiative?
- Where is there greater room for European investment in the Belt and Road Initiative? Should Europeans be seeking deeper involvement in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank?

Session will conclude at 5:00 pm

06:00 pm  **Official Conference Reception offered by HSH Prince Alois, The Hereditary Prince of Liechtenstein**

Schloss Vaduz

08:00 pm  **Conference Dinner**

Restaurant Torkel, Prince of Liechtenstein Vineyards, Vaduz

Saturday, 19 August 2017
Bären Saal, Hotel Kulm, Triesenberg

09:30 am  **Session III: China’s Presence in Europe**

This discussion will address Chinese direct investments and resource acquisition in Europe, and probe how these investments will structure China’s future interests in the EU and beyond.

**Carol Wang,** Tax Associate at Kirkland & Ellis LLP; Princeton University and Harvard Law School
**Dr. Andreas Insam,** CEO, Bendura Bank AG
**Mr. James Kynge,** Emerging Markets Editor, The Financial Times

**Introductory Questions:**

- A developing issue for a lot of European governments, particularly Theresa May’s government in the UK, is that they are growingly unable to ensure that important infrastructure remains secure even in the hands of foreign investors. How can European nations and China work more closely to guarantee the security of these assets?
• Is technology the resource that China is seeking to gain from Europe?
• What are Chinese cultural interests in Europe?
• Is there an asymmetrical cultural interest between Europe and China?

12:30 pm  Working Luncheon - Keynote Address
Hotel Kulm, Triesenberg

The Honorable Minister Dr. Aurelia Frick, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Culture and Education of the Principality of Liechtenstein

03:00 pm  Session IV: The Way Forward
What could be manageable, agreeable, feasible, effective, sustainable initiatives and instruments to alleviate and anticipate possible negative developments and create a positive, cooperative, and mutually beneficial joint future for all involved?

Walk into the Liechtenstein Mountains
*Participants will take a walk into the scenic mountainside of the picturesque Liechtenstein Mountain
Comfortable shoes and loose clothing are recommended.

06:00 pm  Working Conference Dinner
Hotel, Falconry Gallina, 9497 Malbun

Sunday, 20 August 2017
Masescha, Principality of Liechtenstein

09:30 am  Concluding Session:
This session will explore any concluding thoughts and agenda for future interaction and research.

11:00 am  Concluding Brunch
Berggasthaus Masescha, Maseschastrasse 48, Triesenberg

01:00 pm  Departure

List of Participants

Prince Hans Adam II, The Reigning Prince of Liechtenstein, Schloss Vaduz
Prince Alois, The Hereditary Prince of Liechtenstein, Schloss Vaduz
Mr. Ahmad Al-Hamad, former Kuwait Chinese Investment Corp and Asiya Investments, London
Mr. Jose Manuel Dorao Barroso, Goldman Sachs International; former President of the European Commission; co-chair of LISD “Europe and the World Program”, Princeton University
Mr. Christian Bahoo, Former Foreign Affairs Advisor for the Deputy Federal Chancellor and Minister of Trade, Science and Education of the Republic of Austria; LISD non-resident Fellow
Mrs. Rita Kieber-Beck, Head of Kieber-Beck Treuhand Liechtenstein; former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Culture and Deputy Prime Minister of the Principality of Liechtenstein

Prof. Thomas Christensen, Chair, “China and the World Program” Princeton University; former Dept. Assistant Secretary of State, Chinese Affairs

Mr. Christopher Nixon Cox, Co-founder, OC Global Partners, LLC, New York

Dr. Hongjian Cui, Research Scholar at the China Institute for International Studies

Prof. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Founding Director Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University; co-chair of “Europe and the World Program”, Chair, Liechtenstein Colloquium.

Minister Dr. Aurelia Frick, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Culture and Education of the Principality of Liechtenstein

Amb. Dr. Martin Frick, Permanent Undersecretary of State of the Principality of Liechtenstein

Amb. Yanping Gao, Consul General of China in Zurich, Switzerland and for the Principality of Liechtenstein

Amb. Isabel Frommelt-Gottschald, Ambassador of the Principality of Liechtenstein to Germany

Prof. James Gow, King’s College London, Department of War Studies

Mr. Knut Hammarskjöld, President, Ellipsis Human Identity Technologies, S.C.; LISD Non-Resident Fellow

Mr. Alexander Heckscher, Esq., Hong Kong.

Amb. Wolf Dietrich Heim, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson in Office for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process

Dr. Andreas Insam, CEO of Bendura Bank AG

Dr. Peter Krenn, Director of Institutional Clients and Deputy Head of Eastern Europe, Bendura Bank AG

Mr. James Kynge, Emerging Markets Editor, The Financial Times

Mr. Qiang Li, Consular Attaché of the the Consulate General of the People's Republic of China in Zurich and the Principality of Liechtenstein

Mrs. Lachlyn Soper-Lembke, Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Department of State

Prof. Sophie Meunier, Co-director, European Union Program, Lecturer in Politics, Princeton University

Amb. Mohammad Naeem Poyesh, Chargé d’Affaires, Embassy and Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the OSCE

Amb. Ahmad Kamel Safi, Second Secretary, Embassy and Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the OSCE

Mr. Dennis Sammut, Executive Director LINKS (Dialogue–Analysis–Research)

Ms. Hermine Schreiberhuber, Journalist and author, Vienna

Mr. Michael Schoenleber, Baron Associates LLC

Mr. Thomas Seifert, Wiener Zeitung GmbH
Amb. Hans-Dietmar Schweisgut, Ambassador of the European Union to the People’s Republic of China and Mongolia

Amb. Christian Wenaweser, Permanent Representative, Mission of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the United Nations

Ms. Carol Wang, Tax Associate, Kirkland & Ellis LLP; Princeton University; Harvard Law School

Mr. Fengye Zhang, Consular Attaché of the Consulate General of the People's Republic of China in Zurich and the Principality of Liechtenstein

LISD LCM Team

Ms. Trisha Barney, Institute Manager, Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University

Kiara Rodriguez Gallego, LISD Student Associate, Undergraduate Student, Princeton University, ‘19

Jacqueline Gufford, Special Assistant to the Director of LISD, Research Specialist, Princeton University ‘17

Rana Ibrahem, Special Assistant to the Director of LISD, Research Specialist, Princeton University ‘15

Winslow Radcliffe-Trenner, LISD Student Associate, Undergraduate Student, Georgetown University ‘19

Emery T. Real Bird, Princeton University ‘17, Schwarzman Scholar ‘18

Eric Wang, Undergraduate Student, Princeton University ‘18
Crises Cataloging, Evaluation, and Prioritization

Triesenberg, Principality of Liechtenstein
22-24 August, 2017

Background
Today’s OSCE realm, comprising 57 states and the neighborhood, is plagued by challenges to traditional conceptions of security, stability, and crises that call conceived notions of alliance and cooperation into question. Emerging and frozen crises can range in thematic scope from financial, to political, military, economic, leadership, refugee or migration based. In addition, “perception does form reality,” meaning that even if there is no objective ‘crisis,’ a situation can be construed as one, opening situations to potential manipulation.

Furthermore, while many leaders may prefer to refer to irregularities or disturbances as “crises” in order to attract attention and/or support, citizens have become increasingly skeptical of crisis management capabilities and institutions on the governmental and international level; they are also skeptical of news on crises, of leadership, of sovereignty and borders, and of how far governments are willing to go to secure borders. There exists widespread crisis overload and fatigue, numbness to suffering, and doubts proliferate about what form effective crisis management might take.

Therefore, only effective, innovative and credible methods can adequately catalogue, evaluate, and prioritize today’s crises. This private Liechtenstein Colloquium (LCM) will commence with a questionnaire sent to all participants to offer their take on crisis characterization, location, causality, and intensity in the OSCE region, stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok.

Objective
The objective of this Liechtenstein Colloquium is to define a “crisis” (with awareness of potential regional cultural differences). The meeting will also seek to catalogue and evaluate crises as they are currently affecting the OSCE area and its neighborhood. Crises will be grouped by their geographical region and conceptual framework, followed by evaluation and prioritization considering their intensity, scope, costs (human, material, political), leadership, and timeline (6, 12, or 18 month trajectories). The private colloquium is, as any LCM, off-the-record and by-initation-only, and will bring together researchers, academics, experts, policy makers and change agents to focus on building hope, positivity and active engagement, to foster greater and newer substantive analysis. Participants are invited to prepare their special insights and suggestions.

Procedure
This is an LCM, seminar conducted in English. As is LCM tradition, all participants are always invited and encouraged to speak - however please speak for a maximum of 7 minutes duration. Exceptions will be extended to specifically assigned introductory statements. Participants are encouraged to kindly inform organizers about materials they would want to bring and/or distribute to conference participants. Please contact Ms. Rana Ibrahem (lisd-lcm@princeton.edu) at the Liechtenstein Institute at Princeton University for further information.
Program

Tuesday, 22 August, 2017
Masescha, Triesenberg, Principality of Liechtenstein

12:30  Welcoming Luncheon
       Hotel Kulm, Schlosstrasse 3, Triesenberg

       Arrival and Registration
       Participant Arrival/Security Check (Photo ID required)

15:00  Welcoming Session I: What constitutes a Crisis?
       Masescha, Maseschastrasse 48, Triesenberg

Welcoming and Introductory remarks:
Prof. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Founding Director Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University; co-chair of “Europe and the World Program”, Chair, Liechtenstein Colloquium.

Amb. Christian Strohal, Special Representative for the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship

Amb. Michael Reiterer, Ambassador of the European Union to the Republic of Korea

LISD LCM Team

18:30  Reception & Working Dinner
       Berggasthaus Masescha, Maseschastrasse 48, Triesenberg

Wednesday, 23 August, 2017
Baeren Saal, Hotel Kulm, Triesenberg

09:30  Session II: Cataloging 1

11:00  Coffee Break

11:15  Session III: Cataloging 2

12:30  Luncheon
       Hotel Kulm, Triesenberg

14:00  Session IV: Evaluation & Prioritization

15:45  Coffee Break
16:00  Session IV continued.

18:00  Reception & Conference Dinner
       Gasthof Schäfe, Landstrasse 266, Triesenberg

Thursday, 24 August, 2017
Baeren Saal, Hotel Kulm, Triesenberg

09:30  Final Session: Summarizing
       Baeren Saal, Hotel Kulm

During the concluding session, participants will deliver concluding thoughts and set an agenda for future interaction and research.

11:00  Concluding Brunch

List of Participants

The Reigning Prince of Liechtenstein Prince Hans Adam II, Schloss Vaduz
The Hereditary Prince of Liechtenstein Prince Alois, Schloss Vaduz
Dr. Rojda Alac, Political Advisor to HDP, Strasbourg
Ms. Wardah Bari, Legal Associate at Stris & Maher LLP
Dr. Barbara Buckinx, Research Scholar, Princeton University
Prof. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Founding Director Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University; co-chair of “Europe and the World Program”, Chair, Liechtenstein Colloquium.
Prof. Ali Ansari, University of St. Andrews, Chair of Middle East Studies, Director of the Institute for Iranian Studies
Capt. Dr. Lawson Brigham, Professor, University of Alaska Fairbanks; Senior Fellow at the Institute of the North in Anchorage
Prof. Miguel Centeno, Chair, Department of Sociology, Musgrave Professor of Sociology and Professor of Sociology and International Affairs at Princeton University
Dr. Stephen Del Rosso, Program Director, Carnegie Corporation’s International Peace & Security Program
Amb. Dr. Martin Frick, Permanent Undersecretary of State of the Principality of Liechtenstein
Mr. Georg Gassauer, Founder “Train of Hope”
Prof. James Gow, King’s College London, Department of War Studies
Mr. Knut Hammarskjöld, President, Ellipsis Human Identity Technologies; LISD Non-Resident Fellow
Mr. Andrew Hanna, Reporter at Politico, Princeton University ‘16
Maj. Dr. Jan Hanska, Research Planning Unit, Finnish Defense Research Agency (FDRA)
Dr. Walter Kemp, Senior Advisor to the Austrian Chairmanship in Office of the OSCE
Col. Dr. Hans Lampalzer, Head of the OSCE High Level Planning Group
Mr. Erich Leitenberger, Pro Oriente Wien
Maj. Andrew Lembke, Special Assistant to the Director of Operations, United States European Command
Mr. Patrick Lobis, Policy Officer, Foreign and Economic Affairs, European Commission Representation in Germany
Mr. Christopher MacPherson, Frog Design; frmr. Foreign Affairs Officer at US Department of Defense
BGen. Timothy McAteer, Deputy Director, Plans and Programs, U.S. Africa Command, Germany.
Ms. Barbara Monheim, Founder and Chairwoman of the German-Polish-Ukrainian Society (GPUS)
Fr. Bryan Page, frmr. Dean, Aquinas Institute, Princeton University
Amb. Pasi Patokallio, Head of the Embassy of Finland in Canberra, Australia
Dr. Nicola Pedde, Director of the Institute of Global Studies (IGS) in Rome
Prof. Oskar Peterlini, Professor of Economics and Management, Free University of Bozen Bolzano; Representative of the German-speaking South Tyrolean Minority in South Tyrol
Dr. Walter Posch, Institute for Peacekeeping and Conflict Management (BLMVS) of the State Defense Academy in Vienna
Prof. Michael Reynolds, Associate Professor of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University
Amb. Michael Reiterer, Ambassador of the European Union to the Republic of Korea
Amb. Andreas Riecken, Director for International Organizations at the Austrian Foreign Ministry
Dr. Markus Schiller, CEO of St. Analytics
Mr. Michael Schoenleber, Vice President for Special Initiatives, Baron Public Affairs, Washington, DC
Amb. Dr. Hans Ulrich Seidt, frmr. Ambassador of Germany to the Republic of Korea
Ms. Lachlyn Soper-Lembke, Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Department of State
Amb. Christian Strohal, Special Representative for the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship

LCM Team
Ms. Kiara Rodriguez Gallego, LISD Student Associate, Undergraduate Student, Princeton University, ’19
Ms. Jacqueline Gufford, Special Assistant to the Director of LISD, Research Specialist, Princeton University ’17
Ms. Rana Ibrahem, Special Assistant to the Director of LISD, Research Specialist, Princeton University ’15
Ms. Johanna Koja, University of Innsbruck, ’19
Ms. Angella Matheney, Faculty Assistant to the Director of LISD
Ms. Katie Panskyy, Princeton University ’17, LISD Student Associate
Mr. Winslow Radcliffe-Trenner, Georgetown University ’19, LISD Research Intern
Mr. Jakob Rossbacher, Management Center Innsbruck, ’19
Mr. Emery T. Real Bird, Princeton University ’17, Schwarzman Scholar ’18
Multilateral Responses to Emerging Threats

Sunday & Monday, 26-27 November 2017
Stadtpalais Liechtenstein & Hotel Bristol, Wien, Austria

Objective

At the end of 2017, the political security situation in the OSCE region – comprised of 57 states, plus the neighborhood - is plagued by multiple short term and long term challenges which are often met with a perception of uncertainty, mistrust, and fatigue. In our times, the ‘new normal’ seemingly comprises the hitherto considered “un-normal”. In terms of security, relevant developments from the Atlantic, to the Mediterranean, to the Urals, would even suggest that some address this as “the unthinkable”. Concerns range from leadership relations Moscow-Washington, to considerations of weapons of mass destruction, to developments in Ankara and Riyadh, an intensification of crises in the Middle East, to populism and re-emerging strives of self-determination. All this is combined with serious crises competition and fatigue, increasing dissatisfaction with the existing order and a search of the new order and appropriate leadership.

What does this mean for the mission and implementation of the world’s largest regional security organization like the OSCE? How can one consider appropriate steps for stabilization and possible anticipatory responses on national, international, and multilateral levels? In times, when local issues and threats can become regional and national, even international, nearly instantaneously, when crises encompass such different themes as refugees, migration, cyber concerns, economic & energy challenges, great power politics, natural disasters, climate change, to name only a few, it is important to have anticipatory and in-crisis response available. Fatigue, mistrust, change of order perception and uncertainty add; hence one must address these concerns as well. This LCM will ideally hear the concerns of all participants, and their suggestions how to address them, and attempt to launch a meaningful process to effectively address the changing order and develop innovative sustainable crisis response systems.

Procedures

As is tradition with the Liechtenstein Colloquium, this event is private, off-the-record, and by-invitation-only. The LCM is divided into 4 segments: I) on threats, II) on responses, III) on conceptual evaluations, IV) input into solutions and next steps from all.

The colloquium will be conducted like a Princeton seminar, meaning all participants are invited and encouraged to participate actively and speak repeatedly. Remarks should not exceed max. 7 minutes in duration per intervention – albeit repeatedly. Participants are encouraged to kindly inform organizers about materials they would want to bring and/or distribute to conference participants. For further information, please contact Ms. Rana Ibrahem (lisd-lcm@princeton.edu).
Program

Sunday, 26 November 2017
Stadtpalais Liechtenstein, Wien, Austria

11:00 Optional: High Mass with Orchestra
Location: St. Augustiner Kirche, Josefsplatz, 1010 Wien

12:00 Arrival and Registration
Location: Stadtpalais Liechtenstein, Bankgasse, Wien
Security Check (Photo ID required)

12:30 Welcome Luncheon

14:00 I. First Segment:
General Threats Discussion

Prof. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber *
Amb. Christian Strohal, Special Representative for the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship 2017

Perspectives from: EU, Germany, France, Russia, UK, USA, ...

16:00 II. Second Segment
Responding to Global Threats: Possible Instruments and Strategy

18:00 Conference Dinner (for invited participants)
hosted by HSH The Reigning Prince of Liechtenstein
Location: Stadtpalais Liechtenstein Wien

Monday, 27 November 2017
Hotel Bristol, Wien, Austria

09:30 III. Third Segment
Conceptual Causes for Crises & Threats
Highlighting themes of:
Refugees & migration; New / old forms of war and conflict Manipulated news; Cybersecurity; Organized Crime and Corruption; Self-determination; Current Crises in Ukraine, Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia

12:00 Working Luncheon
Emerging Warning Signs & Anticipatory Responses

14:00 IV. Concluding Segment
Suggestions for Next Steps

16:00 LISD High Tea “Conclusion and Projections”
List of Participants

HSH Prince Hans Adam II, The Reining Prince of Liechtenstein, Schloss Vaduz*

Prof. Uriel Abulof, Senior Lecturer at Tel-Aviv University's Department of Political Science and LISD research associate, at Princeton University

Prof. Ali Ansari, University of St. Andrews, Chair of Middle East Studies, Director of the Institute for Iranian Studies & President, British Institute of Persian Studies.

Amb. Sheikh Ali bin Jassim Al-Thani, Ambassador of the State of Qatar to Austria

Mr. Jose Manuel Dorao Barroso, Goldman Sachs International; former President of the European Commission; co-chair of LISD “Europe and the World Program”, Princeton University

Mr. Christian Bahoo, frmr. Foreign Policy Advisor in the Office of the Austrian Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister of Science, Research and Economy; LISD non-resident Fellow

Amb. Dr. Emil Brix, Director, Diplomatic Academy Wien

Cpt. Tomas Čeponis, Lithuanian Armed Forces, Strategic Communications Department, Hostile Information Operations

Mr. Christopher Nixon Cox, Co-founder, OC Global Partners, LLC, New York

Prof. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, Founding Director Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University; co-chair of “Europe and the World Program” & Chair, Liechtenstein Colloquium.

Prof. Annegret Dettwiler-Danspeckgruber, Research Specialist, Princeton Neuroscience Institute, Dettwiler Concussion Laboratory


Mr. Ricardo Estarriol, Journalist, Barcelona-based “La Vanguardia”, Wien

Mr. Georg Gassauer, Founder “Train of Hope”

Prof. James Gow, Director, Security Studies, King’s College London, Department of War Studies

Camilla Habsburg-Lothringen, Wien

Knut Hammarskjöld, President, Ellipsis Human Identity Technologies, S.C.;

Dr. Andreas Insam, CEO of Bendura Bank AG, Triesen, Liechtenstein

Amb. Valentin Inzko, High Representative and EU Special Representative (HR/EUSR) for Bosnia and Herzegovina


Dr. Elena Klein, Deputy Head of Mission, Liechtenstein Embassy in Austria and the Czech Republic

Ivan Krastev, Chairman of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia

Prof. Tomasz T. Konciewicz, Visiting Fellow, LAPA, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University; Director of the Department of European and Comparative Law, University of Gdańsk, Poland

Prof Erich Leitenberger, Pro Oriente Wien

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Amb. Princess Maria-Pia Liechtenstein-Kothbauer, Permanent Representative of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the OSCE, Wien

Amb. Prince Stefan von und zu Liechtenstein, Ambassador of Liechtenstein to the Holy See, Wien, Rome

Stephanie Liechtenstein, Web Editor-in-Chief, Security and Human Rights Monitor, Wien

Peter Löscher, Chair, OeMV, Wien, former CEO Siemens, Munich.

Amb. Frederik Löjdquist, frmr. Permanent Representative of Sweden to the OSCE

Mr. Peter Löscher, Chair, OeMV, former CEO Siemens, Munich.

Mr. Christopher MacPherson, Frog Design; frmr. Foreign Affairs Officer at US Department of Defense

Prof. William Maley, The Australian National University, frmr. Dean, Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, Canberra, Australia

Amb. Alexander Marshik, Director General for Political Affairs, Austrian Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Amb. Thomas Mayr-Harting, Managing Director for Europe and Central Asia in the European External Action Service, Brussels

Don Cristobal Mendez de Vigo, Member of the Board of Directors, C QUADRAT Investment AG, Madrid

Mr. Javier Hurtado Mira, Chairman of the Democrat Youth Community of Europe (DEMYC)

Mrs. Barbara Maria Monheim, Founder & Chair, of the German-Polish-Ukrainian Society, Berlin (GPUS)

Mr. Ghazi Moalla, Consultant with Tunisian Presidency Of Republic in charge of Libyan Affairs

Prof. Dr. Werner Moerth, Senior Vice President, Legal Affairs, Raiffeissen Bank, Wien

José Manuel Grau Navarro, Assistant to the CEO of UNIR (Universidad Internacional de La Rioja), Director of UNIR Revista, and Professor of Print Journalism and International Politics at UNIR

Mlle. Tatiana Ojjeh, Saudi Arabian Spokeswoman of on-site experience of Syrian refugee crisis and involvement of Artfinder.com investment outside the kingdom

Father Bryan Page, frmr. Dean, Aquinas Institute, Princeton University, New York

Dr. Nicola Pedde, Director of the Institute of Global Studies (IGS) in Rome

Dr. Walter Posch, Institute for Peacekeeping and Conflict Management (BLMVS), State Defense Academy, Wien

Amb. Mohammad Naeem Poyesh, Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the OSCE

Amb. Michael Reiterer, Ambassador of the European Union to the Republic of Korea, Seoul

Prince Saud al-Saud, London, Riyadh

Amb. Martin Sajdik, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine, Kiev

Prof. Kavé Salamatian, Computer Science at Université de Savoie, Cybersecurity Consultant

Eckart Schieweck, United Security Council Committee, New York.

Amb. Dr. Hans Ulrich Seidt, frmr Inspector General, German Foreign Office, Berlin, LISD non-resident Fellow

Mr. Simon Schwenoha, National Defense Academy Wien

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Dr. Andrey Sushentsov, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO)
Mr. Benedict Pottering, Vice President, Junge Union Germany (YEPP)
Cpt. Tomas Tauginas, Lithuanian Armed Forces, Strategic Communications Department, Head of Analysis Subsection
Ms. Julianne Whittaker, Humanitarian Professional, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

OSCE TEAM
Amb. Clemens Koja, Chairperson of the Permanent Council, Head of the Permanent Mission of Austria to the OSCE in Wien
Amb. Florian Raunig, Head of the OSCE Task Force for the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship 2017
Amb. Christian Strohal, Special Representative for the Austrian OSCE Chairmanship 2017
Dr. Walter Kemp, Senior Advisor to the Austrian Chairmanship in Office of the OSCE
Harlem Désir, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media
Alexandra Vasileva, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Wien

LISD LCM TEAM
Dr. Barbara Buckinx, Research Scholar, LISD, Princeton University
Katherine Elgin, PhD Candidate, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University
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Dr. Jordi Graupera, LISD Post-Doctoral Fellow, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs
Jacqueline Gufford, Special Assistant to the Director of LISD, Research Specialist, Princeton University ’17
Rana Ibrahim, Special Assistant to the Director of LISD, Research Specialist, Princeton University ’15
Rebecca Keener, London School of Economics, Princeton University, ‘17
Winslow Radcliffe-Trenner, Undergraduate Student, Georgetown University ‘19
Generational Perspectives on National and International Security

Friday, March 3, 2017
09:30 - 13:20

Bowl 016, Robertson Hall, Woodrow Wilson School
Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey

Objective

To continue and expand the LISD Project on generational perspectives on security and work towards a new inclusive "definition of security" which fosters connectivity and mutual trust between and across generations regarding domestic and foreign challenges to security. The results of this Colloquium will also flow into the efforts of the 2017 Austrian chairpersonship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE, the world’s largest regional security organization, to expand and redefine security and dialogue.

Background

The Western millennial generation – more than two generations since the end of World War II – has matured during an age without major war in their immediate consciousness as well as during an information age characterized by unsurpassed interconnectivity and an unprecedented intervention of technology in daily life. The intersection of traditional hard security challenges and the proliferation of cyber-warfare, including the advent of industry 4.0 presents an important moment to hear the voices and concern of this generation. The overwhelming influence of social media, migration, active non-state actors, assertive geopolitics, and change in political discourse and challenges to democratization makes this even more prescient and challenging.

Method

Graduate and undergraduate researchers of Princeton University and graduate students from Universities within the (OSCE) will discuss their respective interpretations on security dimensions including concerns regarding mis-information, cybersecurity, climate change, identity security, radicalization, terrorism, and nuclear proliferation.
Program

Friday, March 3, 2017
Robertson Hall Bowl 16, Woodrow Wilson School

09:30 Introductory Session
Wolfgang Danspeckgruber

H.S.H. Prince Alois, The Hereditary Prince of Liechtenstein

Amb. Christian Strohal
Special Representative for the Austrian Chairperson-in-office of the OSCE

10:00 II. Session: Generational Perspectives Project – an Overview / Princeton

Nathan Eckstein, ’15, MPA ’20, Woodrow Wilson School
Jacqueline Gufford ‘17, LISD Student Associate
Rana Ibrahim ’15, LISD Special Assistant to the Director
Justinas Mickus ’18, LISD Student Associate
Michelle Nedashkovskaya, ’15, MPA ’20, LISD Student Associate
Christine Ostlunch, MPA ’20, Woodrow Wilson School
Jessica Sarriot, MPA ’20, Woodrow Wilson School

European Perspectives

Kristina Amerhauser, Student, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna
Iris Karabaczeck, Student, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna
Lena Pieber, Student, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna
Lukas Ortner, Student, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna
Frederick Vincent, Student, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna

Elena Braendle, Intern, Liechtenstein Embassy, Berlin
Nadja Zuercher, M.A. of Economics ’15, University of Zurich
Jakob Schultz, Student, Humboldt University Berlin

Alena Baur, Advisor, Economics and Environment,
Austrian OSCE Chairpersonship 2017
Tobias Burghardt, Advisor, Task Force Coordination Unit,
Austrian OSCE Chairpersonship 2017

11:30 III. Session: Institutional Channels and Proposals for Security

13:00 Conclusions
Participant List

H.S.H. Prince Alois, The Hereditary Prince of Liechtenstein
Amb. Christian Strohal, Austrian OSCE Chairpersonship 2017
Ambassador Kurt Jaeger, Amb. Liechtenstein to the United States of America
Ambassador Harald Braun, Permanent Representative to the United Nation
Prof. Uriel Abulof, Tel Aviv University
Prof. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, LISD Director
Jacqueline Gufford ‘17, LISD Student Associate
Rana Ibrahem ‘15, LISD Special Assistant to the Director
Michelle Nedashkovskaya, ‘15, MPA ’20, LISD Student Associate
Justinas Mickus ‘18, LISD Student Associate
Vira Tarnavska, ’17 LISD Student Associate
Jessica Sarriot, MPA ’20, Woodrow Wilson School
Nathan Eckstein, ’15, MPA ’20, Woodrow Wilson School
Christine Ostlund, MPA ’20, Woodrow Wilson School
Marie-Immaculata Liechtenstein, Advisor, Permanent Mission of Liechtenstein to UN
Kristina Amerhauser, Student, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna
Iris Karabaczek, Student, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna
Lena Pieber, Student, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna
Lukas Ortner, Student, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna
Frederick Vincent, Student, Diplomatic Academy of Vienna
Elena Braendle, Intern, Liechtenstein Embassy, Berlin
Nadja Zuercher, M.A. of Economics ’15, University of Zurich
Jakob Schultz, Student, Humboldt University Berlin
Alena Baur, Advisor, Economics and Environment, Austrian OSCE Chairpersonship 2017
Tobias Burghardt, Advisor, Task Force Coordination Unit, Austrian OSCE Chairpersonship 2017
Knut Hammarskjöld, President, Ellipsis Human Identity Technologies, S.C.;
Fr. Bryan Page, frmr. Dean, Aquinas Institute, Princeton University
Blaykyi Kenyah, LISD Associate, Undergraduate Student, Princeton University ’19
Amma Prempeh, Princeton University, Undergraduate Student, PORDIR Fellow
Kiara Rodriguez Gallego, LISD Associate, Undergraduate Student, Princeton University ’19
Maya Aronoff, Princeton University, Undergraduate Student, PORDIR Fellow
Cdr. Doyle Hodges (Unite States Navy, Ret.), PhD Candidate, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, LISD Doctoral Student Fellow, Princeton University

Vira Tarnavska, Undergraduate Student, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University ’17

Benjamin Sacks, LISD DIRMAIS Fellow, PhD Candidate, Princeton University

Julianne Whittaker, Graduate Student, Master Public Affairs ’17, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

Richard Trenner, LISD Team, Princeton University
The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University (LISD) supports teaching, research, and publication about issues related to and emerging from self-determination, especially pertaining to the state, self-governance, sovereignty, security, and diplomacy with particular consideration of socio-cultural, ethnic, and religious issues involving state and non-state actors. The Institute was founded in 2000 through the generosity of H.S.H. Prince Hans Adam II of Liechtenstein, and is directed by Wolfgang Danspeckgruber.

The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination seeks to enhance global peace and stability by bringing together academic experts, practitioners, representatives of the public and private sectors, and decision makers to explore key events and crises from strategic, political, legal, economic, cultural, and religious perspectives in order to find innovative and sustainable solutions to pressing issues. In addition to conferences convened as part of specific LISD projects, the Institute regularly sponsors public lectures and special meetings that bring a diverse group of experts and policy makers from around the world to Princeton University to share their work with students and members of the wider University and local communities.

Princeton University students—undergraduate, graduate, and PhD candidates—are involved with all aspects of Institute projects through their participation as LISD Student Associates. Student Associates assist with a range of activities from research to planning workshops and colloquia and serving as conference rapporteurs. Student involvement in Institute projects, as well as courses taught at Princeton University by LISD faculty, are central to the Institute’s commitment to prepare the students of today to be the leaders of tomorrow.